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CHAPTER I
Introduction
On January 19, 2011, House Republicans brought H.R. 2 - Repealing the Job-Killing
Health Care Law Act to a vote. Even though Republicans knew repealing the new Af-
fordable Care Act had no chance of enactment, they decided that this should be one of
the first bills to consider in the 112th Congress. The legislation passed on a party line
vote and was sent to the Democratic controlled Senate, where it was certain to die.
Over the next two years, House Republicans passed dozens of dead-on-arrival (DOA)
bills1 on topics ranging from offshore oil drilling, federal regulations, abortion, and pay-
ments to the United Nations. The House majority’s continual focus on legislation intended
to fail generated a narrative that Republicans lawmakers could not govern. Many argued
this “Do Nothing” (Egan 2012) majority party deserved most of the blame for the extrem-
ist, uncompromising legislation that populated Congress’s agenda (Mann and Ornstein
2012).
At the same time, Senate Democrats pursued a nearly identical legislative strategy.
During the 112th Congress, they proposed dead-on-arrivals bills to reform campaign fi-
nance rules, raise taxes on the wealthy, restrict oil drilling, strengthen gender pay dis-
crimination laws, among many others. In every case, these bills were advanced with the
knowledge that House Republicans would not agree to them.
1I use the terms dead-on-arrival bill and intended failure interchangeably throughout the dissertation.
I refer to a discrete bill in Congress synonymously as a bill, legislation, or proposal.
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Congress’s focus on dead-on-arrival bills left political commentators grasping to explain
this legislative behavior. The general consensus presented a dour view. These bills were
“frenetic gestures and dramatic poses that quickly fade away to nothing” used “only to
stoke the passions of liberal or conservative base voters” (O’Keefe and Farenthold 2013).
However, absent from this discussion about a polarized and dysfunctional Congress was
the reality that dead-on-arrival bills are nothing new. Rather, this type of bill has been
proposed by majority parties in Congress for decades. Landmark legislation2 such as the
Family Leave and Medical Act, the Bush tax cuts, and the Class Action Fairness Act,
were all at one time, dead-on-arrival bills.
The persistent use of this legislative strategy raises numerous questions about intended
legislative failures, such as: what do lawmakers gain from advancing this legislation?
When do legislators focus on DOA proposals? Who pays attention to dead-on-arrival
bills? What are their short term political effects? What happens to these previously
DOA bills once they can be enacted?
While dead-on-arrival legislation itself is puzzling, these bills raise larger questions
about congressional lawmaking. DOA proposals are interesting because majority parties
deliberately advance them in lieu of a compromise bill on the same topic or legislation
that can be enacted on a different issue. Considering how legislators select among various
legislative options, and the opportunity costs associated with this decision, is essential to
studying why dead-on-arrival bills receive consideration.
Consequently, this project is a study of congressional agenda allocation. While I focus
on DOA proposals in this dissertation, I do so to address two questions:
• Why does Congress prioritize certain issues but not others?
• How does issue attention today affect which bills become law in the future?
In this dissertation, dead-on-arrival bills will be the vehicle through which I examine
2As reported by David Mayhew in the extension data to Mayhew (1991).
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these questions. Intended legislative failures are particularly suited for this study for
three reasons. First, these bills defy the conventional wisdom for why certain proposals
gain attention. An important, if not the most important, legislative consideration for
lawmakers is whether a proposed policy can be enacted. If they cannot, it is generally
argued, these proposals are censored from the legislative agenda (Krehbiel 1998; Baron
and Ferejohn 1989). In contrast, dead-on-arrival bills arise even though they are doomed
to fail. By examining both DOA and enactable bills, this dissertation clarifies the full
range of lawmakers’ incentives when constructing their legislative agendas.
Second, studying intended failures explicitly considers how bills compete for legislative
attention. When studying lawmaking, it is nearly impossible to locate lawmakers’ prefer-
ences relative to the status quo and potential alternative policies (see Clinton 2011 and
Richman 2011 for reviews and two exceptions). When a policy is enacted, it is viewed as
the best possible alternative the agenda-setter could enact (e.g., Tsebelis 2002; Krehbiel
1998). However, dead-on-arrival bills do not offer lawmakers any immediate policy utility.
Thus, a crucial agenda setting question is how do DOA bills gain agenda space instead
of compromise legislation on the same topic or enactable legislation on a different topic?
Third, dead-on-arrival bills preclude the most commonly espoused reason for legislative
failure, uncertainty. As a result, this legislation can be studied as a strategy used by
lawmakers rather than a consequence of unsuccessful bargaining.
1.1 Bills as the Unit of Observation
The unit of observation throughout this project is a bill introduced in Congress. From
a theoretical and empirical standpoint, my analysis begins when a policy is introduced by
a member of Congress and becomes a discrete piece of legislation. Studying bills offers
three main advantages compared to examining other potential units of observation (e.g.,
votes, amendments, or policy ideas more generally). First, to advance to the floor for
3
consideration, bills require collective action. With the rare exception of the discharge
petition, in the contemporary Congress, the majority party engages in this collective
action. Therefore, examining bills allows me to study the majority party as the key
strategic actor that allocates agenda space to legislation.
Second, studying bills allows me to avoid interpreting whether procedural tricks used
by the majority party makes a proposal dead-on-arrival. As I will discuss in Chapter 3,
dead-on-arrival bills can fail in numerous ways. They can be blocked by an intra-chamber
final passage vote, an intra-chamber cloture vote, being sent to the subsequent chamber
for consideration, being vetoed by the president, among others.3 By examining bills, it is
straightforward to account for all of the ways a majority party can have a bill intentionally
die. Using other units of observations, such as votes, would make such an analysis much
more difficult.
Finally, legislation is somewhat easily tracked within and between congresses. In a
given term, the Library of Congress reports when bills are added to new legislation or are
identical to other proposals.4 Bills also follow certain patterns that make them relatively
easy to track between congresses. Legislators commonly retain the same short titles when
re-introducing a bill, the Library of Congress’s legislative summaries are similar, and tools
exist to compare bill texts. Compared to tracking a single policy idea, the bill provides a
standard unit that is much easier to classify as dead-on-arrival.
Throughout my dissertation, I focus on when a majority party chooses to send a bill to
the floor for consideration. It is at this stage of the legislative process that a bill changes
from being championed by a committee or a few members therein to affecting the entire
majority party. The decision to bring the bill to the full chamber for consideration dictates
3This is one reason studying votes is not an ideal way to examine DOA legislation. Many intended
failures in the Senate do not receive final passage votes. In the House, most DOA bills actually pass the
chamber only to die later in the process.
4Wilkerson, Smith and Stramp (2015) note the challenges in using the Library of Congress database.
In Chapter 3, I discuss how I matched bills using major titles and provisions rather than only relying on
when the LOC and Congressional Research Service (CRS) report bills are identical.
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whether the legislation will be used by the majority party for policy and/or political gain.
The two main concepts this project revolves around are dead-on-arrival bills and the
majority’s legislative agenda. Before proceeding any further, I define both concepts.
1.2 Definitions
Dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills or intended failures consist of three defining features.
First, they are bills that have no chance of becoming law. This does not mean dead-
on-arrival legislation can never pass. However, under the governing coalition in which
the legislation is proposed, a veto player is guaranteed to block the bill. Second, an
intended failure will not be enacted even when coupled with other proposals. While this
project examines bills, more broadly, dead-on-arrival policies are the set of proposals that
will fail, regardless of any procedural attempts used to enact them. Third, policymakers
and political observers alike know that the legislation is doomed to fail. In other words,
everyone is certain about a bill’s fate if it advances through the legislative process. If all
three conditions are met, a bill is considered dead-on-arrival.
There is an important distinction between a dead-on-arrival bill and an initial offer
during a negotiation. DOA legislation does not serve as the opening salvo of a bargaining
process. Rather, these bills are proposals that do not lead to concessions and policy
compromises. To adopt Cameron’s (2000) language, dead-on-arrival bills are singletons in
the bargaining process.5 In Chapter 3, I discuss the empirical challenges of distinguishing
intended failures from initial offers in a negotiation. I define the legislative (or floor)
agenda as all bills the majority party sends to the chamber floor to be voted on for
passage.6
5A dead-on-arrival bill can be brought up multiple times by a majority party. For instance, Repub-
licans forwarded more than one bill to repeal the Affordable Care Act and, in 2008, Democrats forced
President Bush to veto two SCHIP extension bills. Repeated DOA bills cannot be classified as attempts
at negotiating. Instead, these bills are even more clearly DOA as the proposing party has made no effort
to strike a bargain with the opposition.
6For stylistic reasons, I use the terms majority party, lawmakers, and legislators interchangeably
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1.3 Preview of Findings
My project shows how dead-on-arrival bills are unique instruments used by legislators
and their allied organized interests. The majority party uses intended failures to election-
eer when it most needs electoral support. In exchange for its DOA bill gaining agenda
space, an interest group provides legislators with political help. In doing so, the group
pushes the majority party to adopt the intended failure as its working policy alternative.
As a result, once the majority wins unified government, the previously dead-on-arrival
legislation is more likely to be enacted.
This theory contrasts with the conventional view of DOA bills. Political scientists have
effectively dismissed this legislation as political theater. In this view, the goal of dead-
on-arrival bills is to appeal to voters through symbolic gestures. My theory and empirical
results revise this argument in three ways. First, I find dead-on-arrival bills are not just
used for political showmanship. The majority party strategically adds intended failures
to its agenda in order to secure a reliable political return. Second, organized interests
are the relevant audience for these bills. Allied interest groups consistently reward the
majority party for advancing DOA legislation.
Third, and most importantly, intended failures are not symbolic. These proposals are
an important mechanism for policy change. In unified government, previously DOA bills
are enacted at much higher rates compared to other legislation. When a majority party
controls government, it prioritizes the legislation interest groups pushed it to consider in
the previous congressional term. This finding has important implications for understand-
ing the role organized interests play in setting Congress’s agenda, and which legislation
will become law in the uniquely productive moments of unified government.
throughout the dissertation. In each case, I am referring to the set of representatives or senators that
identify as members of the majority party in that chamber.
6
1.4 Plan for the Dissertation
In the remainder of the dissertation, I examine how majority parties in Congress de-
termine their legislative agendas. I focus on dead-on-arrival bills as a way to understand
how political considerations affect issue prioritization. The purpose of this project is to
show 1) how lawmakers’ electoral priorities and interest groups’ policy goals affect which
legislation gains consideration; and 2) how considering legislation today dictates a party’s
legislative agenda in the future.
In the next chapter, I develop a theory of how Congress decides to allocate its agenda
space, with a focus on when and why a majority party chooses to add to the floor dead-
on-arrival legislation, and not enactable bills. I begin by reviewing the literature on
lawmaking, agenda setting, and politically motivated legislation. I then specify an open
outcry auction model in which DOA and enactable bills compete to gain floor consider-
ation in the U.S. House of Representatives or Senate. The model examines how interest
groups can strategically increase the political value of legislation it supports in order to
make that bill more attractive to legislators. Using simulations of the auction, I specify a
series of empirical hypotheses concerning the conditions under which dead-on-arrival bills
gain floor consideration and their propensity to become law in unified government.
In Chapter 3, I test the hypotheses generated by the auction model. My data includes
every non-trivial bill introduced in the House or Senate from 2003 through 2012. Con-
sistent with my model’s predictions, I find dead-on-arrival bills are more likely to gain
agenda space when control for government is competitive and veto players’ policy prefer-
ences diverge. Additionally, I show that dead-on-arrival bills are not particularly rare. I
document nearly 300 unique pieces of DOA legislation.7
Chapter 4 empirically addresses my theory’s critical assumptions. I assess if allied
interest groups actually reward majority party lawmakers for advancing DOA bills and if
7This is notable as 6 of the 10 years during this decade had unified government.
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an auction is an appropriate way to model Congress’s legislative agenda. Using interest
group campaign advertisements and a novel dataset of legislative scorecards, I show that
allied groups’ electoral support for majority party candidates is greatly influenced by
intended failures. Moreover, I find that the majority party orders its agenda in a manner
consistent with the assumptions of an auction.
In Chapter 5, I consider the conventional views of dead-on-arrival bills. Using a survey
experiment, I test whether voters are an important audience for intended failures. My
results indicate that voters do not necessarily respond to this legislation in a politically
meaningful way. My inconsistent and, in many cases, null experimental results suggest
that if the public responds to DOA legislation, it does so in a more complex manner than
previous studies have claimed. Taken together, Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that intended
failures are politically valuable principally due to how interest groups react to them.
The concluding remarks situate this project in the broader political science literature. I
examine how these findings improve our understanding of lawmaking, agenda setting, and
interest group influence in the United States Congress. I discuss the practical implications
of this study and focus on what this dissertation contributes to debates about reforming
Congress.
My dissertation’s main contributions are three-fold. First, this study reveals how
electoral politics shape why Congress considers certain issues and not others. When a
majority party has the chance to win unified government, the floor agenda becomes a tool
used to electioneer, not make laws. When control for government is competitive, as it is
in contemporary politics, we should expect to observe significantly more dead-on-arrival
bills reaching the House and Senate floors.
Second, my dissertation highlights that intended failures are not a result of legislative
dysfunction. Instead, they are a mechanism used by interest groups to improve a bill’s
future probability of enactment. DOA proposals are not symbolic bills used to politically
grandstand. They are the foundation of partisan agendas in unified government.
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Finally, I clarify that organized interests are the relevant audience for this legislation.
As a result, the topics that will become DOA are the ones most salient to politically
powerful interest groups allied with the majority party. This finding has implications for
understanding how changes in the interest group environment affects legislative prioriti-
zation.
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CHAPTER II
A Theory of Agenda Allocation
After becoming Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan detailed a new House agenda replete
with dead-on-arrival bills. Ryan’s goal was to “...use this year [2016] as a sort-of dress
rehearsal for a time when the party controls the White House” (Lillis 2016). At the same
time, Speaker Ryan stated which DOA policies would not gain legislative consideration.
House Republicans would not bring a bill to replace the Affordable Care Act (ACA) or
tax reform proposals to the floor (Sherman and Bresnahan 2016). Such an explicit, and
rarely stated, strategy to pursue dead-on-arrival legislation raises a number of questions,
including: how did House Republicans decide which proposals to bring to the floor? Why
did Speaker Ryan choose DOA issues other than an ACA replacement or new tax reform?
Why did Republicans choose to focus on these proposals rather than bills that would lead
to policy changes? What are the long term consequences of focusing on some dead-on-
arrival bills and not others?
Notably, the literature on congressional lawmaking and agenda setting speaks very
little to these questions. Dead-on-arrival bills are an anomaly in conventional theories
of agenda allocation. Most studies emphasize the importance of changing the status quo
in dictating when and why legislators advance a bill (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 2005;
Tsebelis 2002; Krehbiel 1998; Baron and Ferejohn 1989). However, intended failures do
not offer this opportunity. Political scientists have noted that some failed bills are politi-
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cally motivated. This work presupposes voters pay attention to this legislative behavior
(Lee 2011; Groseclose and McCarty 2001), an assumption other scholars have called into
question (Cameron 2012). Additionally, no one has examined why some DOA bills gain
legislative attention instead of enactable legislation or other intended failures.
In this chapter, I propose a theory that examines when and why any bill, includ-
ing dead-on-arrival ones, gains agenda space. Using a game-theoretic auction model, I
examine the conditions under which lawmakers prefer an intended failure compared to
enactable legislation. The model considers how the majority party allocates agenda space
to legislation. As the audience to the legislative process, interest groups reward lawmakers
for sending their preferred legislation, enactable or DOA, to the floor.
The auction framework makes explicit the two trade-offs a majority party must consider
when adding a dead-on-arrival bill to its agenda. First, the model clarifies when an
intended failure is more valuable to legislators than an enactable bill. By definition, a
dead-on-arrival bill does not offer lawmakers any policy utility while other legislation
offers the prospect of changing an undesirable status quo policy. The auction shows
when lawmakers are willing to forego making a policy change to pursue a DOA proposal.
Second, the model explicates which dead-on-arrival bill a majority party will focus on. By
examining how legislation competes for agenda space, this theory shows why lawmakers
prefer certain DOA legislation relative to other intended failures.
The auction predicts that dead-on-arrival proposals are strategically added to the
agenda when they provide the most electoral value to the majority party. Both interest
groups and lawmakers benefit from adding intended failures to the floor. For legislators,
these bills provide the political support necessary to win more power in government. For
interest groups, getting their DOA bills on the agenda improves the legislations’ prospects
for future enactment.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds in three parts. I begin by reviewing the litera-
ture on dead-on-arrival bills. To introduce the logic of the auction model and emphasize
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the importance of electoral politics to my theory, I specify a single period auction model
in which intended failures are never added to the agenda. Next, I present a more complex
two round auction with an election between the rounds. This model clarifies the impor-
tance of electoral politics when majority parties decide whether to add DOA proposals
to the floor agenda. Finally, using simulations of this two round auction, I derive a series
of hypotheses concerning when intended failures are likely to gain agenda space and why
these bills are more likely to eventually become law.
2.1 Background
Scholars and journalists have long noted the existence of dead-on-arrival legislation.
These bills have been analyzed using various terms, such as objectionable bills, veto bait,
political footballs, partisan red meat, among others. Political scientists have been studying
examples of these bills as a type of position-taking for decades with the Family Leave and
Medical Act serving as the canonical example (Groseclose and McCarty 2001).1 While
scholars have begun noticing this legislation more often (Nather 2002), little work has
considered why DOA bills gain agenda space. More generally, in studies of lawmaking
and agenda setting, political scientists have focused on why bills become law and why
proposals unintentionally fail, but have not focused on intentional legislative failure.
The literature on lawmaking focuses on why bills pass, not why they fail (Tsebelis
2002; Cameron 2000; Krehbiel 1998; Binder 2003; Mayhew 1991). For instance, bargain-
ing models predict that intended failures are never sent to the legislative floor. In this
situation, the agenda-setter anticipates that other pivotal (or veto) players will block the
proposal and chooses not to waste his time in advancing the bill any further (Tsebelis
2002; Krehbiel 1998). Studies that focus on unsuccessful legislation emphasize uninten-
tional reasons, such as uncertainty among policymakers, for generating failed bills (e.g.,
1Democrats repeatedly proposed the Family Leave and Medical Act only to have President George
H.W. Bush veto it. When President Clinton was elected, Democrats enacted the legislation.
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Cameron 2000). However, by definition, uncertainty cannot explain why a majority party
adds dead-on-arrival proposals to its agenda.
Similarly, work on legislative agenda setting addresses unsuccessful bills, but not inten-
tional failures. Cox and McCubbins (2005) argue dead-on-arrival bills are an additional
tool used by the majority party to censor undesirable legislation from becoming law.
According to procedural cartel theory, proposals that will not be enacted are inherently
“policy change[s] contrary to the wishes of the bulk of the majority party...” and can be
classified as “quasi rolls,” if the bill fails on the floor, or “inconsequential rolls,” if the
legislation is dead-on-arrival in the subsequent chamber (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 225).
Jenkins and Monroe (2015) clarify this logic and argue that disappointments, when the
agenda-setter supports a proposal that fails on the floor, arise because the agenda-setter
does not buy enough votes to move the policy away from the median voter. However,
viewing dead-on-arrival bills as disappointments does not comport with how the majority
party treats this legislation. Many times the majority party chooses disappointment
when considering these proposals. A common tactic in the House involves party leaders
suspending the rules and allowing a dead-on-arrival bill to fail by a two-thirds vote rather
than pass it under a normal majority vote.2 Similarly, the majority leader calling a cloture
vote he knows will fail is the modal way this legislation dies in the Senate. The typology
that captures rolls and disappointments does not necessarily capture the strategic nature
of dead-on-arrival bills. Many DOA proposals are passed through a chamber with the
knowledge they will fail at the next stage of the legislative process. As a result, DOA bills
can appear to be disappointments or successes.
More generally, scholars note certain conditions under which majority parties place
divisive legislation on the agenda. Aldrich and Rohde (2000) argue more extreme bills are
sent to the floor as parties in government become more cohesive and distinct. However,
they are silent on if and when these bills fail. Lee (2009) notes that the Senate’s agenda
2For example, 112-HR-3803: District of Columbia Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act.
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has focused on more contentious issues as competition for majority status has increased
but does not examine the role of intended failures in creating this divisive environment.
A smaller literature recognizes that bills may advance solely for political reasons. Po-
litical scientists have examined veto bait, which are dead-on-arrival bills vetoed by the
president (Martin 2012; Gilmour 2011; Groseclose and McCarty 2001; Gilmour 2002; Ro-
hde and Simon 1985). The main claim in this literature is DOA legislation is used by the
proposing actor (in this case, Congress) to create blame for the obstructing politician (the
president). Groseclose and McCarty (2001) formalize this argument into a blame game
signaling model where Congress can make the president look extreme to moderate voters
by forwarding an intended failure. Martin (2012) and Gilmour (2011) argue the blame
game model better predicts vetoes than a sequential bargaining model in which vetoes
arise due to uncertainty about the president’s preferences (Cameron 2000).
Besides creating blame, others have hypothesized dead-on-arrival bills create credit for
the proposing actors and increase partisan turnout on election day. Gilmour (1995) claims
lawmakers strategically disagree to gain credit from “enthusiastic constituents.”3 Pierce
(2008) suggests these bills are used to rally base voters to turnout on election day.
The conventional wisdom concerning dead-on-arrival legislation presents theoretical
challenges. In particular, it is not clear why voters respond to intended failures. A
signaling model implies the public learns new information about policymakers’ preferences
after observing a DOA proposal. For high-profile intended failures, it is unlikely voters
learn anything new. It is reasonable to assume most citizens already knew Republicans
opposed the Affordable Care Act and Democrats did not support the Iraq War.4 For less
salient DOA bills, as Cameron (2012) notes, most voters are not paying attention. In
many cases, intended failures on campaign finance, trade, and workplace safety do not
3Lind (2014) argues that Republicans proposed a DOA immigration bill prior to their summer recess
so they could credit claim during town hall meetings in their districts.
4If they did not, it is unlikely these voters would be able to accurately attribute credit or blame to
the correct party/candidate on election day.
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generate enough public attention for effective signaling to occur.
A second possibility is that lawmakers signal their commitment to an issue by proposing
a DOA bill. In this scenario, the majority party can take costly action to gain support
from an attentive audience, such as an allied interest group. With this new information,
the group will choose to provide electoral support to the committed legislators. However,
policymakers cannot credibly commit to passing a dead-on-arrival proposal as doing so
requires a different governing coalition.5 Any promise from the party to an attentive
audience, such as interest group, is just that. Since lawmakers cannot credibly argue they
can eventually pass a bill, it is unclear why organized interests should reflexively support
this behavior. For intended failures to be useful, they must provide those observing the
legislation some sort of reliable benefit.
In the next sections, I consider the theoretical microfoundations that underly a model
of agenda allocation in the U.S. Congress. I examine who is the likely audience for dead-
on-arrival bills and the assumptions that are necessary to produce an intended failure on
the floor.
2.2 The Audience for Dead-On-Arrival Bills
To examine why dead-on-arrival bills gain agenda space, it is essential to consider the
political return the majority party receives from these bills. Conventional accounts of
intended failures suggest some segment of the public responds to this legislation (Lee
2011; Groseclose and McCarty 2001). Other political scientists note that voters are an
inattentive audience and are unlikely to provide consistent credit or blame for intended
5Even if the majority party shows commitment to a DOA proposal and reneges, it is hard for a group
to punish the majority party. Since intended failures almost always split the parties, an organized interest
cannot help the opposition and hope it will advance the dead-on-arrival proposal. Pushing out lawmakers
via primary is one enforcement mechanism, but systematically removing powerful lawmakers who control
the agenda is difficult and may not solve the problem. Another veto player, such as the president, may
still oppose the intended failure, leaving groups little recourse if the party does not fulfill its commitment.
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failures (Lenz 2012; Cameron 2012; Bartels 2002; Mayhew 1974).6 If voters are not
consistently paying attention to, much less rewarding lawmakers for advancing, DOA
legislation, a different audience must be the target for these bills.
I argue that interest groups are the relevant audience for dead-on-arrival bills. Orga-
nized interests consistently provide lawmakers political support, particularly for support-
ing their issue positions.7 For a majority party, a group provides a reliable political return
when the group’s preferred policy is advanced through Congress.
Organized interests are willing to offer political support for a DOA bill for three reasons.
First, interest groups are policy maximizers. Their main goal is to get and keep their policy
preferences enacted.8 In other words, organized interests’ time horizons are longer than
lawmakers who are focused on winning their next campaign. As a result, groups are willing
to pursue legislative strategies, such as advocating for dead-on-arrival bills, that may not
provide immediate short term policy benefits. Second, organized interests are attentive
to issues related to their goals. Groups engage officials on topics they care about and help
shape the debate, outcome, and prevailing image of a legislative proposal (Baumgartner
and Jones 1993; Mayhew 1974; Schattschneider 1960). More simply, groups know when a
DOA bill arises on the agenda and which lawmakers are responsible for pushing it through
the legislative process.
Third, dead-on-arrival bills can help groups solve their “alternative problem” (Light
1991; Kingdon 1984). For its policy to be considered for passage, an interest group needs
to get its outcome viewed as the viable option to the status quo by the majority party.
Steering policymakers towards adopting the group’s alternative is an important step in
this long-term process (Kingdon 1984). Even though a dead-on-arrival bill will not pass in
6Mayhew (1974) notes “[i]t must be emphasized that the average voter has only the haziest awareness
of what an incumbent congressman is actually doing in office” (40).
7While political support can include donations, I use it to refer to the myriad of activities interest
groups participate in to support allied legislators (Skinner 2007).
8Groups have other goals, such as maintaining a large membership, fundraising, and raising public
awareness. I assume that when engaging with the legislative process, organized interests seek a policy
outcome (i.e., maintain the status quo or have a new policy enacted).
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the current session, improving its future policy prospects incentivizes organized interests
to support legislators for advancing an intended failure.9
Anecdotal accounts show interest groups pay attention to DOA legislation. For exam-
ple, in 2003, Republicans voted on a number of tort reform bills that were dead-on-arrival.
In reporting on the issue, CQ Weekly noted, “[t]he issue pits one of the top allies of
Democrats, trial attorneys, against a Republican-leaning coalition of insurers and health
care providers. The American Medical Association (AMA), the nation’s largest physi-
cians’ organization, has designated the issue as its top legislative priority” (Adams 2003).
Similarly, “a wide-ranging business coalition” backed OSHA reform in 2005 (Swindell
2005) and unions backed card-check legislation in 2008 (Benson 2008). For these reasons,
it is very likely interest groups provide the consistent political support necessary to get a
dead-on-arrival bill, and not an enactable one, onto the legislative agenda.
2.3 Microfoundations
To begin developing my model of agenda allocation, I begin with a set of assumptions
concerning interest groups and a majority party in Congress. None of the assumptions are
unique to this work. Rather, they come from and are tested in the extensive literatures
on US lawmaking, parties, and legislative organization. To examine why majority parties
focus their agendas on DOA legislation, I adopt five assumptions:
Assumption 1: Interest groups pay attention to and reward or punish majority
parties for their legislative activities.
This assumption is a natural extension from the previous discussion that interest groups
are an audience attentive to lawmakers’ activities. By rewarding or punishing legislators,
9The value interest groups gain from having their policy as the defined alternative to the status quo
should not be understated. Lawmaking conditions can change quickly, meaning whoever’s policy idea is
available at that time will likely get their preferred legislation (Birkland 1997).
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groups can influence the legislative process and increase their likelihoods of achieving their
policy goals.
Additionally, interest groups provide political support to allied legislators. For exam-
ple, a large literature examines organized interests’ donation patterns in elections (see
Stratmann 2005 and Roscoe and Jenkins 2005 for reviews). However, groups provide
much more than money. They endorse candidates, coordinate get out the vote efforts,
run campaign advertisements, among many other activities (Skinner 2007). In many cases
organized interests are explicit about the link between legislative activity and their will-
ingness to support or oppose a candidate. For instance, groups publish scorecards that
rate the votes lawmakers take on legislation and mention legislators’ voting records in
campaign ads. Thus, for bills that generate interest group attention, it is reasonable to
assume the majority party accrues some political reward or blame by working on that
legislation.
Assumption 2: Majority parties are supported by their allied interest groups.
While there is variation in which groups provide contributions, endorsements, get out
the vote drives, and other political support to party members, broadly speaking, majority
parties receive political help from a consistent set of allied interest groups. Theoretically,
this may be due to the fact that groups provide the foundation for what issues parties
organize around (Bawn et al. 2012) or are an important faction of the party that provides
resources to its candidates (Aldrich 1995). This notion is consistent with empirical work
examining campaign contributions (Bonica 2013) and interest group networks (Grossman
and Dominguez 2009).
Assumption 3: Within Congress, majority party members delegate procedural
authority to a set of trusted legislators.
Delegating procedural authority helps the party solve internal collective action prob-
lems, protect lawmakers from taking tough votes, and maintain the party brand by cen-
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soring ‘bad’ bills or forwarding agreeable ones (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Aldrich and
Rohde 2000; Cox and McCubbins 1993).
Assumption 4: Attaining majority status and control of government is a valu-
able goal party leaders in government actively pursue.
This assumption is a standard feature of partisan theories of lawmaking (Lee 2009; Cox
and McCubbins 2005) and theories of parties (Downs 1957). The implication of assump-
tions 3 and 4 is that majority party leaders bring bills to the floor that are in the best
interest of the majority of their co-partisans. Any bill on the floor provides the majority
party (in this case, a majority of its members) positive policy and/or political utility.
As such, I model the bills the majority party, which can be understood as the leaders
delegated to control the floor agenda, decides to bring to the floor for consideration.10
Finally, I assume that moving bills through the legislative process is costly.
Assumption 5: The majority party pays a one-time decision-making cost to
bring a bill to the floor for consideration.
Research on agenda-setting emphasizes the difficulty in building consensus on a specific
issue. Whether a majority party must “soften the ground,” create “value acceptability,” or
develop a positive “policy image” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Kingdon 1984), it pays
a decision-making cost when defining a new partisan policy alternative. Once legislation
has been selected, it is challenging for parties to deviate from that choice. Individuals’
cognitive limitations and the time pressures on lawmakers prevent a majority party from
constantly reconsidering its specific policy stance (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Jones
2001). Switching to a new option requires legislators to pay the same costs in time,
attention, and persuasion they already spent on the original plan.
10An important implication of these five assumptions is what topics will not be covered by DOA bills.
In particular, dead-on-arrival legislation that splits the majority party will not be sent to the floor as
party leaders seek to avoid politically costly conflict on the chamber floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005).
As a result, issues that split Tea Party and mainstream Republicans will not arise as intended failures.
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2.4 An Open Outcry Auction for the Legislative Agenda
In this section, I develop an open outcry auction model that explains when and why
lawmakers choose to add a dead-on-arrival bill to the floor agenda. An auction model
is theoretically useful as it highlights the complications inherit in studying congressional
agenda setting. Specifically, an auction considers why a majority party prefers a dead-
on-arrival bill rather than enactable legislation as well as why the majority chooses a
particular DOA proposal among a set of possible intended failures. Examining both of
these trade-offs is essential in understanding why agenda space is allocated to a given
dead-on-arrival bill.
Other types of models do not capture this complexity. For instance, spatial and signal-
ing models consider a single instance of policymaking (i.e., did a bill become law or what
did that bill signal to an audience). By only focusing on a single piece of legislation, these
approaches consistently find, in some variation, that DOA bills are politically motivated.
However, the more interesting question is not whether these bills are political, but when
is agenda space more useful for politics and not lawmaking? An auction explicitly consid-
ers the complex choices a majority party must make when weighing different legislative
options. As a result, the auction clarifies how the majority party allocates agenda space
and shows how bills compete for attention.
An open outcry or English auction, the type of game specified below, is a ascending-
price auction. For many readers, this type of auction is familiar as it is commonly used
to sell art or antiques, goods at an estate sale, or seized assets at a government-sponsored
auction. At these auctions, the auctioneer begins by announcing his reservation price,
the lowest price the auctioneer will accept. Next, bidders, whose valuation of the good
being auctioned is private information, begin publicly offering sequentially larger bids.
The auction concludes when a bid is made and no other bidder is willing to make a larger
offer to the auctioneer. At that point, the good is sold at that price.
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This type of auction is useful as it most closely resembles how interest groups pursue
agenda space for their legislation. Through lobbying, donations or issue advertisements,
organized interests indicate how much political support they are willing to offer the ma-
jority party for adding the bill to the floor agenda. However, how much a group truly
values a given bill remains private information only known to that group. Other organized
interests observe these ‘bids’ and can attempt to make their legislation more politically
valuable for majority party lawmakers.
I focus on the unique circumstance in which a dead-on-arrival bill beats enactable
legislation for agenda space. The model shows intended failures are more likely to arise on
the floor when control for government is competitive and lawmakers have divergent policy
preferences. Moreover, the game indicates that groups reward the majority for adding
DOA bills to the agenda as doing so makes it more likely those proposals eventually
become law when the groups’ allies control government.
2.4.1 Players and Preferences
The game consists of a majority party, P , and n interest groups, G = {g1, g2, ... gn}.
P has agenda setting power, the ability to decide which legislation is considered by the
chamber. Each group seeks to have a bill enacted. Denote the set of legislation: L =
{l1, l2, ... ln}. For simplicity, assume each group is associated with a single bill (i.e., gi
advocates for li).
P selects at most one bill to include on its policy agenda. P ’s set of legislative options
are: A = {∅, L}. Legislation provides the majority party two types of utility, policy value,
vp(l), and political benefits, b. Policy value is realized when a bill is enacted, otherwise
vp(l) = 0. Let vp(l) ∈ [−1, 1] be independently drawn from a cumulative distribution
function, F (·). Additionally, assume all subsequent parameters are independently drawn
from the same distribution and are elements of [0, 1]. I normalize all status quo policies
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to v0 = 0 for all players.
11 I define the probability of l becoming law as q ∈ [0, 1]. A
bill’s probability of enactment is the probability the bill, if sent to the floor by P , will be
approved by the chamber as well as other veto players and become law. I assume a bill’s
policy value for P and the probability it can pass are common knowledge.
Political benefits, b, are any electorally useful activity provided to or on behalf of P by
a group for placing its bill on the legislative agenda. These benefits are not conditional on
enactment but are supplied by an interest group once its issue gains floor consideration.
Additionally, the majority party pays a one-time decision-making cost when adding a
bill to its agenda. Define P ’s one-time cost of proposing a bill as d ∈ [0, 1]. Following
Assumption 5, after being paid once, d = 0 for all subsequent instances in which l is
offered by the majority party. P ’s total utility is a combination of the policy and political
benefits it receives from a bill, written as:
Up(li) = qivpi + bpi − di (2.1)
P uses the following tie-breaking rules. When two bids provide the same total utility,
P chooses the bill that provides more policy utility; P prefers not to add a bill to the
floor than to offer a bill that provides no utility; and if both bills provide the same total
utility and policy utility, P selects bills using a lottery.
Each group has a budget of political benefits it can provide P for adding the group’s
bill to the legislative agenda. A group’s maximum budget is defined by the utility it
receives from its legislation being enacted. A group’s utility is written as:
Ugi(li) = qivgi (2.2)
where vgi ∈ [0, 1] and is private information. Denote the maximum value a group is willing
to pay as bmaxi = Ugi(li) and define the set of bids a group can offer as: Bi = {0, bi , ...bmaxi }.
11Player utilities are not based on spatial preferences. A negative value is a utility loss for P or g.
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In auction terminology, a group’s total valuation, Ugi(li), is an independent private value.
Note that since P can only add one bill to its agenda, all of its political benefits come
from an interest group’s bid. To examine when a dead-on-arrival bill arises on the agenda,
I define li as dead-on-arrival with its probability of enactment as qi = 0. I assume all
other legislation’s probability of enactment is greater than 0.
2.4.2 Sequence of Play
P holds an open outcry auction where interest groups publicly bid to have their bills
included on the legislative agenda. Define the majority party’s reservation price as the
bill it will add to the agenda absent any bids. P ’s reservation price is the legislation
that offers the party the most total policy utility, written as: Up(lr) = max qrvpr − dr.
For clarity, I write the reservation price, and the group advocating for that bill, with r
subscripts. The auction proceeds as follows:
1. P announces its reservation price, defined as the bill that offers it the most policy
utility: UP (lr) = qrvpr − dr.
2. Interest groups publicly and sequentially offer increasingly large bids.
3. When no new bids can trump the previous bid, the auction ends with the highest
bidder paying its offer to P . The winning bill is sent to the floor for consideration.
This game differs from standard open outcry auctions. P evaluates bids based on the
total utility, vp and bp, it gains from adding the bill to its agenda, not just the bid being
offered by a group. An implication of this choice rule is the winning bill may not include
the largest bid. This occurs because the policy utility associated with a given bill may
be sufficiently high to ensure legislation is added to the agenda even if a group can only
afford a small bid. While a departure from standard auction models, as Proposition 1
shows below, this feature of the game does not change groups’ basic bidding strategies.
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2.4.3 Equilibrium Concept
Auction models are solved by finding a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. An open outcry
auction with independent private values is a type of second price auction. This game
follows a standard open outcry auction in two crucial ways. First, for every bidder,
there exists a maximum bid it will not exceed. By assumption, this amount is a group’s
valuation.12 Second, a bidder’s maximum bid is private information. Since a group’s
valuation is known only to that player, and its maximum offer depends on its valuation, the
game features independent private values. In these settings, an interest group offering bids
up to its total utility is a weakly dominant strategy (Milgrom 1989; Milgrom and Weber
1982). Thus, solving for a unique equilibrium is trivial, as given the above assumptions,
an interest group will remain in the auction until it submits its maximum possible bid,
bmaxi . Instead, I focus on the conditions under which P includes a bill on its agenda when
qi = 0.
To do so, I focus on the three types of groups included in this game, namely: 1) groups
who advocate for a dead-on-arrival bill (gi); 2) groups who advocate for an enactable bill
(gj) and; 3) the group whose bill is selected as the reservation price (gr).
13
2.4.4 Single Round Auction
Consider a game in which P auctions a single space on the agenda. In this situation,
a dead-on-arrival bill will never win:
Lemma 1. In a single period game, gi will never bid for a bill when qi = 0 and a dead-on-
arrival bill will never be selected by P to be included on its agenda.
Proof : Contained in the appendix.
12As I show below, in many cases, a group’s maximum offer will be less than its valuation, vg.
13For simplicity, I focus on single groups from each of these categories. The results generalize to any n
for each type, and situations with zero groups are special cases of the conditions I outline below.
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P selects: 
lr if qi = 0 and Up(lr) ≥ Up(lj) and Up(lr) > 0
lj if qi = 0 and Up(lj) > Up(lr) and Up(lj) > 0
∅ if qi = 0 and Up(l−i) ≤ 0
In this auction, P never gains any utility, policy or political, from elevating dead-on-
arrival legislation to the agenda. Moreover, gi does not gain any utility from a dead-on-
arrival bill so it does not submit a bid. The outcome from this auction is P selects the
enactable bill that provides it the most positive total utility.
2.4.5 Two Period Auction
Scarce agenda space does not explain why a dead-on-arrival bill is not elevated to the
legislative agenda. Consider a two period game in which the same auction is held sequen-
tially.14
Lemma 2. In a two period game, gi will never bid for a bill when qi = 0 and a dead-on-
arrival bill will never be selected by P to be included on its agenda.
Proof : Contained in the appendix.
This lemma extends the logic outlined above. In a two period game, the first auction
is the game discussed in Lemma 1. In round 1, a DOA bill can never win the auction as
a better alternative for P always exists. However, even if lj or lr is added to the floor
in round 1, in round 2, P will not add a dead-on-arrival bill to its agenda. As long as
14Winning the auction only guarantees a bill receives consideration by the full chamber. Unless q = 1,
the legislation will not necessarily be enacted.
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P prefers doing nothing instead of advancing legislation that provides it zero utility, the
DOA bill will never be sent to the floor. This simple model extends to n rounds. No matter
how much agenda space P possesses, in this scenario, it will never add a dead-on-arrival
bill to its agenda.
The noteworthy outcome from these simple models is what does not produce dead-on-
arrival legislation. Gridlock, represented by small q values, and interest groups with large
budgets cannot generate this legislative behavior. This stands in contrast to conventional
views about why these bills are generally proposed. One explanation for DOA legislation
is legislators default to dead-on-arrival bills when they cannot enact other legislation.
This argument does not include the interest group’s strategic calculation. Why would
they reward this behavior if it is perfunctory?15
Additionally, this game indicates that a resource-rich interest group cannot simply
convince legislators to propose a bill that will not become law. While large, well-organized
groups may successfully bid for legislation outside the win set, it is not their size alone
that dictates when a bill will placed on the legislative agenda. Quite simply, gridlock
and large interest groups are not sufficient conditions to incentivize a majority party to
include a dead-on-arrival bill on its agenda.
2.4.6 Auctioning the Agenda Before an Election
Suppose P auctions its agenda in the shadow of an election. Consider a two round
auction identical to the game above. In between auctions an election occurs that changes
the party’s preferences. Denote this change as vt+1p ∼ N(vtp, σ2) ∈ [0, 1]. Assume interest
groups perceive this change as a shift in the probability its bill can be enacted after the
election. Let qt+1 ∈ [0, 1] be the probability a group’s bill is enacted after the election.
15One counter-argument is this activity helps groups gain new members, donations, etc. While true,
this suggests a very specific type of group will bid in equilibrium. For instance, groups with lagging
memberships or ones whose donations come in small amounts from relatively inattentive people who
need reminding of the cause will offer the most political benefits. While possible, anecdotally, these are
not the groups who tend to incentivize these bills. Rather, large, well-organized groups offer the most
political benefits, suggesting something besides boredom born out of gridlock is driving this behavior.
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Assume this value is common knowledge.
P applies any political benefits, bp, it receives from the pre-election auction to its
campaign. When a group provides P political support, it alters the group’s post-election
policy prospects, qt+1. I define g’s updated future policy prospects as:16

qt+1∗ = qt+1 + bp if qt+1 + bp < 1
qt+1∗ = 1 if qt+1 + bp ≥ 1
where bp is the bid the group pays to P . This function restricts the extent to which a
group can ‘buy’ an election. Once a group is certain P will control government after the
election, and its bill will become law, any additional political benefits provided by an
interest group is treated as surplus and has no additional effect on the election outcome.
For a group, the election changes its second round policy prospects. Denote this change as
qt+1 ∼ N(qt+1∗, σ2) ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, I assume groups’ valuations change between rounds
as well. Let vt+1g ∼ N(vtg, σ2) ∈ [0, 1] be private information known only to the group.
The structure of the game is now:
1. P announces its reservation price: Up(lr) = qrvpr − dr.
2. Interest groups publicly and sequentially offer increasingly large bids.
3. When no new bids can trump the previous bid, the auction ends with the highest
bidder paying the winning bid. The winning bill is sent to the floor for consideration.
4. P applies any political benefits to the election, generating updated future bill pas-
sage probabilities, qt+1∗.
5. Election occurs. P ’s valuation is redistributed vt+1p ∼ N(vtp, σ2) ∈ [0, 1]. For groups,
their bills’ prospects and valuations are redistributed: qt+1 ∼ N(qt+1∗, σ2) ∈ [0, 1]
16Groups’ post-election policy prospects can change when another group wins the auction. I address
this possibility below.
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and vt+1g ∼ N(vtg, σ2) ∈ [0, 1].
6. Post-election auction occurs.
2.4.7 Utility Functions
P ’s utility function does not change from the original game. A group’s first round
utility does not change from the original game and is defined as:
qtvg − b (2.3)
where qtvg is a group’s utility from winning the auction and b is the bid it offers. When
deciding to make P an offer, a group also considers how winning agenda space before the
election, but not getting its bill enacted, changes its chances of winning the second round
auction. A group’s post-election utility consists of the expected utility of getting its bill
enacted in the second round conditional on being eligible for the post-election auction
(i.e., the group’s bill did not become law prior to the election). The probability that a
group who wins the first round auction does not get its bill enacted is 1 − qt. Thus, an
interest group’s total utility is written as:
qtvg + (1− qt)(qt+1∗vg)− b (2.4)
where the first term is the utility a group gains from winning the pre-election auction.
The second term is the utility a group receives from winning the post-election auction,
conditional on the probability its legislation was not enacted in the first round. The third
term is the bid a group offers to P . For a dead-on-arrival bill, 1−qt = 1, meaning a group
only considers its post-election legislative prospects. Equation 2.4 can be rewritten as:
qtvg + (1− qt)[vg(qt+1 + b)]− b (2.5)
28
where qt+1 + b is the updated electoral probability the group’s bill will pass in the future.
2.4.8 Conditions that Generate Dead-On-Arrival Bills
In the next section, I show the existence equilibria under which each type of interest
group will bid for a bill in the pre-election auction. Before proceeding, it is important to
note a group’s post-election prospects can benefit from another group winning the first
round auction and providing P political support. To take this into account, I add two
additional parameters. Let w ∈ [0, 1] be the previous bid a group observes in the auction
before deciding whether or not to make P an offer. Define τ ∈ [0, 1] as a belief about how
much a bid from another bidder actually improves a group’s future policy prospects.17
The term τij is the parameter that condition gi’s utility from a bid submitted by gj. For
each group, there are one fewer τ parameters than there are total groups.18 Thus, the
utility gi gets from gj winning the auction is:
τij(vgi(q
t+1
i + wij)) (2.6)
where qt+1i +wij is gi’s updated future policy prospects based on the most recent observed
bid, vgi is its valuation, and τij conditions how much gi actually stands to benefit from gj’s
most recent bid. When a group loses the auction, its change in future policy prospects is
written as: qt+1 ∼ N(τ(qt+1 +w), σ2) ∈ [0, 1], where the mean of the normal distribution
is based on the bid that won the auction. Before proceeding any further, in Table 2.1, I
provide a summary of the game’s players and parameters.
17A different group may provide political support to P , but that may or may not help the other group’s
post-election prospects. For example, the political benefits the Business Roundtable provides Republican
lawmakers also helps the Chamber of Commerce achieve its post-election policy goals. However, political
support from the Family Research Council may help the Chamber of Commerce but will likely be used
to help elect candidates who emphasize conservative social issues, and not necessarily, business issues.
18I use the same type of subscripts for w. wij is the bid gi observes if gj is the most recent offer to P .
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Table 2.1: Players and Parameters
Symbols Players:
P Majority Party
gi Group advocating for DOA bill
gj Group advocating for enactable bill
gr Group advocating for enactable bill and that bill is reservation price
Parameters:
v Player’s valuation of a bill
d P ’s one-time decision-making cost
qt Probability bill is enacted in first round auction
qt+1 Probability bill is enacted in second round auction
w Bid made immediately prior to a group’s potential bid
τ Belief about how other bids affect group’s second round prospects
b Bid offered by a group to majority party and political benefits gained by P
The conditions under which each type of group will make an offer are:
Proposition 1 : An interest group bill will always submit a first round bid for its legislation
if:

Up(l) > Up(lw) if qvp ≤ qwvw
Up(l) ≥ Up(lw) if qvp > qwvw
qtv + (1− qt)[v(qt+1 + b)]− b ≥ τ(v(qt+1 + w))
For gr : Another group bids
(2.7)
Proof : Contained in the appendix.
where Up(lw) is P ’s total utility from the most recent offer it has received.
19 For any
group to make an offer to P , two conditions must be met. First, the bidder’s offer must
increase P ’s total utility relative to the legislation that stands to win at that point in the
19When P has not received an offer, Up(lw) is the reservation price.
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auction. P ’s tie-breaking rule dictates how large the group’s offer must be. If P gains
less policy utility from from the group’s bill relative to the bill that stands to win, the
bidder’s offer must strictly improve P ’s total utility. If the party gains more policy utility
from the new offer, the group only needs to make P indifferent between its bill and the
legislation currently winning the auction. If the group’s offer cannot meet this condition,
the group’s bid can never make P better off for adding the group’s bill to the agenda.
Second, a group’s bid must make it better off compared to the utility the group gains
from the most recent offer to P made by another bidder. If the expected utility the group
receives from making a bid provides it more utility than if the auction ended at that
point, the group will bid. Finally, a third condition applies to gr. Since this group’s bill
will win absent any bids, gr only makes an offer if another bidder offers P more than the
reservation price. If no one else bids, gr wins by default and has its bill added to the
agenda.
2.4.9 Maximum Bids
In this section, I describe the maximum bid a group is wiling to offer P , conditional
on the bidder choosing to make an offer. By knowing how much each a group is willing to
offer the majority party, I can examine under what circumstances a dead-on-arrival bill
wins pre-election agenda space.
Bid −qv+τvw−vq
t+1+qtvqt+1+τvqt+1
−1+v−qv : Assuming the group can exceed the reservation price,
its largest bid makes it indifferent between its offer and the bid that stands to win the
auction made by another group. This condition is written as:
qtv + (1− qt)[v(qt+1 + b)]− b = τ(v(qt+1 + w)) (2.8)
and simplifies to:
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b =
−qv + τvw − vqt+1 + qtvqt+1 + τvqt+1
−1 + v − qv (2.9)
A group will not offer a bid that exceeds this value. Doing so would mean a bidder
pays more to P to get less utility than it would receive by allowing another group to
win the auction. Importantly, this maximum bid changes throughout the auction. Since
this condition includes the τ and w parameters, its value depends on which group offered
the most recent bid to P . As a result, there may be cases in which a group is not
willing to exceed the most recent bid and does not make an offer. However, a subsequent
bid, particularly from a bidder that shares a low τ value with the group, may make it
worthwhile for the group to make a new offer to P .
This situation leads to an auction environment with reentry based on interdependent
values. These additional features principally affect the auction’s efficiency (i.e., does
the auction maximize the auctioneer’s gain based on the available information) rather
than the bidders’ strategies (Izmalkov 2001; Krishna 2003). In a game with reentry and
interdependent values, a bidder only makes an offer if it can improve its own utility by
winning the auction and making the auctioneer better off with its bid. This condition
can be understood as dictating when a group will make an offer or abstain at any point
during the auction.
Bid v: In some circumstances, the maximum bid in Equation 2.9 exceeds a group’s
valuation, v. However, in an auction, a bidder is never willing to pay more than how
much it values the item being sold. Therefore, if the next offer a group must offer exceeds
its valuation of the agenda space, it will stop bidding.
Bidding when qti = 0: The bidding strategy for the special case, when q
t
i = 0, in-
cludes an exception to the conditions outlined above. Since there is no chance of securing
pre-election agenda space, a group’s only consideration is improving its future policy
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prospects. Assuming gi meets the reservation point, it can offer three possible maximum
bids. The first two possibilities are identical to the ones discussed above. The group will
either bid to the point it is indifferent between its bid and the most recent offer or its
valuation. The third potential maximum bid arises when gi can ‘buy the election’ (i.e.,
qt+1∗ = 1). In this scenario, gi is not willing to pay more than the amount that makes
qt+1∗ = 1. Any additional resources spent is a waste as those political benefits do not
increase gi’s utility.
20 Therefore, if gi bids its indifference point or valuation and q
t+1∗ > 1,
gi will decrease its bid to the point it buys the election. This bid is:
1− qt+1 (2.10)
The maximum bids groups are willing to offer to P can be summarized as:

bmaxr and b
max
j :
min(−qvg+τvgw−vgq
t+1+qtvgqt+1+τvgqt+1
−1+vg−qvg , vg)
bmaxi :
min(−qvg+τvgw−vgq
t+1+qtvgqt+1+τvgqt+1
−1+vg−qvg , vg, 1− qt+1)
(2.11)
A group’s maximum bid dictates its equilibrium bidding strategy. A bidder will stay
in the auction as long as its offer is less than or equal to the minimum values in Equation
2.11. If its offer exceeds that value, it will drop out of the auction (albeit, due to the
first condition, not necessarily permanently). In some cases, a winning interest group will
pays its potential maximum offer, but in most cases it will not. Rather, the winning bid
is an offer slightly larger than the second-to-last remaining group in the auction. Thus,
the potential bids in Equation 2.11 are most useful for understanding groups’ equilibrium
strategies and when they will exit the auction.
20Groups advocating for enactable bills do not face this same restriction as they still gain more utility
from winning the first round auction even if they bid enough to buy the second round one.
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2.5 Auction Simulations and Comparative Statics
To understand when dead-on-arrival bills are more likely to win agenda space, I exam-
ine changes in the current policymaking environment and the majority’s future electoral
prospects. More specifically, I consider how changes in the level of gridlock (qj and qr)
and a DOA bill’s future chances of enactment (qt+1i ) affect which legislation is added to
the agenda.
Deriving and showing comparative statics from this game is difficult. A player’s bid
is based not only on its expected utility but also on the previous bid and the player’s
belief about how much the standing offer will help it (as captured by the τ parameter).
Additionally, I do not make any assumptions about the auction’s order.21 Groups can
bid in any order as long as their offers meet Proposition 1’s conditions. An auction can
occur in which each player bids in the same order each time (e.g., j, i, r, j, i, r...), two
players bid until the eventual winner is reached (e.g., i, r, i, r...) or any other imaginable
combination. Thus, showing groups’ maximum potential bids during the auction is not
useful, as those offers may change based on who makes the next offer to P . Similarly,
showing the end result from an auction leaves open the possibility that the result is
aberrational, as a different game ordering may produce a different winner and bids. For
these reasons, I simulated the game. For each change in the parameters of interest, I
simulated 5000 auctions. In the next sections, I graph the probability a group wins
the auction as a function of gi’s electoral uncertainty and the amount of gridlock in the
lawmaking process. Doing so reveals when dead-on-arrival bills are more likely to win
agenda space relative to enactable legislation.
2.5.1 Electoral Uncertainty
Electoral uncertainty is captured by the qt+1 parameter. As qt+1 approaches 0, a group
believes the election will change the majority party’s preferences in a way that its bill will
21The only restriction is r does not make the first bid since its bill is the reservation price.
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have no chance of future enactment. More simply, the group believes its allies will lose
control of the majority or other veto points in government. When qt+1 = 1, the group is
certain the bill will become law. The simplest way a group can be so certain of its future
prospects is if the group’s legislative allies win unified government. Notably, gi’s utility,
and its bid, only depends on its potential future utility. Thus, its decision to make P
an offer changes in accordance with its expectations about the future. To examine how
changes in gi’s perception about P ’s electoral fortunes affects when DOA bills win agenda
space, I plot the probability each group wins the auction as qt+1i changes:
22
22The other parameters are set at: vpi = 0.4, vpj = 0.02, vpr = 0.03, qi = 0, qj = 0.5, qr = 0.6,
di = 0.002, dj = 0.002, dr = 0.002, vgi = 0.35, vgj = 0.2, vgr = 0.05, q
t+1
j = 0.2, q
t+1
r = 0.4, τri = 0.3,
τrj = 0.9, τir = 0.6, τij = 0.5, τjr = 0.7, τji = 0.7. I assume a group must offer at least 0.001 in total
utility to P more than the previous offer.
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Figure 2.1: Probability Group Wins Auction as qt+1i Changes
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Probability Dead-On-Arrival Bill Is Enacted After Election
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Probability Group Supporting Dead-On-Arrival Bill Wins Auction
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Probability Dead-On-Arrival Bill Is Enacted After Election
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Probability Group Supporting Reservation Price Bill Wins Auction
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Probability Dead-On-Arrival Bill Is Enacted After Election
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
Probability Group Supporting Passable Bill Wins Auction
Note: Probabilities each type of group wins auction as qt+1i changes. Probabilities are
generated from 5000 auction simulations at every hundredth interval (0.01) between 0
and 1.
As Figure 2.1 shows, the probability a dead-on-arrival bill wins agenda space increases
when gi has some uncertainty about which party will control government in the upcoming
election. gi’s probability of winning the auction, shown by the blue line in Figure 2.1,
increases when the group is very uncertain about its future policy prospects. In this
situation, gi increases its bids as doing so can increase the likelihood its allies win more
seats in the election. However, as it becomes very likely a DOA bill will be enacted after
the election, because P will win control of government, it becomes less likely gi wins
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the auction. In this situation, gi gains little future utility from improving P ’s already
outstanding electoral prospects. Moreover, when P has very little chance of gaining
power in the election, gi’s probability of winning the auction decreases to zero. This
occurs because gi’s post-election utility is very small, and as a result, it offers a low bid
that rarely, if ever, wins the auction.
The parabolic shape shown in Figure 2.1 generally describes when gi will win the
auction but its location along the x-axis shifts as the model’s parameters change. One
way to gain additional insight about when a dead-on-arrival bill is more likely to gain
agenda space is to examine gi’s mean bid as q
t+1
i changes. Doing so reveals how gi’s bids
increase relative to P ’s electoral prospects, even if gi loses the auction. In Figure 2.2,
I plot gi’s mean bid as q
t+1
i moves from 0 to 1. This figure shows when gi is willing to
offer larger bids to P , and as a consequence, increases the likelihood it wins the auction.
The bounds represent the maximum and minimum bids gi made at each simulated level
of qt+1i :
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Figure 2.2: Group Supporting Dead-On-Arrival Bill’s Mean Bid
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Note: The mean bid offered by gi as q
t+1
i changes calculated after 5000 simulations at
every hundredth interval (0.01) between 0 and 1. The bounds represent the minimum
and maximum bid made by gi at a specific value of q
t+1
i .
Figure 2.2 more generally reveals gi’s bidding strategy. When q
t+1
i is small, the group
offers lower bids as it believes it is unlikely P will win power and enact the dead-on-arrival
bill in the next session. As qt+1i increases, gi’s bids increase and reach their peak when the
group is uncertain about which party will gain control of government. In this scenario,
the group’s bids are most useful in helping the party electioneer, as additional political
support makes it more likely than not that the intended failure will become law in the
future. Finally, as gi is confident P will win power, it decreases its bid. Any large offer
will not improve the party’s electoral prospects and the likelihood the dead-on-arrival bill
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is enacted after the election. Based on this result, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: As a majority party’s electoral prospects improve, dead-on-arrival bills are
more likely to be added to the agenda.
Hypothesis 1b: As it becomes very likely the majority party will control government after
the next election, dead-on-arrival bills are less likely to be added to the floor agenda.
2.5.2 Legislative Gridlock
In addition to an intended failures’ future prospects, I consider how gridlock in the pre-
election auction affects when dead-on-arrival bills secure agenda space. Scholars have long
noted that bills are harder to enact when veto players do not share the same preferences
or partisanship (Binder 2003; Tsebelis 2002; Cameron 2000; Krehbiel 1998; Ferejohn and
Shipan 1990). While it seems intuitive that difficult lawmaking conditions lead to more
intended failures being added to the agenda, it is not because DOA bills’ values increase.
Instead, more of the floor agenda is devoted to dead-on-arrival bills because the relative
value of other proposals decreases.
Gridlock is measured by how likely it is enactable legislation can become law, qtj and
qtr. When these parameters are small, it is unlikely any legislation will become law. As
these parameters increase, policymakers are more inclined to enact non-DOA bills. To
show how changes in the level of gridlock affects when DOA bills arise on the agenda, I
plot the probability each type of bill - li, lr, and lj - wins the auction as q
t
j and q
t
r increase.
For simplicity, I set qtj = q
t
r; however, the general trends outlined below are robust to
when these parameters change at different rates.
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Figure 2.3: Probability Group Wins Auction As Gridlock Increases
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Note: Probabilities each type of group wins auction as qtj and q
t
r change. Probabilities
are generated from 5000 auction simulations at every hundredth interval (0.01) between
0 and 1.
The results in Figure 2.3 present a complex bidding environment. At very high levels
of gridlock, all types of bills have a reasonable chance of winning the auction. This occurs
because no group gains much additional utility from getting its bill enacted before the
election. Therefore, groups are willing to free-ride off of one another to improve P ’s
electoral prospects.23
23Importantly, this strategy changes as the τ parameters become smaller. As τ approaches 0, groups
simply offer their maximum bids and the group that provides P the most utility always wins.
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In a mostly gridocked legislative environment (i.e., when all bills’ probability of enact-
ment is less than 0.5), there is some probability a DOA bill wins the auction. However,
once an enactable bill becomes more likely than not to become law, the probability a
dead-on-arrival ends up on the agenda decreases. With policymakers willing to enact lr
and lj, gr and gj offer large bids. These groups are confident winning the auction means
their legislation will most likely become law. As a result, when legislative veto players
share similar policy preferences, and qtj and q
t
r are sufficiently large, dead-on-arrival bills
stand little chance of gaining agenda space. Yet, as gridlock increases, intended failures
always have some chance of winning the auction. I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: As veto players’ policy preferences diverge, the likelihood a dead-on-arrival
bill is added to the agenda increases.
2.6 Model Extensions
To this point, I have focused exclusively on when a dead-on-arrival bill can secure
agenda space in the pre-election auction. However, this model, and the auction model
framework more generally, offers additional insights concerning DOA legislation and
agenda setting in the U.S. Congress. In this section, I focus on two extensions of the
model. First, I consider how previously dead-on-arrival bills fare in the post-election auc-
tion. I show that by winning the first round auction, a previously DOA bill is more likely
to become law after the election. Second, I consider how auctioning agenda space affects
the order in which the majority party adds bills to the floor.
2.6.1 Post-Election Auction and Dead-On-Arrival Bills
Begin by considering the two round auction examined above and assume a dead-on-
arrival bill wins the first round auction. As a result, the previously DOA legislation is
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more likely to win agenda space compared to other legislation. This becomes clear by
examining P ’s expected second round utility.
Recall, after the election the majority party’s valuation for each bill is redistributed
vt+1p ∼ N(vtp, σ2) ∈ [0, 1] and each group’s valuation for its legislation is redistributed
vt+1g ∼ N(vtg, σ2) ∈ [0, 1]. P and G’s expected valuation is E(vt+1) = vt. Each probability
a bill is enacted is redistributed qt+1 ∼ N(qt+1∗, σ2). Groups’ maximum bids are written
as vt+1g q
t+1. For a dead-on-arrival bill to beat another bill in the second round auction,
the following condition must hold:
vt+1ip q
t+1
i + bi > v
t+1
jp
qt+1j + bj − dj (2.12)
where the left side of the equation is P ’s utility from a dead-on-arrival bill that won the
first round auction and the right side is the utility from another bill.24 Since P paid its
one-time decision-making cost, di, after the first round, it is omitted from this equation.
To see why previously DOA legislation is advantaged in the second round, consider P ’s
utility from each bill but exclude dj. The three ways these utilities can relate to one
another are:

vt+1ip q
t+1
i + bi > v
t+1
jp
qt+1j + bj
vt+1ip q
t+1
i + bi = v
t+1
jp
qt+1j + bj
vt+1ip q
t+1
i + bi < v
t+1
jp
qt+1j + bj
(2.13)
In the first circumstance, in which the previously DOA bill’s (li) utility is greater than
another bill (lj), it is straightforward that P prefers li to lj. In the second situation,
in which the utilities are equivalent, P still prefers li. Once lj’s decision-making cost,
24If P ’s utility from each bill is equivalent, the winning offer depends on which bill provides it more
policy utility, as per P ’s tie-breaking rule.
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which is greater than zero, is subtracted from that utility, li always provides more utility
to P . In the third scenario, li can still win the auction. Rearranging Equation 2.12,
and reintroducing the decision-making cost term, the condition under which a previously
dead-on-arrival bill wins the second round auction over another bill is:
dj > v
t+1
pj
qt+1∗j + bj − vt+1pi qt+1∗i + bi (2.14)
If dj is greater than the surplus policy and political utility P receives from lj relative to
li, then li will still win the second round auction. Only when lj’s decision-making cost is
sufficiently small will that legislation defeat a previously dead-on-arrival bill. I summarize
these scenarios below:
Table 2.2: Conditions In Which DOA or Enactable Bill Wins Second Round
Winner Utilities Condition
gi v
t+1
ip
qt+1∗i + bi > v
t+1
jp
qt+1∗j + bj —
gi v
t+1
ip
qt+1∗i + bi = v
t+1
jp
qt+1∗j + bj —
gi v
t+1
ip
qt+1∗i + bi < v
t+1
jp
qt+1∗j + bj dj ≥ vt+1jp qt+1∗j + bj − vt+1ip qt+1∗i + bi
gj v
t+1
ip
qt+1∗i + bi < v
t+1
jp
qt+1∗j + bj dj < v
t+1
jp
qt+1∗j + bj − vt+1ip qt+1∗i + bi
As Table 2.2 shows, in most circumstances, li wins the second round auction rather
than lj. Only when another bill provides P more utility than li and that legislation’s
decision-making cost is sufficiently small will it win the second round auction. Rather, it
is more likely the previous DOA bill wins the post-election game. I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: Conditional on a majority party gaining control of government, dead-on-
arrival bills proposed prior to the election are more likely to gain floor consideration rel-
ative to new legislation.
Besides being favored over bills that have not received floor consideration, in the post-
election auction, previously dead-on-arrival bills are more likely to be enacted compared
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to other bills that also failed in the first round. In other words, if two bills, one DOA
and one enactable, fail prior to the election, after the election (and conditional on the
previously dead-on-arrival becoming enactable), the former intended failure is more likely
to gain floor consideration. This occurs even though P has already paid the decision-
making cost associated with both bills. The reason previously dead-on-arrival bills can
beat other failed bills is because groups supporting intended failures tend to have much
larger valuations than groups advocating for enactable bills. This feature is what allows
DOA legislation to win the pre-election auction and advantages intended failures after the
election.
Since P only receives political utility from intended failures, a group must be able to
offer the majority party a bid sufficiently large that it outweighs the policy and political
utility other proposals offer. The main parameter that dictates bid size for gi is vgi , its
valuation. Other groups can win the pre-election auction with much smaller valuations
because their bills offer P policy utility. To visualize this gap in groups’ valuation sizes, I
plot the probability gi wins the auction for a DOA bill and that group’s valuation. Keep-
ing all other parameters equal, I change the value of gj’s valuation of its enactable bill.
Each line plots the probability an intended failure wins the auction, given gi’s and gj’s
valuations:
44
Figure 2.4: Probability gi Wins Auction As Its and gj’s Valuation Change
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Note: Probability gi wins auction based on its own valuation. Each line represents a
different value of vgj , the group’s whose valuation gi is competing with. Probabilities are
generated from 5000 auction simulations at every interval.
In the pre-election auction, gi’s valuation must be significantly larger than gj’s to have
any chance of winning agenda space. This logic extends to the difference in valuations
between gi and any group supporting a enactable bill. As a consequence, intended failures
are more likely to win floor consideration in the post-election auction as well. To under-
stand why, consider a slightly modified two-round auction model. The players, sequence
of play, and utilities of the game remain the same with one exception. In the first round,
P adds the two most valuable bills to its agenda. In other words, the game ends when
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there are two bidders left.25 Additionally, assume that the enactable bill that wins a spot
on the first round agenda is not enacted. As a consequence, that legislation can win the
second round game in which only one bill wins the auction.
During the election, players’ valuations are redistributed vt+1 ∼ N(vt, σ2). In expec-
tation, a group’s post-election valuation is equal to its pre-election one. Thus, in general,
gi’s valuation in the second round auction is very large, while other groups that also won
the pre-election auction can have much smaller valuations. If the lawmaking environment
now makes it possible for a previously DOA bill to become law (qt+1i > 0), this bill is
much more likely to get floor attention relative to other bills. Examining P , gi, and gj’s
post-election utilities show why this is the case. For each bill, P ’s second round utility is
identical to Equation 2.1. An interest group’s utility is:
Ug = q
t+1vt+1 − b (2.15)
Unlike the first round auction, in this game, bidders only consider the utility they re-
ceive from winning the auction. Rearranging Equation 2.15 indicates a group’s maximum
bid is b = qt+1vt+1. Assuming all else equal except each group’s valuation, it is clear why
former intended failures are more likely to win the second round auction. If vgi > vgj ,
which is generally the case, then gi can offer a larger bid than gj. Consequently, in the
post-election game, li is more likely to gain agenda space compared to other legislation
that also won the pre-election auction. I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: Conditional on a majority party gaining control of government, dead-on-
arrival bills proposed prior to the election are more likely to gain floor consideration than
legislation that failed for other reasons.
25This modification changes a bidder’s strategic calculation. Rather than considering the utility it
receives from the previous bid, it weighs making an offer against the second-to-last bid made.
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2.6.2 Ordering the Agenda
The final extension concerns testing the key feature of the auction model: that majority
parties order their agendas by placing more valuable bills ahead of less valuable ones. The
crucial assumption of the model is that a group can secure agenda space by making its
bill more attractive to the majority party. If P uses some other process for determining
its agenda, an auction is not a useful way to understand the strategy that leads to dead-
on-arrival gaining legislative attention. To test the auction’s appropriateness, I consider
whether more valuable legislation is prioritized by the majority.
One challenge in assessing legislation’s value is that measuring a bill’s policy utility is
notoriously difficult.26 However, since dead-on-arrival bills only provide political utility,
which can be measured, I can examine the order in which intended failures are sent to the
floor. My model’s basic claim is that DOA legislation that provides the majority party
more political benefits should be proposed before DOA bills that provide less support.
This prediction contrasts with conventional wisdom that intended failures are emphasized
during the election season (e.g., Cassata 2014). In this alternative view, dead-on-arrival
bills are brought to the floor during the spring and summer of an election year in an effort
to appeal to voters. If bills brought up earlier in the term garner more political support
than ones sent to to the floor closer to the election, then there is support for the auction
framework. However, if groups do not reward bills with any regard to timing during the
congressional session or do so more frequently near election day, then there is support
these bills are targeted at voters when they are most attentive to politics. I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5: Dead-on-arrival bills that provide the majority party more political benefits
are added to the legislative agenda earlier in the congressional term.
26This requires locating the utility lawmakers receive from the proposed alternative relative to the
status quo. Locating the status quo, much less how relevant policymakers feel about the new legislation,
has proven a daunting task.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented an open outcry auction model that shows the condi-
tions under which interest groups can secure agenda space for dead-on-arrival bills. My
model indicates intended failures are more likely to gain floor attention when the ma-
jority party has uncertain electoral prospects and the lawmaking system is gridlocked.
Additionally, I show that securing agenda space for a DOA proposal before the auction
makes it more likely that legislation gains floor consideration in the future. Conditional
on the majority party winning unified government, my model predicts intended failures
are more likely to gain agenda space relative to newly proposed legislation and enactable
bills that failed before the election. By subsidizing the party’s decision-making cost when
legislation is DOA, the group makes it cheaper for the party to advance that proposal
compared to a new bill. Moreover, if an interest group is willing to pay to get its proposal
on the agenda, a previously intended failure is more likely to win agenda space compared
to another bill that also failed in the previous session.
The auction model presents novel short term electoral and long term policy implica-
tions associated with dead-on-arrival bills. In the short term, intended failures provide
the majority party political support when it most needs it. When the majority party,
and by extension its allied interest groups, are uncertain about which party will control
government after an election, groups are most willing to compensate the party for a DOA
bill. This suggests DOA bills are electorally useful to lawmakers and not simply perfunc-
tory attempts at position-taking. In the long term, intended failures are more likely to
secure agenda space in future sessions. The implication is this future attention makes it
more likely these bills eventually become law. More generally, the model indicates that
today’s DOA proposals portend a majority party’s legislative agenda once it gains control
of government. In these uniquely productive policymaking moments, interest groups have
previously used intended failures to ensure their issues remain party priorities, and are
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enacted by its allies in government.
These short and long term implications arise due to the differing time horizons between
lawmakers and interest groups. For the majority party, winning more seats or veto points
in the upcoming election is its main concern. This proximate electoral goal incentivizes
legislators to use the floor agenda as a tool to generate political support. As policy
demanders, interest groups have longer time horizons. While they may not be able to get
their preferred policy enacted today, organized interests use DOA bills to make it more
likely their bill is enacted in the future. By subsidizing the majority’s decision-making
cost upfront, groups get lawmakers to adopt the policy as its working alternative to the
status quo.
Finally, the auction model offers novel insights about dead-on-arrival bills. Other
studies emphasize that DOA legislation is politically motivated and argue voters respond
to these proposals. However, it is not clear what the public gains from this legislation and
if voters actually provide consistent political support for this legislation. This chapter
clarifies when and why DOA bills arise on the agenda, and emphasizes the consistent
political return interest groups provide for these proposals. By emphasizing groups’ longer
policy time horizons, the model indicates DOA bills are part of a strategic interaction in
which each player clearly benefits. Furthermore, the auction stresses the key underlying
question concerning intended failures: why are they elevated over enactable legislation
on the floor agenda? By directly modeling how bills compete for attention, this game
provides new insights about why a majority party prefers to use its agenda to electioneer
rather than enact new laws.
49
2.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Single Round Auction
Proof. For gi to make an offer, its bid must meet the condition qivgi > 0. Since qi = 0,
this condition is never met. Therefore, gi does not bid and Up(li) = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Two Round Auction
Proof. Lemma 1 proves why a dead-on-arrival bill will never win the first round auction.
Consider the case where the reservation price is negative and g−is’ bids do not meet the
condition Up(l−i) > 0. In the first round, no bill is added to the agenda. The second
round conditions are identical to the first; therefore, P ’s tie-breaking rule precludes any
bill being added to the agenda.
If qi = 0 and Up(lj) > 0 or Up(lr) > 0, whichever bill’s total utility is greater and
exceeds 0 will be selected by P . If the selected bill is enacted, P ’s round 2 options are
{∅, li, lj} (and lj or 0 is the new reservation price) or {∅, li, lr}. The minimum reservation
price in either scenario is 0. Since Up(li) = 0, by P ’s tie-breaking rule, li never wins the
auction. If the bill selected in the first round is not enacted, P ’s round 2 options are
{∅, li, lj, lr}. This second round auction is identical as the one proven in Lemma 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. By construction. Begin with the second condition. A group only offers a bid if,
by winning the auction, it is better off than if the auction ends and the previous bid wins
the game. This condition is written as:
qtv + (1− qt)[v(qt+1 + b)]− b ≥ τ(v(qt+1 + w)) (2.16)
If this condition does not hold, the group prefers that the previous bidder wins the
auction and does not bid. Assume the bidder meets the condition above. Benefiting from
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its bid is not sufficient for a group to make an offer. In addition to knowing how it benefits
from its offer, the bidder also knows how much P will benefit from its bid relative to the
most recent offer. P only accepts an offer if it improves its total utility compared to the
total utility it receives from the most recent bid submitted. Write this condition as:

Up(lm) > Up(lw) if qmvmp ≤ qwvwp,
Up(lm) ≥ Up(lw) if qmvmp > qwvwp
(2.17)
where the left-hand term is the bid made by the group and the right-hand side is the
previous bid P received. If a group’s bill provides P less or the same amount of policy
utility than the standing bid, by P ’s tie-breaking rules, the total utility from the group’s
bill must be strictly larger than the previous bid to guarantee P prefers its bill. If a
group’s bill provides P more policy utility, P ’s total utility from the new bid must be
greater than or equal to the previous bid.
If a group gains utility from its offer and its bid does not meet the above condition, it
will not make an offer to P . The group has complete information and knows P will not
accept its bid. Therefore, the group does not make an offer. Only if a group’s bid meets
the conditions in Equations 2.16 and 2.17 will it make a bid to P .
Consider the special case of gr. Since its bill is the reservation price, it does not need
to bid to win the auction if no other bids have been made. Therefore, it will only enter
the auction if it can meet the conditions in Equations 2.16 and 2.17, and if another group
has offered a bid that will win absent any other offers. If any of these three conditions do
not hold, gr will not bid. 
51
CHAPTER III
The Electoral and Policy Consequences of
Dead-On-Arrival Bills
While dead-on-arrival bills generate significant political commentary, few systematic
accounts of this legislation exist. From a lawmaking standpoint, this is not surprising.
Once the DOA bill fails, the policymaking story is over. As a result, political scientists
have not tracked the prevalence or topics of intended failures over a sustained time period.
Since these proposals are viewed as symbolic position-taking, scholars have not examined
these bills’ fates once a majority party achieves unified government.
In this chapter, I provide a systematic analysis of dead-on-arrival bills from 2003
through 2012. I proceed in two parts. I begin by testing the first two hypotheses from
Chapter 2. I find DOA bills are added in a manner consistent with my model’s predictions.
Intended failures are more likely to gain floor consideration when control for government
is competitive and lawmakers have divergent policy preferences. Next, I examine the third
and fourth hypotheses generated by the auction model. These hypotheses predict previ-
ously DOA bills, relative to other legislation, are more likely to gain floor consideration,
and eventually become law, in unified government. My results support this prediction,
indicating that previously DOA bills are privileged by the majority party after it wins
control of government.
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3.1 The Strategic Timing of Dead-On-Arrival Bills
The population of observations for my analysis is every bill introduced in the House
or Senate from 2003 through 2012 (the 108th through the 112th congresses).1 This ten-
year period is a particularly useful time to examine intended failures. During this decade,
there was ‘classic’ divided government (110th Congress), unified government in which both
parties held power (108th, 109th, and 111th Congresses), and ‘quasi’ divided government
(112th Congress).2
Recall, Hypothesis 1 predicts that dead-on-arrival bills are more likely to receive floor
consideration when control for government is competitive in the upcoming election. Hy-
pothesis 2 predicts intended failures are more likely to arise on the agenda when lawmak-
ers’ policy preferences diverge.
3.1.1 Selection Problem and Estimating Bill Passage Probabilities
Hypotheses 1 and 2 concern when the majority party will add a dead-on-arrival pro-
posal to the floor agenda. Therefore, for every bill introduced in Congress, I need a
reliable way to assess if a bill has zero probability of passing. To determine this, I used
two approaches. First, for bills that reach the floor, I identified intended failures using
contemporaneous news reports. I isolated the set of bills that did not pass during a con-
gressional term and excluded policies that were modified and passed in a different form.3
To code dead-on-arrival bills that reach the floor, I searched CQ Weekly for contempora-
neous news concerning that bill. I coded a bill as dead-on-arrival if those reports explicitly
said the legislation had no chance of becoming law.4 If CQ Weekly was ambiguous con-
1I exclude ceremonial, commemorative or trivial (e.g., land conveyances) legislation as well as House
and Senate resolutions.
2This variation ensures advancing DOA bills is not a party-specific strategy or only arises in unified
or divided government.
3For instance, if one version of the Department of Defense Authorization did not pass but a second
version did, the first bill is not considered dead-on-arrival. I follow Cameron (2000) and consider this
behavior a type of bargaining or coordination between policymakers.
4Cameron (2000) finds that veto threats tend to lead to concessions. Thus, many veto threats are
not associated with intended failures even if the legislation does not pass. To avoid miscoding legislation
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cerning a bill’s fate, I searched the Proquest Newsstand database for any indication a bill
was dead-on-arrival.5
The most reliable way to determine if a bill is DOA is to examine CQ Weekly’s reporting
on the bill.6 While the articles themselves do not necessarily use the term ‘dead-on-
arrival,’ a bill’s fate can be inferred from the reporting. For instance, when writing
about 112-HR-910: Energy Tax Prevention Act of 2011, Koss and Symes (2011) reported
that a Senate amendment that mirrored the House bill had previously failed and that
President Obama had threatened to veto the legislation. Koss and Symes (2011) also
quoted Senators John D. Rockefeller IV (D-WV) and Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) who
both noted the bill would not gain enough support from Democrats to pass the Senate.
Similarly, when writing about 111-HR-5987: Seniors Protection Act of 2010, Weyl (2010)
reported that the bill received a vote because “Democrats sought to underscore their
political priorities even though the bill’s outcome was not in doubt.”
Second, I estimated the latent probability a bill can be enacted, which is a defining
feature of an intended failure. For bills that do not reach the floor, there is no consistent
way to categorize legislation as DOA. This creates a selection problem where, if I only
used news reports to identify DOA bills, I would only observe whether legislation is
dead-on-arrival once it becomes an outcome of interest.7 The latent variable addresses
that generates a veto threat, I checked the OMB’s statement of administrative position to determine
what part of the bill the president deemed dead-on-arrival. If Congress passed the same bill with the
dead-on-arrival provision, I coded it as DOA.
5The most common evidence used by news outlets to deem a bill dead-on-arrival involves prominent
legislators (e.g., a party leader or committee chair) or the president announcing the legislation would not
become law. In no instances did these announcements generate concessions that led to a modified version
of the bill being passed. Other situations include a bill being brought to the floor after the companion bill
failed in the other chamber and legislation being brought up again after an identical bill had previously
been defeated.
6There is no single type of reporting or coding within an article that ensures a bill can be classified
as DOA. That said, there are useful indicators that help expedite the coding process. For example, one
step I use to identify an intended failure is by examining the ‘Box Score’ that accompanies many CQ
Weekly articles. CQ Weekly reports the ‘next likely action’ to take place on the bill. If they reported
‘None’ as the next likely action, I closely examine why the legislation would not move through the rest of
the legislative process. Of course, a report of no further action on the bill does not guarantee it is DOA
and many articles do not include a box score.
7Other work on this topic generally ignores this issue. For instance, many studies of presidential
vetoes examine variation among bills the president vetoes. These studies do not consider the set of bills
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this problem by estimating the probability any introduced bill will be enacted. A bill is
recorded as DOA if its latent value of passage equals zero.
Using eleven factors commonly viewed as relating to a bill’s prospects in Congress, I
calculate weighted and unweighted sums that return the probability that a piece of leg-
islation can become law (Adler and Wilkerson 2003-2012b). The latent variable includes
factors related to the proposal’s sponsor, features of the bill itself, and the legislative
environment in which it is introduced (see the Appendix for the full latent variable spec-
ification).8 The measure conforms with conventional views of what legislation is likely to
pass Congress. For instance, Ron Paul’s attempt to exempt the industrial hemp industry
from marijuana regulations was the legislation that recorded the lowest value between
2003 and 2012. The bills with the highest enactment probabilities were Department of
Defense reauthorizations. In Table 3.1, I report the number of dead-on-arrival bills as well
as median and maximum bill enactment probabilities in each congress. The unweighted
measure is reported in parentheses next to the weighted one:
Table 3.1: Latent Measure of Introduced Bills’ Passage Probabilities (2003-2012)
Total Dead-On-Arrival Median Max
Bills Bills Pr(Passage) Pr(Passage)
108th Congress 8061 1342 (1043) 0.135 (0.137) 0.662 (0.607)
109th Congress 10189 1498 (953) 0.135 (0.142) 0.619 (0.596)
110th Congress 10528 284 (264) 0.124 (0.150) 0.601 (0.592)
111th Congress 10337 500 (392) 0.210 (0.198) 0.611 (0.569)
112th Congress 9986 917 (669) 0.105 (0.123) 0.812 (0.522)
Total 49101 4541 (3321) 0.143 (0.151) 0.812 ( 0.607)
The weighted and unweighted measures return similar results, albeit the unweighted
measure reports fewer bills as being dead-on-arrival or very likely to become law. During
this ten-year period, 5073 bills were sent to the House or Senate floor. I find 278 (weighted)
Congress could send the president to block.
8This method follows a similar approach used by Volden and Wiseman (2014) to estimate members’
latent effectiveness as legislators. While I do not directly incorporate their legislative effectiveness scores
(which are only available for House members), my latent measure incorporates aspects of their findings
by noting how individual and institutional characteristics make it more likely a bill will be enacted.
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or 276 (unweighted) DOA bills were added to the agenda.9 As a first step in examining
this legislation, I assessed how much of the floor agenda was devoted to dead-on-arrival
bills. I joined the set of intended failures with all other legislation that reached the floor
and created three discrete categories: Became Law, Dead On Arrival, or Other Failed. In
Table 3.2, I report the percentage of bills, by type, from 2003 through 2012.
Table 3.2: Bills that Receive Floor Consideration, 2003-2012
Bill Type Total Divided Unified
Government Government
Dead On Arrival 5% (277) 9% (172) 3% (105)
Other Failure 35% (1765) 35% (677) 34% (1088)
Became Law 60% (3026) 56% (1059) 62% (1967)
Not surprisingly, most bills that reach the floor in the House or Senate become law.
Forty percent of bills on the majority party’s agenda do not pass, most of which are not
DOA. However, most laws and other bill failures are on minor issues. In Table 3.3, I
subset the data on important bills, as defined by whether the legislation received coverage
in a CQ Weekly annual legislative summary article.
Table 3.3: Important Bills that Receive Floor Consideration, 2003-2012
Bill Type Total Divided Unified
Government Government
Dead On Arrival 11% (90) 21% (52) 7% (43)
Other Failure 19% (146) 16% (36) 20% (110)
Became Law 70% (592) 63% (159) 73% (433)
9One concern with this approach is that I exclude killer amendments that could change an enactable
bill to one that is dead-on-arrival. This is not an issue for three reasons. First, as a practical matter, CQ
Weekly never reported that a bill became an intended failure because of an amendment. Additionally,
none of the bills identified as DOA using the latent variable method had any amendments proposed.
Second, DOA bills do not exhibit the features that make a proposal susceptible to a killer amendment.
Jenkins and Munger (2003) note that killer amendments arise when a majority party is divided on an
issue. However, intended failures are on topics that almost always unify the chamber caucuses. These
bills are politically divisive and generally produce party line votes. Third, successful killer amendments
are very rare (Wilkerson 1999). Excluding them from this analysis means, at most, I will miss a few
idiosyncratic cases. Even if these cases do exist, CQ Weekly’s lack of coverage indicates these amendments
are unimportant in the first place.
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Once properly parsed, dead-on-arrival bills become a much more important feature of
the congressional agenda. In divided government, most important failed bills are sent to
the floor with the intention they will fail. Even in unified government these proposals
make up a quarter of all unsuccessful bills. The content of DOA bills further indicate
their outsize importance on the legislative agenda. These proposals cover a myriad of
notable and contentious policy topics, including the Affordable Care Act, U.S. policy
in Iraq, children’s healthcare, tort reform, workplace safety, union elections, campaign
finance reform, renewable energy, oil drilling, abortion regulations, among others.
In fact, these dead-on-arrival bills represent some of the most recognizable legislation
during this ten year period. Perhaps the most familiar DOA bill in this data set is
112-HR-2: Repealing the Job-Killing Healthcare Law. Additionally, many of the most
intense partisan fights, besides repealing the ACA, are represented by the intended failures
Democrats or Republicans advanced during this decade. For instance, repealing the estate
tax, an issue Republicans stridently fought for during the 108th and 109th Congresses, is
represented by two separate DOA proposals that gained floor consideration. During the
110th Congress, Democrats passed nearly a dozen intended failures related to the Iraq
War. In the same term, Democrats passed two doomed S-CHIP extension bills as well as
the DOA Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and the Paycheck Fairness Act.
For all of these high-profile examples, intended failures also include less publicized
issues. For example, during the 109th Congress, Republicans forwarded DOA bills that
would change oil refinery permitting requirements (109-HR-5254) and the criteria for
designating an animal as endangered (109-HR-3824). Most importantly, adding DOA
bills to the agenda is not only a Republican or Democratic strategy. From 2003 through
2012, Democrats and Republicans each controlled five chambers in Congress. In this
decade, Republicans added 57 percent (159) of the intended failures that received agenda
space and Democrats forwarded the other 43 percent (119).
Moreover, the dead-on-arrival bills that receive floor consideration are noticeably differ-
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ent than enactable legislation that is given agenda space. For instance, intended failures
tend cover more divisive issue areas (as defined by the Policy Agendas Project codebook).
The three most common topics featured in DOA bills are: 1) healthcare (14 percent); 2)
the economy (13 percent); and 3) labor, employment, and immigration issues (11 per-
cent). In contrast, the most common issues that enactable bills cover are: 1) public lands
(16 percent); 2) government operations (10 percent); and 3) defense (10 percent)10 Addi-
tionally, DOA and enactable legislation differ in the coverage they receive from political
observers. For a DOA bill that reaches the floor, CQ Weekly publishes nearly two times
as many articles (5.78) compared to an enactable proposal (2.99).
Although intended failures represent a relatively small portion of the agenda, these
proposals are not on trivial matters. In fact, they tend to be on particularly divisive issues
and generate significantly more commentary than enactable legislation. The importance
of these issues suggests majority parties do not simply pepper the agenda with DOA
legislation, but strategically use these bills for significant political gain.
3.1.2 Statistical Model
For Hypotheses 1 and 2 the outcome of interest is when legislation is added to a
chamber’s floor agenda. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if a bill is sent to the floor,
and 0 otherwise.11 I specify a hazard model with a Weibull distribution in which the unit
of analysis is the bill-day dyad.12 This data structure takes into account the time-varying
nature of a majority party’s electoral prospects (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 98).
My results are robust to other hazard rate distributions, such as a Cox proportional
10The Appendix includes a full count for each issue area.
11If a bill passes the House and is later introduced in the Senate, a new observation is recorded for
when the House proposal receives floor consideration in the Senate. The same is true for Senate bills sent
to the House.
12By using the Weibull distribution, I make the assumption that the likelihood a bill is added to the
agenda monotonically decreases the longer it is pending. This is reasonable particularly after taking into
account features of the bill that influence its time pending, such as its complexity, committee referrals,
and if it is must pass legislation. Additionally, the longer a bill is in committee it is more likely the
proposal has been subject to winnowing (Krutz 2005) or some other form of negative agenda control.
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hazards model.13
Once a bill is introduced, it ‘survives’ a certain number of days in committee before
it ‘expires’ and receives floor consideration. For clarity, I refer to an expiration as being
added to the floor agenda, and a proposal’s survival as the bill pending in the House or
Senate. The model is written as:
h(t|x) = ptp−1 + exp(αx) (3.1)
where h is the hazard, α are the coefficients, x are the covariates, t is time, and p is
the shape parameter. Since I assume the hazard decreases the longer a bill is pending, I
expect p < 1.
3.1.3 Independent Variables
To test Hypothesis 1, I measure a majority’s Electoral Prospects using data from the
Iowa Electronic Betting Market (IEM). The IEM produces a daily probability for which
party will win control of the House, Senate or presidency in the upcoming election. I
measure a majority party’s Electoral Prospects using the lowest probability that party
will win control of the House, Senate or presidency. This approach bases the likelihood
the majority wins unified government on its most difficult electoral circumstance. Even if
a party is very likely to win two institutions but not the third, its prospects for controlling
government remain low.14 During midterm elections, the presidency score is fixed at one
13The main downside to using a hazard model approach is I implicitly assume committees have limited
control over their agendas as a majority party can pull a bill from committee and send it to the floor.
An alternative approach that avoids this problem is to use a logistic regression in which I examine if a
bill received floor consideration. The results I present below are robust to logit model specifications in
which I use the same time-varying structure as the hazard model (the dependent variable is if a bill is
added to the floor). Additionally, my findings are robust to a model in which I subset the data on bills
that gain floor consideration. That model shows DOA bills, relative to enactable bills, are more likely to
be sent to the floor when control for government is competitive and in divided government.
14A natural inclination is to treat the House, Senate, and presidency as joint probabilities and use
the product to measure electoral prospects. However, these probabilities are not independent and are
conditional in complicated ways that vary by election. For instance, studies of presidential coattails
show who is on the ballot in other races affects each institution. The joint probability almost certainly
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or zero depending on whether his co-partisans are in the majority.
The IEM does not open at the start of a congressional term, so I imputed a party’s
future electoral prospects for those dates. I calculated the probability the majority party
will win an institution as follows. First, I counted the total number of competitive seats
in the House or Senate. Second, I counted the number of seats the party needs to win
to secure the majority. I defined a seat as competitive if the district/state voted for
the presidential candidate of the opposite party in the last election or if the district’s
competitiveness score is between 0 and -10 (Griffin 2006).15 I calculated the probability a
party would win enough seats for a majority, given the number of competitive elections.16
After an election, I set this variable at one if the party wins all three lawmaking institutions
or zero if there will be divided government.
Hypotheses 1a predicts a positive relationship between dead-on-arrival bills being pro-
posed and a party’s electoral prospects. Hypothesis 1b predicts that as it becomes very
likely a party will control government after the election, the probability intended failures
are added to the agenda decreases. To model this relationship, I included two variables:
Electoral Prospects and Electoral Prospects2. To test Hypothesis 2, I include a dummy
variable for whether there was Divided Government during a congress.
I include a dummy variable coded as 1 for a Dead on Arrival bill and 0 otherwise. I
underestimates a party’s electoral prospects. In a period of sorted parties, if there is a 50 percent chance
a party wins the House or Senate, the probability both events occur is unlikely to be 25 percent. Rather,
if a party wins one chamber, it likely reflects a successful campaign strategy that brought more voters
to the polls who support the party’s candidates in the other chamber. Thus, the probability of winning
both chambers, conditional on winning one, should exceed 50 percent. This may not be true of every
election cycle, which reflects these conditional probabilities’ complexity. For this reason, the minimum
probability is the best measure, as it more accurately reflects how difficult it will be for a majority party
to secure unified government. Additionally, I estimate Hypotheses 1 and 2 using the joint probability
measure. My results are generally robust to these specifications.
15The formula is −|%Democratic Presidential Vote Share−50%|. Values closer to zero indicate a more
competitive district, and smaller scores (more negative) indicate safer seats.
16This calculation is based on the binomial distribution. I assume Democrats and Republicans had a
0.5 probability of winning each competitive seat. While this varies by election, the amount of unknown
information each party had concerning a given race makes this assumption appropriate. The IEM is not
open before candidates are selected, so legislators do not know who their opponent will be or if there is
a national trend towards supporting one party or another.
60
interact it with the Electoral Prospects, Electoral Prospects2 and the Divided Government
covariates. These terms can be understood as assessing the effect of the party’s electoral
prospects or lawmakers’ divergent preferences, conditional on a bill being dead-on-arrival.
I expect a positive effect on the interaction that includes Electoral Prospects, a negative
effect on the interaction that includes Electoral Prospects2 and positive effect on the
Divided Government interaction term.
3.1.4 Controls
I include a dummy variable for Must Pass legislation, which I define as any department
or agency-level authorization or appropriations bill. Legislation that prevents large policy
reversions is more likely to end up on the legislative agenda and be enacted (Adler and
Wilkerson 2012a). I expect a positive relationship between a bill being sent to the floor
and must pass legislation. I include a measure of issue Salience, which is the percentage of
respondents saying a policy topic is the country’s most important problem, as measured by
Gallup. When citizens pay attention to an issue, the majority party may feel compelled
to bring legislation to the floor that addresses that topic. Additionally, voter concern
may reflect an exogenous shock that requires new public policy. Regardless of the reason,
lawmakers may choose to bring up more salient topics to display responsiveness to the
electorate. As a result, I expect a positive relationship between a bill’s salience and when
that issue is added to the agenda.
The time a bill spends in committee is influenced by the legislation’s complexity as well
as the number of committees that work on the proposal. I use the number of subjects a
bill covers, as measured by the Library of Congress, to measure a bill’s Complexity. This
variable ranges from 1 to 1602 subjects. Since I exclude trivial bills from this analysis, I
expect a majority party tends to focus on more complex legislation. This variable should
have a positive coefficient. Additionally, I count the number of committee Referrals a
bill receives. As legislation that receives multiple referrals is likely to move through the
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committee process more slowly, I expect this covariate to have a negative relationship
with when a bill is added to the floor. Finally, I include a Senate dummy variable to
account for differences in how the House and Senate add legislation to their respective
floor agendas.
3.2 Results
In Table 3.4, I report the results from a hazard model and include each variable’s
coefficient.17
17Rather than the hazard ratio. In the appendix, I report Cox models and Weibull hazard models
stratified by congress. The results are consistent with the findings in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Hazard Models of Bills Being Added to the Floor Agenda, 2003-12
Model 1 Model 2
Expected Weighted Unweighted
Sign Latent Variable Latent Variable
Dead On Arrival * + 4.786∗∗∗ 3.240∗∗∗
Electoral Prospects (1.232) (1.556)
Dead On Arrival * - -4.187∗∗∗ -3.072∗∗∗
Electoral Prospects2 (0.984) (0.937)
Dead On Arrival * + 1.987∗∗∗ 1.823∗∗∗
Divided Gov’t (0.169) (0.166)
Dead On Arrival -2.458∗∗∗ -1.604∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.371)
Electoral Prospects -0.213 -0.188
(0.230) (0.232)
Electoral Prospects2 -0.076 -0.010
(0.184) (0.185)
Divided Gov’t - -0.386∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.232)
Must Pass + 2.157∗∗∗ 2.165∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.067)
Salience + -0.711∗∗∗ -0.746∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.169)
Complexity + 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Committee Referrals - -0.072∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030)
Senate - -0.091∗∗∗ -0.038
(0.030) (0.030)
Constant -4.308∗∗∗ -4.359∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.089)
p < 1 0.412 0.412
N 20275135 20275135
Log likelihood -25145.64 -25201.42
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01, N=20,276,065
Note: DV = 1 if non-trivial bill is sent to the floor that day, 0 otherwise. The unit is the
bill-day dyad and entries are coefficients from a hazard model with a Weibull distribution.
p is the shape parameter.
Both models support Hypotheses 1 and 2. Conditional on pending to a given day,
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intended failures are more likely to be added to the agenda when a majority party’s
electoral prospects are uncertain. The interacted quadratic terms show that when the
probability a majority party will gain power is very likely or unlikely, dead-on-arrival
legislation is held off the agenda. More simply, when control for government is competitive,
the majority is more likely to add DOA legislation to the floor. The divided government
interaction terms are positive and significant. This indicates that dead-on-arrival bills are
added to the agenda sooner, relative to other legislation, when lawmakers’ preferences
diverge.
Enactable bills do not exhibit the same trends. Neither of the unconditional electoral
prospects variables are significant. In both specifications, the divided government covari-
ate is significant but in the opposite direction. This result conforms with other studies of
lawmaking. In divided government, fewer enactable proposals are sent to the floor relative
to when one party controls Congress and the presidency (Binder 2003; Krehbiel 1998).
This suggests that the majority party responds to a different set of factors when deciding
when to add dead-on-arrival legislation or enactable proposals to the floor. The control
variables are significant and in the expected direction except for the Salience covariate.
All else equal, less salient bills spend less time pending in committee than legislation on
more salient topics.18
To better understand these effects, I plot the predicted hazard ratios for DOA and non-
DOA bills as a function of both electoral prospects and divided government.19 When the
hazard ratio exceeds one, the likelihood the bill gets sent to the floor that day increases
relative to the baseline hazard rate. When it is smaller than one, the probability the
legislation is added to the floor that day decreases relative to the baseline hazard rate. In
18One reason this might occur is the manner in which committee members treat salient bills. These
proposals may be more prone to hearings and other committee activities so lawmakers can extract more
personal political value from the bill. Additionally, salient bills may be on more contentious topics. This
divisiveness may slow these bills in committee or prevent them from ever reaching the floor.
19The numerator of the hazard ratio is a function of the baseline hazard rate and the covariates. The
denominator is the baseline hazard rate. It is written as exp(α0)pt
p−1 where α0 is the parameter for the
regression constant term, p is the shape parameter, and t is time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 27).
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Figure 3.1, I plot the predicted hazard ratios for a dead-on-arrival and an enactable bill
as a majority’s electoral prospects change:
Figure 3.1: Predicted Hazard Ratios for Dead-On-Arrival and Enactable Bills
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Note: Predicted hazard ratios for dead-on-arrival and enactable bills being added to
the floor agenda as the majority party’s electoral prospects change based on Model
1 in Table 3.4. Must Pass and Senate are held at 0, Divided Government is held at
1, and all other variables are held at their means.
As Figure 3.1 shows, when control for government is competitive, the probability a
DOA proposal is sent to the floor increases. When Electoral Prospects equals 0.54, which
corresponds to the highest observed hazard ratio, the likelihood a DOA bill is sent to the
floor on that day increases 34 percent relative to the baseline hazard rate. In contrast,
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when a majority party’s electoral prospects are great or dismal, the likelihood a dead-
on-arrival bill is added to the agenda on a given day decreases. When the majority is
guaranteed to lose (Electoral Prospects equals zero), an intended failure is 60 percent less
likely to be sent to the floor that day compared to the baseline hazard. Similarly, when
the majority is guaranteed to win, an intended failure is 46 percent less likely to be added
to the agenda.
A majority party’s changing electoral prospects does not have the same effect on when
enactable bills get sent to the floor. On a given day, the probability an enactable proposal,
as shown by the purpled dotted line, is added to the agenda monotonically decreases as
the majority’s electoral prospects improve. Notably, the rate at which enactable bills gain
floor consideration does not share the same parabolic shape that characterizes when DOA
bills gain agenda space.
The results in Table 3.4 indicate intended failures are more likely to gain floor con-
sideration in divided government. However, enactable bills, as shown by the Divided
Government covariate, are more likely to get floor attention in unified government. To
better understand the size of these effects, I plot the predicted hazard ratios for a DOA
or enactable bill being added to the agenda in unified and divided government:
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Figure 3.2: Predicted Hazard Ratios for Bills in Unified and Divided Government
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Note: Predicted hazard ratios for a bill being added to the floor agenda in unified
or divided government based on Model 1 in Table 3.4. Must Pass and Senate are
held at 0 and all other variables are held at their means.
In unified government, the likelihood a DOA bill gets added to the agenda decreases
by 73 percent relative to the baseline hazard rate. However, in divided government, the
likelihood a DOA proposal gets sent to the floor only decreases by 2 percent. For enactable
bills, the effect of divided government has the opposite effect. The likelihood enactable
legislation gets sent to the floor in unified government only decreases 20 percent on a
given day, compared to an 80 percent decrease in divided government. More simply, bills
are less likely to make it to the floor the longer they are pending. However, for DOA bills
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in divided government, this decrease in the chance of making it to the floor is very small.
Non-DOA bills display the reverse trend. These proposals’ chances of making it to the
floor remains relatively higher in unified compared to divided government.
Taken together, these results lend support to my argument concerning when DOA
bills are advanced by the majority party. As Figure 3.1 shows, when a party’s electoral
prospects are uncertain, intended failures are emphasized on the agenda. When it is
more difficult to pass legislation in divided government, DOA proposals are relatively
more likely to get agenda space. Yet, in unified government, the majority party tends to
emphasize enactable bills.
3.3 The Future Success Of Dead-On-Arrival Bills
In this section, I test Hypotheses 3 and 4. Recall these hypotheses predict that once
a majority party wins unified government, a previously failed dead-on-arrival bill is more
likely to gain agenda space compared to new bills and other previously failed non-DOA
bills. A natural extension of these predictions is that gaining floor attention in unified
government makes it more likely a bill will become law. I test this possibility by examining
whether previously dead-on-arrival bills are enacted at higher rates than newly proposed
legislation as well as previously failed enactable legislation.
I leverage the 2004 and 2008 elections to assess whether former intended failures gained
agenda space and became law in the subsequent unified governments. Prior to the 2004
election, Republicans controlled government and maintained that control in the next
congress. In the 110th Congress, Democrats controlled the House and Senate, but not
the presidency. After the 2008 election, Democrats had unified government for the next
two years.20
20These two cases represent a particularly strong test of Hypotheses 3 and 4. Since Republicans
retained control of unified government but did not gain a supermajority in the Senate after the 2004
election, it is likely the previously DOA bills would still be difficult to enact. Additionally, the Great
Recession forced Democrats to prioritize important economic legislation that pushed other previously
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For this analysis, I combined three categories of bills. First is the legislation proposed
in the 109th and 111th Congresses. This data includes all previously failed bills that
are matched to legislation in these subsequent sessions as well as all newly introduced
legislation in those Congresses.21 Second are the dead-on-arrival bills that received agenda
space in the 108th and 110th Congresses but were not reintroduced in the subsequent
legislative session. Third are enactable bills that received agenda space in the 108th and
110th Congresses but were not reintroduced in the next session.22
I examine models with slightly different dependent variables. In the first specification,
the dependent variable is coded as 1 if a bill gained agenda space in the 109th or 111th
Congress and 0 otherwise. This model directly tests Hypotheses 3 and 4, that previously
dead-on-arrival bills are more likely to gain floor consideration in unified government
than previously failed enactable bills and new bills. The second specification includes a
dependent variable coded as 1 if a bill became law in unified government and 0 otherwise.
This model is a natural extension of Hypotheses 3 and 4, that gaining agenda space makes
it more likely a bill will be enacted.
Matching legislation between congresses is not a simple proposition. As Wilkerson,
Smith and Stramp (2015) note, there are numerous barriers, both from technical and
interpretative standpoints, to reliably connect legislation across time. My basic approach
is to count a version of the previously failed bill as being enacted if: the program or policy
in a DOA bill gets authorized in unified government or the main appropriations in the
DOA proposal are funded in unified government. The details between the bills do not
DOA priorities down the agenda (e.g., climate change and union election legislation). Any intended
failure that eventually became law had to overcome these significant obstacles.
21Newly introduced is a bit of a misnomer. A bill could have been introduced in the previous congress,
but not gained floor consideration, and reintroduced in the subsequent session. The auction model does
not predict the majority party prioritizes these bills once it gains control of government, so I do not
account for previous bill introductions.
22Matching old bills with new ones is not always a one-to-one proposition. In some cases old bills are
combined with other proposals into new legislation or the old bill is introduced in numerous new bills. If
two previously introduced bills (Bill A and Bill B) are combined into one bill, Bill C, in the new session,
I include two observations of Bill C to account for both previously failed proposals. If a previously failed
bill, Bill D, is reintroduced in Bills E and F, I code both new bills as previous failures based on Bill D.
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need to be the exact same, but the legislation needs to generally accomplish the same goal
(e.g., create a national park on the same land, close the same tax loophole, fund the same
program.) I identify versions of the same legislation between congresses using the Library
of Congress’s bills database. I matched legislation by short title and if unsuccessful, by
major provision. I read each bill’s summary to determine if the policy proposal matched
the previously failed bill.23 Compared to text matching methods, this approach is more
flexible but also more ambiguous. However, it is useful as it allows me to code bills that
obviously correspond to a previously failed bill that a more orthodox approach will miss.
For example, the text between the DOA S-CHIP extension bills (110-HR-976 and
110-HR-3963) passed during the 110th Congress are not the exact same as the S-CHIP
extension bill (111-HR-2) enacted in the 111th Congress. However, my coding scheme
matches these bills as the main program authorization that was previously DOA is enacted
in the subsequent legislation. Some bills provide straightforward matches, such as the
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (110-HR-2831 and 111-S-181) and the Class Action Fairness
Act (108-S-2062 and 109-S-5). Other legislation is much more ambiguous. For instance,
Republicans passed a dead-on-arrival comprehensive energy bill in the 108th Congress. A
similar, albeit slightly different comprehensive energy bill was enacted by Republicans in
the 109th Congress. In comparing the bills, it is difficult to assess whether the changes
to the 109th version excised the previously DOA provisions, changed them to make the
bill palatable to pivotal lawmakers, or included them in their entirety from the previous
legislation. For this reason, I do not match these bills. More generally, my coding scheme
errs on the side of caution. If the main provisions of a previously failed bill cannot be
matched to a bill in the subsequent Congress, I do not count that legislation as passing
in the next term.
I specify two main independent variables. First, if a bill in the 108th and 110th
23As an additional check, after identifying the failed bill and the subsequent enactment, I used the CQ
Roll Call database to compare the bill texts.
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session was Dead On Arrival, I coded it as 1 and 0 otherwise. Second, if a bill in the
108th and 110th session was Enactable but failed, I coded it as 1 and 0 otherwise. The
baseline category in these empirical models is newly introduced bills in the 109th or 111th
Congresses. I expect both independent variables to be positively signed. This result
would support Hypothesis 3, that previously failed DOA bills are more likely to gain
floor attention, and become law, compared to new proposals. Additionally, Hypothesis 4
predicts that the coefficient on the Dead On Arrival covariate should be significantly larger
than the Enactable covariate. This finding would indicate that former intended failures
are more likely to gain agenda space, and become law, compared to other previously failed
bills.
I control for the change in an issue’s average salience between each congress, defined as
∆Average Salience. To construct this variable, I calculated a bill’s salience by matching
its Policy Agendas Project issue code with data from Gallup’s Most Important Problem
question. I averaged the bill’s issue salience by congressional term and subtracted the more
recent term from the previous session. Bills may be more likely to get floor consideration
and become law in the subsequent congress if the issue is in the public’s eye compared to
previous years. For this reason, I expect a positive relationship between this variable and
the likelihood a bill gets agenda space and enacted. I also include a dummy variable for
the 109th Congress.
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Table 3.5: Probability Failed Bill Gains Consideration or is Enacted in Subsequent
Congress
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Expected Bills Receive Bills Receive Bills Bills
Sign Floor Floor Become Become
Consideration Consideration Law Law
Dead On Arrival + 2.260∗∗∗ 2.285∗∗∗ 1.745∗∗∗ 1.773∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.1864) (0.222) (0.222)
Enactable + 1.678∗∗∗ 1.686∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗ 1.274∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.0806) (0.106) (0.106)
∆Average Salience + -1.037∗∗ -0.285
(0.451) (0.589)
109th Congress 0.119∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.062)
Constant -2.328∗∗∗ -2.391∗∗∗ -2.960∗∗∗ -3.058∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.035) (0.033) (0.047)
Log likelihood -6595.785 -6589.977 -4335.617 -4330.860
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob DOA = Enactable 0.004 0.003 0.042 0.039
N 20973 20973 20973 20973
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: In Models 1 and 2, DV is 1 if bill receives floor consideration and 0 otherwise. In Models 3 and 4, DV is 1 if
bill becomes law and 0 otherwise. Data includes all non-trivial bills that received floor consideration but failed in
the 108th and 110th sessions and all newly introduced bills in the 109th and 111th congresses. Entries are log-odds
from a logistic model.
The results in Table 3.5 conform to my expectations. The positive coefficients on the
Dead On Arrival variable supports Hypothesis 3, that previously DOA bills are more
likely to gain floor consideration and become law compared to newly proposed legislation.
Additionally, the positive coefficients on the Enactable variable indicates previously failed
non-DOA bills are more likely to gain floor attention and become law relative to new bills.
This suggests that these proposals are relatively cheaper to enact because the majority
party has already paid the decision-making associated with this legislation.
In all four specifications, a Wald test indicates the Dead On Arrival coefficient is
significantly larger than the Enactable one. This result supports Hypothesis 4, that
previously dead-on-arrival bills are more likely to gain agenda space and become law
relative to other previously failed bills. Additionally, in each model ∆Average Salience
is negative. As an issue increases in salience between congresses, a majority party does
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not bring more bills to the floor on that topic.24 To examine the effects’ magnitude from
Table 3.5, I plot the predicted probability a bill receives floor consideration or becomes
law:
Figure 3.3: Predicted Probability Previously Failed Bill Is Enacted in Unified Government
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Note: Predicted probabilities that a bill receives floor consideration or becomes law
based on the results from Models 1 and 3 in Table 3.5.
The predicted probability a previously dead-on-arrival bill receives floor consideration
in the next session is 0.48. For previously failed enactable bills, the probability is 0.34
and for new bills this probability is 0.08. Consistent with the auction model’s predictions,
Figure 3.3 shows that gaining agenda space when a DOA bill will not become law increases
the likelihood that legislation receives floor consideration in unified government.
24That is not to say the majority is not responsive to changes in issue salience. Lawmakers may focus
on a few important proposals on that topic in order to find a legislative solution.
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Moreover, the attention previously failed DOA bills receive in unified government is
not limited to securing agenda space. These proposals, relative to new bills and other
previously failed bills, are more likely to be enacted. The predicted probability formerly
dead-on-arrival legislation becomes law in the subsequent congress is 0.23. This compares
to a predicted probability of 0.15 for other previously unsuccessful legislation and 0.05 for
new proposals.25 These results support the theory that these short-run intended failures
portend the majority party’s agenda in unified government. Once a dead-on-arrival bill
can be enacted, the majority party is more likely to pass that legislation relative to the
other bills lawmakers could not enact in divided government.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I tested the four main hypotheses from the auction model presented
in Chapter 2. In each case I find support for my theory. As predicted, majority parties
are more likely to add intended failures to their agendas when control of government is
competitive and lawmakers’ policy preferences diverge. Adding dead-on-arrival bills to the
agenda has long-term policy consequences. By paying the decision-making cost associated
with an intended failure when it will not pass, a previously DOA bill is more likely to
gain agenda space, and become law, when the majority party wins unified government.
By adding dead-on-arrival bills to the floor, legislators seek additional political support
when winning more seats can help the party achieve unified government. This behavior
creates an important link between a bill’s short-term legislative failure and its long-term
success. By coalescing around a specific policy alternative even when it will not be
enacted, the majority party increases the likelihood that proposal becomes law in unified
government.
These results have important implications for understanding how lawmakers structure
25The null hypothesis that the mean predicted probabilities are the same can be rejected at the p < 0.01
level in both models.
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Congress’s legislative agenda. As electoral competition increases, majority parties use
their agenda setting powers to electioneer rather than make new laws. This notion runs
counter to classic models of lawmaking in which policymakers genuinely bargain with one
another no matter their electoral prospects (e.g., Cameron 2000; Krehbiel 1998).
Moreover, these findings extend the literature on politically motivated legislative pro-
posals. While most studies argue dead-on-arrival bills are used to signal an outside au-
dience, this chapter clarifies when these bills arise, and more importantly, why they are
useful to lawmakers and the outside audience. Intended failures are not a blunt tool con-
stantly used by the majority party. Rather, these proposals are strategically added to the
floor when the party needs additional electoral support.
For interest groups, these bills are useful because they push lawmakers to agree to a
specific policy alternative. Subsidizing a bill’s decision-making cost is what distinguishes
DOA bills from other position-taking tools. While lawmakers can signal a policy position
or commitment to a certain issue with a speech (or other position-taking methods), in-
tended failures are unique in that they actually improve the likelihood the legislation is
eventually enacted. Interest groups do not reflexively support DOA legislation because
they agree with the proposal. They actually stand to gain by having the majority party
focus on their preferred intended failure.
In the next chapter, I examine a crucial assumption of my formal model: that interest
groups reward majority party lawmakers for advancing dead-on-arrival bills. Additionally,
I test Hypothesis 5, which predicts the order in which DOA bills should arise on the
agenda.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Dead-On-Arrival Bills Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.6: Number of Dead-On-Arrival Bills that Gained Floor Consideration, by
Congress
Congress Type of Government Number of DOA Bills
108 Unified (R) 44
109 Unified (R) 48
110 Divided (House - D; Senate - D) 81
111 Unified (D) 13
112 Divided (House - R; Senate - D) 92
Total 278
Note: Dead-on-arrival counts are based on the weighted
latent variable.
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Table 3.7: Percentage of Dead-On-Arrival and Enactable Bills that Reach the Floor, by
Issue Area
Dead-On-Arrival Enactable
Economy 13% (37) 2% (92)
Civil Rights and Liberties 5% (14) 2% (76)
Healthcare 14% (38) 7% (359)
Agriculture Less than 1% (2) 2% (84)
Labor, Employment, and Immigration 11% (30) 3% (138)
Education 1% (3) 4% (168)
Environment 5% (13) 4% (215)
Energy 9% (26) 3% (121)
Transportation 2% (6) 5% (226)
Law, Crime, and Family Issues 4% (12) 8% (390)
Social Welfare 2% (5) 2% (92)
Housing and Community Development 1% (4) 2% (104)
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce 5% (14) 10% (475)
Defense 7% (19) 10% (488)
Space, Science Technology and Communications 1% (3) 3% (160)
Foreign Trade 1% (4) 2% (102)
International Affairs and Foreign Aid 1% (4) 5% (225)
Government Operations 10% (27) 10% (498)
Public Lands and Water Management 5% (14) 16% (768)
Other/Miscellaneous Less than 1% (1) Less than 1% (10)
Note: Issue areas based on the Policy Agendas Project codebook. Dead-on-arrival per-
centages are based on the weighted latent variable. The number of bills by issue area is
in parentheses.
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3.5.2 Robustness Checks
Table 3.8: Cox Models of Bills Being Added to the Floor Agenda, 2003-12
Expected Sign Weighted Unweighted
Latent Variable Latent Variable
Dead On Arrival * + 4.723∗∗∗ 3.282∗∗∗
Electoral Prospects (1.254) (1.712)
Dead On Arrival * - -2.439∗∗∗ -3.067∗∗∗
Electoral Prospects2 (0.404) (0.947)
Dead On Arrival * + 1.952∗∗∗ 1.795∗∗∗
Divided Gov’t (0.172) (0.169)
Dead On Arrival -2.439∗∗∗ -1.628∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.379)
Electoral Prospects -0.616∗∗∗ -0.597∗∗
(0.237) (0.239)
Electoral Prospects2 0.169 0.150
(0.189) (0.190)
Divided Gov’t - -0.432∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037)
Must Pass + 2.093∗∗∗ 2.102∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.067)
Salience + -0.674∗∗∗ -0.708∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.168)
Complexity + 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Committee Referrals - -0.071∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030)
Senate - -0.101∗∗∗ -0.049∗
(0.030) (0.030)
N 20275135 20275135
Log likelihood -53076.42 -53131.62
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01, N=20,276,065
Note: DV = 1 if non-trivial bill is sent to the floor that day, 0 otherwise. The unit is the
bill-day dyad and entries are coefficients from a Cox proportional hazards model.
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Table 3.9: Weibull Models of Bills Added to the Floor Agenda Stratified by Congress,
2003-12
Expected Sign Weighted Unweighted
Latent Variable Latent Variable
Dead On Arrival * + 5.427∗∗∗ 3.960∗∗∗
Electoral Prospects (1.295) (1.241)
Dead On Arrival * - -4.631∗∗∗ -3.558∗∗∗
Electoral Prospects2 (1.026) (0.924)
Dead On Arrival * + 2.257∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗
Divided Gov’t (0.171) (0.169)
Dead On Arrival -2.731∗∗∗ -1.897∗∗∗
(0.415) (0.397)
Electoral Prospects -1.094∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.262)
Electoral Prospects2 0.603∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗
(0.214) (0.214)
Divided Gov’t - -0.674∗∗∗ -0.648∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.129)
Must Pass + 2.149∗∗∗ 2.154∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.067)
Salience + -0.871∗∗∗ -0.909∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.174)
Complexity - 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Committee Referrals - -0.145∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032)
Senate - -0.113∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030)
109th Congress 0.139 0.132
(0.118) (0.118)
110th Congress 0.592∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.122)
111th Congress 0.085 0.119
(0.119) (0.118)
112th Congress — —
Constant -4.045∗∗∗ -4.129∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.124)
p < 1 0.412 0.412
N 20275135 20275135
Log likelihood -25050.14 -25112.46
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: DV = 1 if non-trivial bill is sent to the floor that day, 0 otherwise. The unit is the
bill-day dyad and entries are coefficients from a hazard model with a Weibull distribution.
p is the shape parameter. 79
Table 3.10: Bills Being Added to the Floor Agenda with Electoral Prospects Product
Measure, 2003-12
Weibull Models Cox Models
Expected Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted
Sign LV LV LV LV
Dead On Arrival * + 2.982∗∗∗ 1.246 17.880 3.226
Electoral Prospects (0.987) (0.991) (18.108) (3.280)
Dead On Arrival * - -2.982∗∗∗ -1.486∗ -0.056∗∗∗ 0.247
Electoral Prospects2 (0.861) (0.866) (0.049) (0.218)
Dead On Arrival * + 2.100∗∗∗ 1.821∗∗∗ 7.871∗∗∗ 5.951∗∗∗
Divided Gov’t (0.188) (0.183) (1.529) (1.126)
Dead On Arrival -1.838∗∗∗ -1.048∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.354
(0.272) (0.268) (0.046) (0.098)
Electoral Prospects 0.117 0.181 0.860 0.912
(0.214) (0.215) (0.191) (0.203)
Electoral Prospects2 -0.491∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗∗ 0.704∗ 0.667∗∗
(0.182) (0.183) (0.132) (0.125)
Divided Gov’t - -0.430∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.026) (0.129)
Must Pass + 2.155∗∗∗ 2.162∗∗∗ 8.105∗∗∗ 8.163∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.067) (0.541) (1.126)
Salience + -0.714∗∗∗ -0.755∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.169) (0.085) (0.082)
Complexity - 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Committee Referrals - -0.075∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗ 0.918∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Senate - -0.088∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.957
(0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
Constant -4.321∗∗∗ -4.381∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.077)
p < 1 0.412 0.412 — —
N 20275135 20275135 20275135 20275135
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01, N=20,276,065
Note: DV = 1 if non-trivial bill is sent to the floor that day, 0 otherwise. The unit is the bill-day dyad
and entries are coefficients from hazard models with a Weibull distribution or a Cox proportional hazard
model. p is the shape parameter.
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3.5.3 Latent Variable Measure
To calculate the latent probability a bill will become law, I use 11 measures26 that
manifest when a bill is introduced. I split the measures into three discrete groups: Sponsor
traits, bill/issue traits, and political environment traits. Each group is the sum of the
traits divided by the number of traits, and are written as:
Sponsor =
Majority + Seniority + Chair + SubChair +MembComm
5
(3.2)
Bill/Issue =
Auth/Approp+Divisiveness+ Cosponsors+Bipartisanship
4
(3.3)
Environment =
SupporterDistance+ Companion
2
(3.4)
Equations 1, 2 and 3 are summed and divided by 3:
Sponsor +Bill/Issue+ Environment
3
(3.5)
The full codebook that explains each of these variables can be found at the end of
the Appendix. In some cases, it is possible to identify dead-on-arrival bills using coding
schemes other than this latent variable. The three ways to do so are: 1) contemporaneous
news coverage reports that the bill as dead-on-arrival; 2) it is introduced after the same
dead-on-arrival legislation previously failed; or 3) there is a standing threat to block the
26I examined other variables including an issue’s salience, the distance from the sponsor’s ideology to
the most distance veto player, and a House member’s effectiveness score (Volden and Wiseman 2014).
The legislative effectiveness score predicted whether a bill is likely to pass the House, Senate or become
law, but is not available for Senators. Issue salience and sponsor distance did not predict if a bill would
pass the House, Senate or became law.
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proposal by a veto player. In those cases, the probability that bill will pass is zero. In
Table 3.9, I report the number of dead-on-arrival bills based on each identification method:
Table 3.11: Dead-On-Arrival Bills by Identification Method
Identification Method Number of Dead-On-Arrival Bills Percent
Weighted Measure
Identified by CQ Weekly 238 6%
Standing Threat 78 1%
Identified by Latent Variable Measure 4230 93%
Total 4546
Unweighted Measure
Identified by CQ Weekly 238 8%
Standing Threat 78 2%
Identified by Latent Variable Measure 3007 90%
Total 3323
To account for dead-on-arrival proposals identified by means other than the latent
variable, I multiply a dummy variable, Non-DOA, to Equation 3.5. The full, weighed
sum measure is written as:
Sponsor +Bill/Issue+ Environment
3
(Non−DOA) (3.6)
I calculate an unweighted sum in which all the factors are added together and divided
by 11. This equation is:
Majority + Seniority + Chair + SubChair +MembComm+
Auth/Approp+Divisiveness+ Cosponsors+Bipartisanship+
SupporterDistance+ Companion
11
(Non−DOA)
These measures can return a negative value, which I normalize to 0, meaning a bill has
no chance of enactment.
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Descriptive Statistics
The weighted measure’s mean bill enactment probability is 0.16 with a 0.12 standard
deviation. The median is 0.14. The normalized minimum is 0 (the true minimum is -0.07)
and the maximum is 0.82. The mean probability for bills that become law is 26%. The
measure returns 4541 proposals that will not pass.
The unweighted measure is more optimistic about a bill’s probability of enactment
than the weighted measure. The mean probability a bill will become law is 0.16 with
an 0.12 standard deviation. The median is 0.15. The normalized minimum is 0 (the
true minimum is -0.08) and the maximum is 0.61. The mean probability that legislation
becomes law is 0.28. The measure returns 3321 proposals that will not be enacted. The
distribution of bills is similar between the weighted and unweighted measures as can be
seen in the histograms below:
Figure 3.4: Histograms of Latent Bill Passage Probabilities
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An examination of the least and most likely bills to become law provides face validity
to the measures. The bills least likely to be enacted are proposed by legislators who
are known for offering legislation that is unlikely to become law (e.g., Ron Paul, Dennis
Kucinich). Both measures report a bill proposed by Ron Paul to exempt the industrial
hemp industry from marijuana laws as the bill with the lowest passage probability between
2003 and 2012. The most enactable bills tend to be major authorization/appropriations
bills. However, many important bills also return high probabilities. Most of Mayhew’s
landmark bills have a 30% chance or higher of passing (which places those bills at least
in the 88th percentile of enactment probability).
3.5.4 Performance
I assess the measure’s performance in two ways. First, I examine the number of Type
1 errors this approach produces by examining how many bills are coded as DOA but
are enacted. Second, I evaluate whether the measure helps predict which legislation is
enacted. The data in this section uses all bills introduced in the House and/or Senate
from 2003 through 2012,27 which is an N=49,101.28
3.5.4.1 Type 1 Errors
The clearest way to determine if the latent measure is capturing dead-on-arrival bills by
estimating the bill’s probability of enactment is to examine the number of false positives
it produces. Since definitively identifying a dead-on-arrival bill requires knowing the
intention behind the legislation, and not just observing whether it fails in the lawmaking
process, the only way to know the latent variable misidentifies a proposal as DOA is
if that bill becomes law. Both latent measures perform well in avoiding Type 1 errors.
For bills that become law, the weighted measure only mistakes 15 (or 0.0002%) of them
27The original measure was only tested on 110th House bills. The findings are robust when I conduct
an out of sample test by dropping the 110th House observations.
28I exclude trivial bills which are commemorative bills, bills that name facilities, and land conveyances.
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as dead-on-arrival. The unweighted measure mistakes 10 (or 0.0001%). These bills are
generally on minor topics and are listed below:
Table 3.12: Dead-On-Arrival False Positives By Measure
Bill Title Measure
112-HR-6328 Clothe a Homeless Hero Act Both
112-HR-515 Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2011 Both
112-HR-4849 Sequoia and King Canyon National Parks Backcountry Access Act Both
112-HR-4606 To authorize the issuance of right-of-way permits Both
for natural gas pipelines in Glacier National Park,
and for other purposes.
109-HR-606 Angel Island Immigration Station Restoration Both
and Preservation Act
109-HR-2099 Arabia Mountain National Heritage Area Act Both
108-HR-2152 To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to extend for Both
an additional 5 years the special immigrant religious worker program.
108-HR-2489 Cowlitz Indian Tribe Distribution of Judgment Funds Act Both
112-HR-6007 North Texas Zebra Mussel Barrier Act of 2012 Weighted
108-HR-3479 Brown Tree Snake Control and Eradication Act of 2004 Weighted
108-HR-5204 To amend section 340E of the Public Health Service Act Weighted
(relating to children’s hospitals) to modify provisions regarding the
determination of the amount of payments for indirect expenses
associated with operating approved graduate medical
residency training programs.
108-HR-2010 To protect the voting rights of members of the Weighted
Armed Services in elections for the Delegate representing
American Samoa in the United States House of Representatives,
and for other purposes.
112-HR-514 FISA Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 Unweighted
108-S-2575 Sudden Oak Death Syndrome Control Act of 2004 Unweighted
Additionally, the number of false positives quickly increases as the cut-off for dead-
on-arrival bills increases from zero. In the graphs below, I report the number of Type 1
errors as the definition for a DOA bill becomes more inclusive (greater than zero):
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Figure 3.5: Number of Type 1 Errors As Latent Measure Becomes Less Restrictive
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As the figure shows, the number of false positives from each latent variable drastically
increases as the cut-off for which bills are considered DOA expands. In particular, a more
expansive latent variable misidentifies a significant number of important enactable bills.
This suggests that both measures, and using zero as the cut-off to designate DOA bills,
are good at avoiding false positives.
3.5.4.2 Predictive Power
The latent measures help predict which bills become law. Below, I report logistic and
linear probability models in which the dependent variable is whether a bill is enacted and
the independent covariate is the latent measure:
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Table 3.13: Probability Bill Is Enacted
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LPM Logit LPM Logit
Weighted Measure 0.343∗∗∗ 6.109∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.154)
Unweighted Measure 0.429∗∗∗ 8.001∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.173)
Constant -0.004∗∗∗ -4.175∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -4.683∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.044) (0.002) (0.051)
N 49101 49101 49101 49101
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.036 0.079 0.051 0.116
All four measures indicate that as the latent probability a bill passes rises, so does
the likelihood that legislation is enacted. The effect from the linear probability models
show a 1 percent increase in a bill’s passage probability corresponds to between a 0.34
percent and 0.43 percent increase in the likelihood that proposal is enacted. The predicted
probabilities from the logistic models are similar and are plotted below:
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Figure 3.6: Predicted Probabilities Bill is Enacted Based on Latent Measure
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Based on the weighted measure, a bill with a 0.1 passage probability is enacted 3
percent of the time. However, when passage probability increases to 0.8, the highest
value recorded, the likelihood the bill is enacted increases to 52 percent. Similarly, using
the unweighted measure, the a bill with a 0.1 passage probability is enacted 2 percent of
the time, but a bill with an 0.8 passage probability becomes law 72 percent of the time.
One concern with this approach is the models’ modest fit. For instance, the R2 values
suggest the latent measure predicts between 4 and 12 percent of the variation in the data.
However, evaluating the measure in this way ignores the myriad of ways a bill’s fortunes
can change after its introduction. None of these models take into account the leadership’s
priorities, potential amendments, the committee chair’s preferences (except for the bill he
proposes), competition for scarce agenda space, presidential priorities, changes made in
the committee mark-up, media attention, among many others. All of these factors change
a bill’s passage probability throughout the legislative process. For non-DOA legislation,
88
the latent value I calculate should be viewed as the bill’s initial prospects, which changes
based on the priorities and lawmaking tactics employed by various legislators.
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Table 3.14: Latent Variable Measure Codebook
Sponsor Traits
Majority Majority party member Coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
Seniority Number of terms served Number of terms served
Maximum number of terms observed in that session
Chair Chair of Committee Bill is Referred to Coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
SubChair Chair of Subcommittee Bill is Referred to Coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
MembComm Member of Committee Bill is Referred to Coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
Bill/Issue Traits
Auth/Approp Major Authorization/Appropriation Coded 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
Divisiveness Issue Divisiveness (1- % Party unity votes on issue in previous year)
minus by (1- the average divisiveness in the previous year)
More divisive issues have smaller values
Cosponsors Proportion of Chamber
Total Cosponsors
Total Members
who cosponsored bill
Bipartisanship Relative bipartisanship of
Democrat Cosponsors
Total Cosponsors
,
bill’s cosponsors subtracted by 1− Democrat Cosponsors
Total Cosponsors
if measure > 0.5
Environment Traits
Supporter Distance Median sponsor and cosponsor distance 1- Absolute value of differenced
from furthest veto player DW-NOMINATE scores
Companion Companion Bill Coded 1 if companion or identical bill
is introduced in the Senate, 0 otherwise
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CHAPTER IV
How Interest Groups Incentivize Lawmakers to Focus
On Dead-On-Arrival Bills
In Chapter 2, I specified an auction in which interest groups provide political support to
the majority party in order to get their preferred legislation onto the floor. An important
feature of this model is dead-on-arrival bills only receive floor consideration when interest
groups offer the party sufficient political support. While organized interests may prefer
DOA legislation, there is little extant scholarly evidence they actually reward lawmakers
for adding intended failures to the agenda. Rather, political scientists argue voters are
the relevant audience for dead-on-arrival bills.
In this chapter, I test a key assumption of my theory, that interest groups provide
majority party lawmakers political support for adding dead-on-arrival bills to the floor
agenda. Using interest group sponsored campaign advertisements and legislative score-
cards, I show organized interests consistently reward its majority party allies for DOA
legislation. Additionally, my results indicate the rewards lawmakers accrue from intended
failures outstrip the political costs generated by opposing groups. Finally, I test Hypoth-
esis 5, which predicts that more valuable dead-on-arrival bills should be elevated to the
agenda earlier in the congressional term. As predicted, I find more politically valuable
intended failures are added earlier in the term relative to less valuable DOA bills.
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4.1 Interest Group Attention to Dead-On-Arrival Bills
There are good reasons to believe organized interests reward legislators for intended
failures. Journalistic accounts report the crucial role groups play in incentivizing this
legislative behavior. For instance, in Chapter 2, I noted that in 2003, the American
Medical Association provided significant political support to Republicans for advancing
tort reform legislation, “a wide-ranging business coalition” backed OSHA reform in 2005
(Swindell 2005), and unions backed card-check legislation in 2008 (Benson 2008). All of
these bills were dead-on-arrival.
Second, the wide range of policy areas DOA proposals cover suggests that interest
groups are an important audience for this legislative behavior. Intended failures on topics
such as OSHA reform or trade policy are important to powerful organized interests but
are rarely salient to voters. Third, organized interests are attentive to bills relevant to
their policy goals. Groups actively lobby Congress to get their issues on the agenda and
to inform members about the ‘correct’ way to vote on legislation. Finally, groups make
explicit connections between legislation and their political support. They donate money,
run ads, make endorsements, publish scorecards, organize voting drives, among many
other activities, based on legislative positions (Skinner 2007).
Moreover, the formal model and the results in Chapter 3 clarify why organized interests
are willing to provide support for dead-on-arrival bills. By subsidizing the majority party’s
decision-making cost when the legislation will not become law, groups make it more likely
their preferred bill is enacted in the future. To the extent interest groups are attentive
to legislation and are documented as being involved when DOA legislation is brought up,
the relevant question is do organized interests systematically reward intended failures?
To this point, I have maintained this is the case. My auction model, in Chapter 2,
assumes that interest groups are providing political support to the majority party for
adding bills they prefer to the floor. To examine my assumption about interest groups, I
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consider three propositions that underly my theory about organized interests and dead-
on-arrival bills. I subsequently test these propositions.
4.1.1 Interest Group Propositions
The most basic assumption I make about interest groups is that they reward majority
party lawmakers when dead-on-arrival bills are added to the floor. I write this assumption
as Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: Allied interest groups provide majority party lawmakers political support
for including dead-on-arrival bills on the majority’s legislative agenda.
Recall from Chapter 2 that agenda space is doled out based on legislation’s policy
and political utility. As a consequence, on average, dead-on-arrival bills should provide
lawmakers more political benefits than enactable proposals. This is because a group must
provide more political support to get a DOA bill on the agenda relative to other legis-
lation. As an intended failure does not offer legislators any policy utility, groups must
compensate legislators with more political benefits to make up for this difference. Thus:
Proposition 2: Compared to enactable legislation, allied interest groups are more likely
to provide the majority party political support for dead-on-arrival bills that arise on the
legislative agenda.
Of course, legislation can generate political costs in addition to benefits for the majority
party. Lawmakers are concerned with any political backlash to legislative proposals, dead-
on-arrival or otherwise. Binder and Lee (2013) note that legislators carefully consider the
electoral costs associated with a bill. Arnold (1990) argues that members of Congress
consider how traceable an unpopular policy will be on election day. Cox and McCubbins
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(2005) theorize party leaders avoid legislation that will harm the party brand. Generally,
these costs are assumed to come from voters but interest groups also play a crucial role
in the majority party’s political considerations.
In particular, organized interests are important actors in developing a policy’s image
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993), financing campaigns, educating and mobilizing voters
(e.g., Hillygus 2005; Franz and Ridout 2007; Pfau et al. 2002; Pfau et al. 2001) as well as
more generally expanding the scope of a policy’s conflict (Schattschneider 1960). While
the majority party may be less inclined to pay attention to opposing interest groups,1
it is likely to avoid DOA bills that generate more negative backlash than support from
organized interests. More generally, my theory assumes that intended failures net positive
political returns for the majority party even after accounting for any backlash these bills
may produce. Thus:
Proposition 3: For majority party lawmakers, dead-on-arrival bills generate more interest
group support than blame.
4.2 Data and Statistical Models
To examine if interest groups reward lawmakers for advancing DOA bills, I use the
same set of legislation that was introduced in the House or Senate from 2003 through 2012
featured in Chapter 3.2 When assessing legislations’ political consequences, most studies
attempt to connect organized interests’ campaign contributions to legislative behavior (see
Roscoe and Jenkins 2005 for a review). The downside to using donations to study which
bills interest groups reward or punish is that money, by law, cannot be explicitly connected
to a certain bill or vote. In contrast, I use two data sets, television advertisements
1Conservative groups are unlikely to approve of Democratic legislation anyway, and vice versa.
2Recall, I calculate two similar latent variables as one way to identify dead-on-arrival bills. For
parsimony, I include the weighted latent variable analyses in the body of the paper and the unweighted
latent variable analyses in the Appendix. In all models, the results are nearly identical.
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and legislative scorecards, in which organized interests are explicit about which bills are
important to them. I test Propositions 1, 2, and 3 using both data sets.
4.2.1 Interest Group Campaign Advertisements
The population for this analysis is all interest group campaign advertisements3 run
during the 2004, 2008 and 2010 congressional campaigns.4 These data include 1,025
different creatives that were aired 336,728 times paid for by 167 different interest groups.5
Sixty-two percent of the ads were run during the 2010 midterms, 38 percent during the
2008 general election and 6 percent in the 2004 general election. Seventy-eight percent of
the advertisements are attack ads.
The ad that most frequently mentioned a dead-on-arrival bill was run by America’s
Agenda: Health Care for Kids during the 2008 election. The ad thanked a specific legis-
lator, almost always a Democrat, for voting in favor of 110-HR-3963, the S-CHIP Reau-
thorization bill. This particular commercial aired 13,499 times prior to election day. The
second most frequently mentioned DOA bill was 110-HR-800: the Employee Free Choice
Act. This intended failure, which conservative groups used to attack Democratic law-
makers, was mentioned in 14,414 ads that aired during the 2008 election. Notably, most
DOA bills are not mentioned in these ads. During the three election cycles analyzed,
32 intended failures were mentioned in a group-sponsored campaign advertisement. At
the same time, dozens of enactable bills were mentioned, although the Affordable Care
Act, the Democrats’ climate change bill, and the Recovery and Reinvestment Act were
mentioned many times more than any other legislation.
3These ads are distinct from issue advertisements, which ask a legislator to vote a particular way when
a bill is being debated or advocates for an idea more generally. The ads included in this data set are
coded by the Wisconsin and Wesleyan Advertising Projects as campaign spots and explicitly discuss a
candidate rather than asking them to advocate for a certain bill.
4All data comes from the Wisconsin and Wesleyan Advertising Projects (Fowler, Franz and Ridout
2015b; Fowler, Franz and Ridout 2015a; Goldstein and Rivlin 2007). The Wisconsin Advertising Project
did not collect data in 2006 and the Wesleyan Advertising Project releases data 4 years after an election.
At the time of writing, the 2010 data is the most recent campaign cycle available.
5In a few cases, two interest groups combined to run an ad, which I counted as a unique group.
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The unit of analysis is the individual TV spot (i) run in a congressional district (j) dur-
ing a given electoral cycle (k). This data presents three empirical challenges. First, there
are systematic factors related to whether an interest group chooses to feature legislation
in its ad. Only 51 percent of the commercials actually mention a bill of any sort. Factors
such as whether the ad is about the incumbent make it more likely a group mentions
legislation in the commercial.
Second, since TV ads are nested in congressional districts (or states, for Senate elec-
tions) and election cycles, a multilevel selection model may be appropriate. However,
many districts either only have one interest group advertising (37 percent of the time) or
all of the advertisements in the district support or oppose the majority party candidate.
This lack of variation makes estimating a multilevel model infeasible. Third, there may
be unobserved factors associated with an interest groups’ propensity to mention DOA
bills in their ads. However, for most groups in the data, they a) only support or oppose
the majority party and/or b) only run ads in a specific district or state in one election
cycle. As a result, in many cases, interest group fixed effects perfectly predict whether
the group supports the majority party candidate. Since groups may only run ads in one
district during one election cycle, group fixed effects drops most of the data.
To balance these concerns, I specify a Heckman probit selection model with standard
errors clustered by the interest group-election cycle dyad.6 This specification takes into
account the selection issue and heterogeneity associated with an interest group’s decision
to mention legislation in a given election. This approach assumes within an electoral
cycle, the decision to mention certain legislation (DOA or otherwise) is correlated within
groups but not between groups.7 In other words, in 2008, the Club for Growth’s decision
6I do not cluster by district for two reasons. First, I assume groups that advertise widely generally pick
an issue as the basis for most of their ads (e.g., repealing the Affordable Care Act in the 2010 election).
Anecdotally, groups tend to run creatives that make similar electoral appeals between districts. Second,
while group-time clusters have been examined in the applied econometrics literature, there is little work
on the precision of three-way clustered standard errors.
7An alternative way to cluster the data is by interest group. This approach suggests all ads, regardless
of election cycle, are correlated within groups. The results from clustering the data in this manner is
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to mention legislation in its ads is independent of the Chamber of Commerce’s decision
to do so. To test Propositions 1, 2, and 3, I examine the probability an ad mentions a
dead-on-arrival bill as a reason to support the majority party candidate. The model’s
first stage predicts whether a bill, DOA or otherwise, is mentioned in the ad. The second
stage predicts if the commercial supports the majority party.
First Stage The dependent variable in the first stage is coded as 1 if the advertisement
mentions any bill and 0 otherwise. I include three covariates to predict when a commercial
mentions legislation. Since ads about the incumbent are more likely to highlight a legisla-
tor’s voting record, I include a dummy variable if the commercial is about the Incumbent
and expect a positive coefficient. Primary election ads tend to focus on a member’s ideo-
logical qualifications rather than specific policy goals. To account for differences between
ads run in the general election and primaries, I include a dummy variable for whether the
commercial was run in the General election. I expect ads run during the general contest
to mention a bill more often.8
Close races generate more scrutiny of a lawmaker’s record, which can lead to ads
mentioning specific bills. To measure which districts are more likely to produce close
elections, I specify a District Competitiveness variable. I adopt a measure similar to
one used by Griffin (2006), which is the inverse of the absolute value of the district’s
presidential vote minus 50.9 A value of zero is an extremely competitive district and
smaller (more negative) values indicate a less competitive district. I expect a positive
relationship between a district’s competitiveness and whether a bill is mentioned in an
ad.
robust to the specifications included below. Additionally, Cameron and Miller (2015) suggest using
clustered robust standard errors. In the Appendix, I report models with these standard errors. All
specifications are similar to the results discussed below.
8It is not obvious if any primary election ad actually supports the majority party. Thus, in the model’s
second stage, I code all primary contests as 0, or not supporting the majority. I report models where I
include and exclude these commercials in Table 4.1. The results are robust to both specifications.
9Formally, District Competitiveness = −|Democratic Presidential Vote Share− 50|
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Second Stage The dependent variable is coded as 1 if an interest group advertisement
supports the majority party and 0 otherwise. I define support as either a) positively
portraying the candidate who is a member of the current majority; or b) attacking the
candidate of the opposing party.10 The independent variable is a dummy variable coded
as 1 if the commercial mentions a Dead On Arrival bill and 0 otherwise. Additionally,
I specify models in which the Dead On Arrival covariate is a count of the number of
intended failures mentioned in the ad.
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 predict a positive Dead On Arrival coefficient. This result
would indicate commercials that mention intended failures tend to support the majority
party and provide it more credit than blame. A negative coefficient would indicate DOA
legislation is principally used to blame majority party candidates. A null effect would
indicate interest groups do not emphasize DOA bills relative to enactable legislation to
support or punish majority party candidates. Formally, the model is written as:
Pr(Billijk = 1) = Φ(α0 + α1Incumbentijk + α2Generalijk
+ α3DistrictCompetitivenessijk + uijk)
Pr(SupportMajorityijk = 1|Billijk = 1) = Φ(β0 + β1DeadOnArrivalijk + ijk) (4.1)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. I
report four models in Table 4.1. Models 1 and 2 include all ads. Models 3 and 4 exclude
ads run during the primary.11 In all four models I cluster the standard errors by the
interest group-election year dyad:
10If the ad supports the minority party candidate or attacks the majority’s candidate, it is coded as 0.
Thirty-one percent of ads support the majority party candidate.
11In the Appendix, I include models that account for bills mentioned in previous sessions. The results
are robust to those specifications.
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Table 4.1: Heckman Probit Model Predicting if Election Ad Supports Majority Party
All Ads General Election Ads
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sign Dichotomous Count Dichotomous Count
Dead On Arrival + 0.993∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.288) (0.324) (0.295)
Constant -0.364∗∗∗ -0.368 -0.429∗∗∗ -0.417
(0.241) (0.237) (0.271) (0.255)
Incumbent + 0.792∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.157) (0.156) (0.154)
General + 0.774∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗
(0.216) (0.211)
District Competitiveness + 0.016 0.018 0.029∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant -1.057∗∗∗ -1.003∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.230) (0.185) (0.185)
Prob(ρ > χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -270808.1 -270301 -275397.5 -274473.1
N 336728 336728 336728 336728
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: First-stage DV=1 if bill mentions any bill, 0 otherwise. Second-stage DV=1 if ad supports
the majority party, 0 otherwise. The unit is the TV spot run in a congressional district in a given
election cycle. Coefficients are from a Heckman selection probit model and SE are clustered by the
interest group-election cycle dyad.
The results in Table 4.1 conform to my expectations. The positive Dead On Arrival
coefficient indicates commercials that mention an intended failure tend to support the
majority party candidate more often than ads that only mention enactable legislation.
This finding supports Propositions 1 and 2 that interest groups commonly use DOA bills
as a reason to support majority party candidates. Additionally, this finding shows groups
use DOA bills to reward majority lawmakers in their ads, rather than punish them, as
predicted by Proposition 3. Substantively, the political benefits interest groups provide
the majority party for advancing intended failures via campaign ads are substantial. In
Figure 4.1, I plot the predicted probability a commercial supports the majority party
candidate based on whether an ad mentions a DOA bill:
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Figure 4.1: Predicted Probability Interest Group Ad Supports Majority Party
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Note: Predicted probabilities that interest group advertisement supports the majority party candidate based
on results from Model 1 in Table 4.1. In the ‘Ad Mentions Bill’ model, predicted probabilities are conditional
on selection. Predicted probabilities in the ‘All Ads’ model are unconditional on selection. Incumbent and
General are held at 1, and District Competitiveness at -6.
In commercials where a bill is mentioned, and one of those bills is dead-on-arrival,
there is a 0.6 predicted probability that the interest group is supporting the majority
party. If only an enactable bill is mentioned, there is a 0.13 predicted probability the
commercial supports the majority party candidate. For all ads, when a dead-on-arrival
bill is mentioned, the predicted probability that a commercial supports the majority
party candidate is 0.74. In an ad where an intended failure is not featured, the predicted
probability the commercial supports the majority party candidate is 0.36.12 In short,
12Predicted probabilities that only assess ads in which a bill is mentioned and support the majority
party (but ignore the selection effects) are 0.39 for a DOA bill and 0.08 for ads that only mention an
enactable bill. Even in this case, bills that mention DOA bills still support the majority party more often
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when an intended failure is mentioned in a commercial, the ad is much more likely to
support the majority party candidate. However, if a DOA bill is not mentioned, it is very
unlikely the commercial supports the majority party.
Figure 4.1 illustrates that dead-on-arrival legislation is principally used by interest
groups to support the majority’s candidates rather than blame them. For groups, dead-
on-arrival bills serve as evidence that on a particular issue, the majority party candidate
holds the correct position or his or her opponent does not. In contrast, intended failures
are infrequently used by groups to support the minority party. The possibility that
voting for an intended failure will lead to claims that a legislator is extreme or unwilling to
compromise rarely occurs. As a result, advancing dead-on-arrival legislation is a politically
profitable way for the majority party to generate supportive campaign ads from allied
interest groups.
A likelihood-ratio test indicates the selection model is appropriate (ρ 6= 0). The co-
variates in the first stage are in the expected direction and significant. The one exception
is the district competitiveness measure, which is not significant in Models 1 and 2. To-
gether, these results support my argument that DOA bills are used by interest groups
to principally credit, not blame, majority party lawmakers and generate more political
benefits than other legislation.
4.2.2 Legislative Scorecards
In addition to commercials, I test my propositions using legislative scorecards. I col-
lected scorecards from 34 interest groups, split evenly among their support for each party
(see the Appendix for a full list). These data area a good measure of interest groups’
political benefits for two reasons. First, they exist as a tool for groups to identify and
provide political support to their legislative allies. The votes used to rate legislators are
selected to clearly separate friends from foes in order to ensure the ‘correct’ members
than the average ad, which supports the majority 31 percent of the time.
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receive political help (Snyder 1992; Fowler 1982). Second, lawmakers are aware of and
care about these scorecards. Groups inform lawmakers they are rating a bill or vote and
legislators tout their ratings. For instance, Rep. Steve Israel (D-NY) advertised his per-
fect rating from the League of Conservation Voters (Israel 2008) while Rep. Scott Tipton
(R-CO) distributed a press release announcing he was named a ‘Pro-Worker Legislator’
by the Competitive Enterprise Institute (Tipton 2011). As legislative scorecards are one
way groups provide political benefits to legislators, the more a bill is rated by various
allied interest groups, the more political support it provides to lawmakers.13
Organized interests vary in the number of votes, and subsequently the legislation, they
rate. On average, a group rates 22 unique bills in a given congress. Out of 177,244
bill-interest group observations, 2,984 (1.68 percent) bills are scored by a group. The
maximum number of bills rated in my sample is 63 (the John Birch Society in the 109th
Congress). In four cases, a group only rated one bill in a given term. For conservative
groups, the most frequent raters are: 1) the John Birch Society (54 bills per Congress);
2) Freedom Works (46); 3) Club for Growth (46); 4) Chamber of Commerce (42); 5)
American Conservative Union (37). For liberal groups, the most frequent raters are: 1)
Americans for Democratic Action (47 bills per Congress); 2) AFL-CIO (42); 3) SEIU
(33); 4) NAACP (30); 5) League of Conservation Voters (24). The groups that rated the
fewest number of bills are: 1) Citizens for Global Solutions (2 bills per Congress); 2) the
Human Rights Council (3); 3) NARFE (4); 4) NARAL (5); 5) NumbersUSA (6).14
13An objection to this approach is that groups vary in political clout, meaning some ratings are more
important than others. While possible, it is not clear attempting to control for group size or influence
would be useful for two reasons. First, since groups use different tactics to reward legislators, no single
metric, such as total campaign contributions, capture political influence. Second, even if clout could be
measured, scorecards are used as informational tools for donors and members of the group. It is not
obvious groups with more money or members necessarily produce more politically important scorecards.
What these data show is that positive ratings produce some political reward for lawmakers and negative
ratings some cost. Thus, all else equal, the more positive ratings a bill gets from allied interests, the more
valuable it is.
14These data raise two concerns. First, the vast majority of bills, DOA or otherwise, are never rated.
In other words, a bill being rated is a rare event. Consequently, the analyses below, which are logistic
regressions, do not account for the rarity of a bill rating. To address this concern, I estimated all of the
subsequent models using a rare events logistic regression. All of my findings are robust to those specifica-
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To test Propositions 1 and 2, that DOA bills provide political benefits to majority
party legislators, I subset the data to include the groups’ scorecards that are allied with
the majority party. This way, I can assess if supportive groups reward the majority
for advancing DOA bills.15 The unit is the bill-interest group dyad. I specify a logistic
regression model where the dependent variable is coded as 1 if the interest group rated the
bill and 0 otherwise. The main independent covariate is a dummy variable for whether
a bill is Dead On Arrival. I expect this covariate to have a positive coefficient. This
would indicate supportive groups are more likely to rate a DOA bill compared to other
legislation.
Additionally, I control for Important Bills and define this variable as the number of
mentions the legislation received in CQ Weekly annual legislative summary articles. I
expect this covariate to have a positive coefficient as groups are more likely to care about
and rate significant legislation. In Models 1 and 2, I include standard errors clustered by
interest group. In Models 3 and 4, I include interest group fixed effects to account for
unobserved group-specific factors that may lead to organized interests rating some bills
but not others.
tions. Second, some groups that frequently rate bills may not be politically important to legislators (e.g.,
the John Birch Society). Being the case, I subset all of my models using ten groups (five conservative
and five liberal) that are generally viewed as politically powerful. These groups are: AFL-CIO, National
Education Association, Americans for Democratic Action, NAACP, League of Conservation Voters, the
Chamber of Commerce, Club for Growth, Family Research Council, the American Conservative Union,
and the National Association of Manufacturers. I estimated my models using those groups’ ratings. My
findings are robust to these specifications except for Model 1 in Table 4.3. The coefficients are in the
expected direction but the interaction term is not statistically significant.
15It is possible an allied group could disapprove of the intended failure and downgrade majority party
legislators’ ratings for voting for it. In reality, only once did a supportive group disagree with how the
majority of the majority voted on a DOA bill. In this case, conservative groups supported a Republican
Study Committee’s balanced budget amendment, while most GOP lawmakers preferred a more moderate
version. The RSC amendment was rated positively by a number of groups even though a slight minority
of Republican members supported the bill. No other cases of this disagreement on DOA bills arise in the
data.
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Table 4.2: Probability Allied Interest Group Rates Dead-On-Arrival Bill, Weighted Measure
Expected Sign Model 1 Model Model 3 Model 4
Dead On Arrival + 2.443∗∗∗ 2.497∗∗∗ 2.481∗∗∗ 2.554∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.136) (0.061) (0.065)
Important Bill + 0.316∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.0148) (0.0126) (0.013)
109th Congress 0.285∗∗∗ 0.131
(0.099) (0.109)
110th Congress 0.025 0.072
(0.3106) (0.173)
111th Congress 0.610∗ 0.686∗∗∗
(0.328) (0.171)
112th Congress 0.453∗∗ 0.294∗∗
(0.226) (0.121)
Constant -4.536∗∗∗ -4.845∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.227)
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood -6025.409 -5989.990 -5526.753 -5499.082
N 73230 73230 73230 73230
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: DV = 1 if bill is rated by allied interest group and 0 otherwise. Coefficients are log-
odds from a logistic regression. The dead-on-arrival covariate is based on the weighted latent
variable outlined in Chapter 3. Models 1 and 2 include standard errors clustered by interest
group. Models 3 and 4 include interest group fixed effects. The unit is the bill-interest group
dyad.
The results from Table 4.2 indicate groups who support the majority party are more
likely to rate a dead-on-arrival bill compared to enactable legislation. The predicted
probability an intended failure is rated is 0.11 compared to a 0.01 predicted probability
for a non-DOA bill. Moreover, this effect does not arise because intended failures tend
to be more important than most bills that receive floor consideration. For important
legislation, a DOA bill has a 0.14 predicted probability of being rated compared to a 0.01
predicted probability for an enactable bill. These results support Propositions 1 and 2,
that groups allied with the majority party provide more political benefits to lawmakers
for an intended failure relative to other bills.
Even though DOA legislation provides political benefits to the majority party, it is
possible these bills are more costly than helpful to lawmakers. Opposition groups may
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rate intended failures more often than allied interests. In this scenario, for an average
DOA proposal, it could be more politically costly than beneficial for the majority to send
the bill to the floor. Proposition 3 predicts the opposite. I theorize intended failures are
rated more often by allied groups than opposition interests.
To test these possibilities, I specify a model using all bills that receive floor consider-
ation in the House or Senate between 2003 and 2012. The unit is the bill-interest group
dyad and this analysis includes allied and opposing groups’ scorecards. The dependent
variable is coded as 1 if the interest group rated the bill and 0 otherwise. I include four
independent variables. First, I code a dummy variable as 1 if the legislation is Dead On
Arrival and 0 otherwise. Based on the findings in Table 4.2, I expect a positive rela-
tionship between whether a bill is DOA and if it gets rated. Additionally, I include a
dummy variable for whether the interest group is a Majority Party Ally. For example,
if Democrats control the House, liberal groups are coded as 1 and conservative groups
as 0 when rating that chamber’s legislators and vice versa. Third, I interact these two
variables. The interaction term is interpreted as assessing, conditional on a group being a
majority party ally, the probability an intended failure is rated. I expect a positive coef-
ficient on this term, indicating allied interests rate DOA bills more often than opposition
groups.
Finally, I control for whether the legislation is an Important Bill. Importance is mea-
sured as the number of CQ Weekly legislative summary articles that mention the legis-
lation. I expect this covariate to have a positive coefficient as more important bills are
more likely to be rated by interest groups. I report four models in Table 4.3. In Models
1 and 2, I estimate a logistic regression model that examines the probability a bill that
receives floor consideration is rated by an interest group with standard errors clustered
by interest group. In Models 3 and 4, I include interest group fixed effects.
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Table 4.3: Probability Interest Groups Rate Dead On Arrival Bills, Weighted Measure
Expected Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dead On Arrival + 2.043∗∗∗ 2.070∗∗∗ 2.112∗∗∗ 2.170∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.110) (0.067) (0.069)
Majority Party Ally 0.083 0.032 0.177∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.098) (0.050) (0.051)
Majority Party Ally x + 0.407∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
Dead On Arrival (0.1272) (0.121) (0.090) (0.090)
Important Bill + 0.333∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009)
109th Congress 0.387∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗
(0.0906) (0.078)
110th Congress 0.438∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.075)
111th Congress 0.952∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.075)
112th Congress 0.708∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.076)
Constant -4.636∗∗∗ -5.158∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.159)
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -11737.579 -11630.236 -10874.377 -10790.346
N 152168 152168 152168 152168
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: DV = 1 if bill is rated by interest group and 0 otherwise. Coefficients are log-odds from a
logistic regression. The dead-on-arrival covariate is based on the weighted latent variable outlined in
Chapter 3. The unit is the bill-interest group dyad. Models 1 and 2 include standard errors clustered
by interest group. Models 3 and 4 include interest group fixed effects.
The results support Proposition 3. In all four models, the positive Dead On Arrival
coefficient indicates DOA bills are more likely to be rated compared to other bills by allied
and opposition groups. Additionally, Models 3 and 4 indicate majority party allies are
more likely to rate a given bill compared to opposition groups. However, the positive effect
on the interaction term shows majority party allies rate intended failures more often than
groups that support the other party. This effect is significant even after controlling for an
allied group’s propensity to rate more bills. The difference between how often supportive
and unsupportive groups rate intended failures can be seen in Figure 4.2. I plot the
predicted probability a group allied with the majority party, and one who supports the
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Probability Groups Allied and Opposing the Majority Party Rate
DOA Bill
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Note: Predicted probabilities that interest group rates a bill in its legislative scorecard
based on the interaction term from Model 1 in Table 4.3. Dead On Arrival is held at 1.
Important Bill is held at 0 in the ‘All Bills’ model and 1 in the ‘Important Bills’ model.
other party, rates a DOA bill.
The predicted probability an interest group allied with the majority party rates an
intended failure is 0.11 compared to a 0.07 predicted probability for an opposition group.
This difference is not due to allied groups rating a lot of unimportant DOA bills. The
predicted probability groups allied with the majority rate important intended failures is
0.15, compared to 0.11 for opposition organized interests.16 This finding lends support
to Proposition 3, that DOA legislation provides more political benefits than blame for
16The null hypothesis that these means are the same is rejected at the p < 0.01 level.
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majority party lawmakers.
4.3 The Legislative Agenda’s Order
Hypothesis 5 posits a specific order in which dead-on-arrival bills should arise on the
agenda. Legislation that provides more political benefits should be proposed before bills
that provide less support for the majority party. In contrast, conventional wisdom suggests
intended failures are more likely to arise during election season as a way for lawmakers
to appeal to voters. To test these possibilities, I examine which DOA bills are rated by
groups in their legislative scorecards. These data are particularly suited for this analysis
as they are insulated from time effects. Interest groups release their scorecards at the
end of each congress or year. Therefore, all legislation, regardless of when it receives floor
consideration, has the opportunity to be rated.17
In this analysis, I subset the data to include interest groups who support the majority
party18 and estimate a logistic regression where the dependent variable is coded as 1 if
an interest group rated a DOA bill and 0 otherwise.19 The main independent variable is
the number of Days Until the Next Election. I expect this covariate to have a positive
coefficient as more valuable dead-on-arrival bills should be rated earlier in the congres-
sional term. A negative coefficient would indicate the intended failures rated most often
are brought up in election season.
I control for a DOA bill’s Salience among voters, as measured by Gallup’s quarterly
Most Important Problem poll. Using Policy Agendas Project and Congressional Bills
17In contrast, campaign advertisements and monetary donations are affected by time. For instance, an
interest group has more time to run ads for bills brought up earlier in the term.
18In considering which bills to add to the agenda, I assume the majority party is principally concerned
with which bills its allied groups will compensate the most, and not which legislation opposition interests
will dislike the least. This follows from the findings above that these supportive groups rate bills more
often. More generally, non-allied groups aren’t likely to support majority lawmakers anyway, so it is
reasonable to think legislators are less concerned with appeasing those interests. The results are robust
to specifications that include all scorecards.
19In the Appendix, I report models in which the dependent variable includes votes on amendments to
the bill rated by interest groups. The results are robust to these specifications.
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Project data, I matched a bill’s topic with the Policy Agendas Project major topic code.
I measure salience as that policy area’s salience in the quarter in which a bill receives initial
floor consideration. As citizens care more about an issue, it is possible the majority party
sees a political opportunity to act in that policy area. Moreover, it is possible interest
groups are more likely to rate salient bills to ensure their ratings are relevant to their
members. If true, this variable should have a positive effect on the probability a bill is
rated.
I include control variables for each congressional term, with the 108th Congress serving
as the baseline. I report four models in Table 4.4. Models 1 and 2 exclude the congressional
session dummy covariates, while Models 3 and 4 include them. All four specifications
include standard errors clustered by interest group.
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Table 4.4: Probability DOA Bill Is Rated Early in Legislative Session, 2003-12
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Expected All Important All Important
Sign Bills Bills Bills Bills
Days to Election + 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Salience + -0.762∗∗ -1.888∗∗ -0.808∗∗ -1.846∗∗
(0.366) (0.735) (0.331) (0.728)
109th Congress 0.314∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.180)
110th Congress -0.039 -0.113
(0.438) (0.478)
111th Congress -0.125 0.1901
(0.503) (0.5560)
112th Congress 0.2170 0.5083
(0.356) (0.4387)
Constant -2.084∗∗∗ -1.828∗∗∗ -2.171∗∗∗ -2.021∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.263) (0.364) (0.387)
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -1721.80 -684.26 -1716.60 -672.92
N 4419 1437 4419 1437
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: DV = 1 if a dead-on-arrival bill is rated by interest group and 0 otherwise. Coefficients
are log-odds from a logistic regression. The unit is the bill-interest group dyad and SE are
clustered by group.
As expected, intended failures brought up earlier in the legislative session are rated
more often than DOA bills voted on closer to election day. However, the bills rated
by allied interest groups tend to be on topics that are less salient to the public. This
suggests the legislation groups focus on is not principally driven by whether the topic is
in the public’s eye. More generally, these results are consistent with Hypothesis 5 and
contrasts with the conventional wisdom that bringing up politically motivated legislation
late in the term is more advantageous to lawmakers. To better understand the size of this
effect, I plot the predicted probability an intended failure is rated by an interest group as
election day approaches.
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Figure 4.3: Figure 3: Predicted Probability of When a DOA Bill Gets Rated
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Note: Predicted probabilities that allied interest group rates a bill throughout a
congressional session based on the results from Model 1 in Table 4.4. Salience is
held at its mean.
Near an election, the probability a DOA proposal is rated by an interest group is
0.11. However, the predicted probability an intended failure proposed at the outset of
the legislative session is rated is 0.16. In other words, the dead-on-arrival bills that are
advanced early in a congressional term generate political benefits more often from allied
interest groups than those offered later on. These findings are consistent with the idea
that the majority party adds more politically valuable dead-on-arrival bills to its agenda
earlier in the legislative session rather than waiting until the months prior to the upcoming
election.
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4.4 Conclusion
The auction model presented in Chapter 2 rests on two important assumptions. First, I
assume that interest groups are the relevant audience for dead-on-arrival bills. Second, by
arguing the majority party auctions off agenda space, I assume it prioritizes more valuable
bills over less valuable ones. The results in this chapter support both assumptions. I find
that allied interest groups are more likelihood to reward the majority party for DOA bills
compared to other legislation. This political support outweighs the political backlash
from opposition groups. Additionally, I show that the majority party orders the intended
failures on its agenda in a manner consistent with an auction.
These results provide evidence that interest groups are the relevant audience for dead-
on-arrival bills. Unlike the public, who may not be paying to DOA legislation, allied
groups provide the majority party with a reliable political reward for advancing intended
failures. The findings in Chapter 3 make clear why supporting these bills is useful for
organized interests. By getting their preferred alternative on the agenda as a DOA pro-
posal, the group makes it more likely that legislation is enacted once the majority party
wins unified government.
While these results reveal the role of groups in generating DOA bills on the agenda,
important questions remain about voters’ reactions to this legislative strategy. Political
scientists emphasize that the public is the audience for intended failures. Indeed, it is
possible that groups and citizens reward lawmakers for dead-on-arrival legislation. In
the next chapter, I examine how voters respond to intended failures to determine if they
provide the same consistent political support groups do for DOA proposals.
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4.5 Appendix
Table 4.5: Heckman Probit Model Predicting if Election Ad Supports Majority Party, Including
Old Bills
All Ads General Election Ads
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sign Dichotomous Count Dichotomous Count
Dead On Arrival + 0.980∗∗∗ 0.988∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.286) (0.344) (0.305)
Constant -0.363 -0.365 -0.431 -0.415
(0.242) (0.238) (0.264) (0.255)
Incumbent + 0.791∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.157) (0.172) (0.170)
General + 0.772∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.212)
District Competitiveness + 0.016 0.018 0.020 0.019
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
Constant -1.055∗∗∗ -1.001∗∗∗ -0.295 -0.293
(0.236) (0.231) (0.200) (0.200)
Prob(ρ > χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -271138.1 -270720.6 -252998.3 -253284.5
N 336728 336728 304330 304330
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: First-stage DV=1 if bill mentions any bill, 0 otherwise. Second-stage DV=1 if ad supports
the majority party, 0 otherwise. The unit is the TV spot in a congressional district (or state)
in a given election year. Coefficients are from a Heckman selection probit model and SE are
clustered by the interest group-election cycle dyad. The Dead On Arrival covariate include DOA
bills mentioned from previous congressional sessions.
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Table 4.6: Heckman Probit Model Predicting if Election Ad Supports Majority Party
with Clustered Robust SEs by Interest Group-Election Year Dyad
All Ads General Election Ads
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sign Dichotomous Count Dichotomous Count
Dead On Arrival + 0.999∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.288) (0.325) (0.295)
Constant -0.366∗∗∗ -0.370 -0.430∗∗∗ -0.417
(0.241) (0.237) (0.270) (0.255)
Incumbent + 0.795∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.157) (0.157) (0.154)
General + 0.774∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗
(0.217) (0.213)
District Competitiveness + 0.016 0.018 0.029∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant -1.063∗∗∗ -1.009∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.232) (0.187) (0.186)
Prob(ρ > χ2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -270047.8 -269541.8 -275397.5 -273703.6
N 336132 336132 336132 336132
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: First-stage DV=1 if bill mentions any bill, 0 otherwise. Second-stage DV=1 if ad supports
the majority party, 0 otherwise. The unit is the TV spot run in a congressional district in a given
election cycle. Coefficients are from a Heckman selection probit model and included cluster robust
standard errors by the interest group-election cycle dyad.
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Table 4.7: Interest Group Scorecards, by Congress
Democratic Affiliated Groups Republican Affiliated Groups
American Association 108-112 American Conservative Union 108-112
of University Women
Americans for Democratic Action 108-112 American Security 108-111
Council Foundation
AFL-CIO 108 - 112 Associated General 108-112
Contractors of America
American Federation of State, 108-112 Campaign for Working Families 108-112
County and Municipal Employees
Alliance for Retired Americans 108-112 Cato Institute 108-112
Citizens for Global Solutions 108-112 Chamber of Commerce 110-112
Council for a Livable World 108-112 Club for Growth 109-112
Defenders of Wildlife Action 109-112 Concerned Women for America 108-112
Human Rights Council 108-112 Family Research Council 108-112
International Brotherhood 108-110 Freedom Works 109-112
of Electrical Workers
Leadership Conference on Civil 108-109, John Birch Society 108-112
and Human Rights 111-112
League of Conservation Voters 108-112 National Association 108-112
of Manufacturers
NAACP 108-112 National Federation 112
of Independent Businesses
NARAL 111, 112 National Retail Federation 108-112
National Active and Retired 108-112 National Right to 108-112
Federal Employees Association Life Council
National Education Association 108-112 Numbers USA 108-112
Service Employees International Union 108-112 Small Business 111-112
Entrepreneurship Council
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Table 4.8: Probability Allied Interest Group Rates DOA Bill, Including Rated Amendments
Expected Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dead On Arrival + 2.185∗∗∗ 2.202∗∗∗ 2.226∗∗∗ 2.258∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.1169) (0.053) (0.056)
Important Bill + 0.401∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012)
109th Congress 0.220∗ 0.055
(0.114) (0.084)
110th Congress -0.170 -0.171
(0.302) (0.135)
111th Congress 0.335 0.356∗∗∗
(0.307) (0.133)
112th Congress 0.363∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.096)
Constant -4.217∗∗∗ -4.375∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.222)
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -8598.70 -8557.12 -8024.37 -7993.73
N 85059 85059 85059 85059
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: DV = 1 if bill, including votes on amendments, is rated by an interest group that
supports the majority party and 0 otherwise. Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic re-
gression. The dead-on-arrival covariate is based on the weighted latent variable outlined in
Chapter 3. The unit is the bill-interest group dyad. Models 1 and 2 include standard errors
clustered by interest group. Models 3 and 4 include interest group fixed effects.
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Table 4.9: Probability Interest Groups Rate Dead On Arrival Bills, Including Rated Amend-
ments
Expected Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dead On Arrival + 1.813∗∗∗ 1.799∗∗∗ 1.863∗∗∗ 1.868∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.081) (0.056) (0.057)
Majority Party Ally -0.034 -0.064 0.021 0.006
(0.069) (0.060) (0.038) (0.038)
Dead On Arrival x + 0.375∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗
Majority Party Ally (0.105) (0.099) (0.077) (0.077)
Important Bill + 0.416∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.008) (0.008)
109th Congress 0.201∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗
(0.069) (0.057)
110th Congress 0.155 0.066
(0.102) (0.056)
111th Congress 0.584∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.056)
112th Congress 0.542∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.057)
Constant -4.196∗∗∗ -4.490∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.121)
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -17697.89 -17603.43 -16643.71 -16570.18
N 177212 177212 177212 177212
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: DV = 1 if bill, including votes on amendments, is rated by interest group and 0 otherwise.
Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic regression. The unit is the bill-interest group dyad. The
dead-on-arrival covariate is based on the weighted latent variable outlined in Chapter 3. Models 1
and 2 include standard errors clustered by interest group. Models 3 and 4 include interest group
fixed effects.
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Table 4.10: Probability Allied Interest Group Rates Dead-On-Arrival Bill, Unweighted Measure
Expected Sign Model 1 Model Model 3 Model 4
Dead On Arrival + 2.451∗∗∗ 2.508∗∗∗ 2.490∗∗∗ 2.566∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.135) (0.061) (0.065)
Important Bill + 0.316∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.0126) (0.013)
109th Congress 0.313∗∗∗ 0.160
(0.098) (0.109)
110th Congress 0.034 0.090
(0.311) (0.173)
111th Congress 0.623∗ 0.707∗∗∗
(0.329) (0.171)
112th Congress 0.467∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.121)
Constant -4.537∗∗∗ -4.859∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.227)
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood -6022.015 -5985.589 -5522.629 -5494.344
N 73230 73230 73230 73230
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: DV = 1 if bill is rated by allied interest group and 0 otherwise. Coefficients are log-
odds from a logistic regression. The dead-on-arrival covariate is based on the unweighted
latent variable outlined in Chapter 3. Models 1 and 2 include standard errors clustered
by interest group. Models 3 and 4 include interest group fixed effects. The unit is the
bill-interest group dyad.
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Table 4.11: Probability Interest Groups Rate Dead On Arrival Bills, Unweighted Measure
Expected Sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dead On Arrival + 2.050∗∗∗ 2.080∗∗∗ 2.119∗∗∗ 2.179∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.110) (0.067) (0.069)
Majority Party Ally 0.083 0.033 0.177∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.098) (0.050) (0.051)
Majority Party Ally x + 0.408∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
Dead On Arrival (0.128) (0.1203) (0.090) (0.090)
Important Bill + 0.332∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.0087) (0.009)
109th Congress 0.410∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.078)
110th Congress 0.446∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.075)
111th Congress 0.963∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.075)
112th Congress 0.720∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.077)
Constant -4.636∗∗∗ -5.169∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.159)
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log Likelihood -11731.958 -11623.107 -10867.816 -10782.765
N 152168 152168 152168 152168
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: DV = 1 if bill is rated by interest group and 0 otherwise. Coefficients are log-odds from a
logistic regression. The dead-on-arrival covariate is based on the unweighted latent variable outlined
in Chapter 3. The unit is the bill-interest group dyad. Models 1 and 2 include standard errors
clustered by interest group. Models 3 and 4 include interest group fixed effects.
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CHAPTER V
Where’s the Credit or the Blame? Reassessing
Dead-On-Arrival Bills’ Political Effects
“The purpose on both sides was less to solve the issues than to reap credit with the voters
and put blame on the other side.” - Hedrick Smith 1988, 657
When explaining dead-on-arrival bills’ political effects, commentators almost exclu-
sively argue that this legislation is targeted at some segment of the public. One common
argument is these proposals are used to highlight the majority’s support for a popular
policy and embarrass the opposition. For example, in 2008, Democrats forced Senate Re-
publicans to filibuster the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. The conventional explanation for
this legislative episode was that“[t]he measure was part of Senate Democrats’ continuing
effort to highlight divisions with Republicans over women’s issues and to force Republi-
cans to take difficult votes on bills focused on domestic violence, wage discrimination and
other matters” (Steinhauer 2008).
Similar arguments are made about Republican dead-on-arrival proposals. After Repub-
licans forced votes on the doomed Keystone oil pipeline, pundits claimed “House Speaker
John Boehner (R-OH) and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) made this
vote an early priority, confident that the public support for the project and what it sym-
bolizes in terms of jobs and lower energy prices would endure” (Sands 2015). A second
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common claim is DOA legislation is used to mobilize the majority party’s most partisan
voters. For example, after Republicans advanced a DOA reconciliation bill that would
have defunded the Affordable Care Act and Planned Parenthood, Democrats charged
that Speaker Paul Ryan “[was] more interested in energizing the Republican base than in
legislating this year” (Kelly 2016).
More generally, scholars agree that DOA proposals are targeted at the public and that
these bills have a direct effect on citizens.1 Some argue intended failures have attitudinal
effects, such as creating blame or support towards the obstructionist or proposing lawmak-
ers (e.g., Groseclose and McCarty 2001; Gilmour 1995). Others claim DOA bills change
voter behavior by rallying partisans to the polls or priming individuals to consider certain
campaign issues (e.g., Lee 2011; Keith 2012). However, political scientists disagree about
which citizens are affected by observing dead-on-arrival bills. Political moderates, “en-
thusiastic constituents,” partisan voters, and the public more generally are all identified
as potential audiences for intended failures.
Notably, the results from Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that DOA bills are not principally
targeted at the public. Many intended failures are on obscure issues that interest groups
reward but do not generate attention from voters. However, a majority party’s calculus
is more complex. For lawmakers, the best intended failure is one that generates interest
group and voter support. In this situation, the dead-on-arrival proposal’s political effects
are magnified as legislators and groups can effectively use this proposal to persuade voters.
To the extent a majority party can try to exploit both its interest group and public
audiences, the outstanding questions are whether voters react to dead-on-arrival bills and
if so, what are these proposals’ effects?
In this chapter, I use a survey experiment to examine these questions. My experiment
leverages a unique situation, in which Senate Democrats and House Republicans proposed
1In many cases, the commentator may not posit an effect the bill has but just acknowledge the
legislation is political. This leads to vague claims that these bills are, for example, symbolic victories,
political footballs, or that they generate political momentum.
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dead-on-arrival legislation on the same topic. I utilize this unique case, in which both
parties pursued a DOA bill on the exact same topic during the same week, to assess the
four most common hypotheses associated with dead-on-arrival bills: 1) the blame game
hypothesis; 2) the reward hypothesis; 3) the rallying the base hypothesis; and 4) the
campaign issue hypothesis.
My results indicate that dead-on-arrival bills’ political effects are more complicated
than previously assumed. While the Democratic sponsored DOA legislation provided
Democrats political gain, the Republican intended failure did not help Republican legis-
lators. Compared to three different counterfactuals, the Democratic dead-on-arrival bill
led moderates to blame Republicans for blocking the legislation and voters to reward
Democrats for their proposal. In contrast, the Republican’s DOA legislation did not
create blame towards Democrats or support for Republican lawmakers. This null find-
ing contrasts with the conventional view that Republican partisan voters reward their
co-partisan legislators for advancing extreme legislation.
I do not find support for the rallying the base or campaign issue hypotheses. Relative
to the counterfactual scenarios, intended legislative failures do not make respondents more
likely to vote or mention border issues/immigration as affecting their political decision-
making. The inconsistent and null results from this experiment raise new questions about
the political effects of dead-on-arrival bills. The political gain generated by a Democratic
DOA bill, but not by the Republican one, suggests other political factors beyond the
experiment’s scope dictate when a DOA bill is effective.
This experiment suggests that many of the political effects associated with dead-on-
arrival bills need closer examination. My results show these bills’ commonly assumed
effects are conditional on other political factors. In particular, as shown in Chapter 4,
these effects are likely mediated by the information disseminated by interest groups. As
a general matter, further research should be conducted, particularly to study the claim
that voters are a relevant audience for this legislation.
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5.1 The Proposed Effects of Dead-On-Arrival Bills
5.1.1 Blame Game Hypothesis
The most common claim about intended failures is that they are used to embarrass the
obstructing party. Political commentators argue moderate voters blame the obstructing
actor after they observe him reject a proposed bill out of hand (Smith 1988). Groseclose
and McCarty (2001) formalize this idea in a signaling model. In their game, moderate
voters update their political views towards the obstructing actor after observing him block
an intended failure.2 By blocking the popular dead-on-arrival bill, the vetoing politician is
viewed as extreme by centrist voters. This results in the obstructing player being blamed
or disapproved of by political moderates.
Anecdotal evidence suggests lawmakers try to play the blame game. Binder and Lee
(2013) note that politicians are concerned about losing a messaging blame game among
voters. Additionally, legislators cite creating blame as a reason for some DOA bills. For
example, in the 107th Congress, House Republicans voted on a number of dead-on-arrival
tax cut bills they believed would “embarrass Senate Democrats.” The House majority
called this “the ‘flaming arrow’ strategy” (Nather 2002). There are few empirical tests
of the blame game hypothesis. To date, it has been examined using data on presiden-
tial vetoes (Martin 2012; Gilmour 2011; Gilmour 2002; Groseclose and McCarty 2001).
This work indicates many vetoed bills were sent to the president with the intention they
would be blocked and the veto would not be overridden. Groseclose and McCarty (2001)
document a relationship between major vetoes and decreased presidential approval (see
Cameron (2012) for an opposing view) but no other scholars have directly tested this
theory.
The blame game hypothesis’s main empirical claim is that moderate voters blame the
obstructing politician(s) for that particular policy problem. For instance, Republicans
2Groseclose and McCarty’s (2001) model considers veto-bait bills sent from Congress to the president.
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advancing DOA tax bills make Democrats look extreme on tax policy. To examine this
argument, I specify the blame game hypothesis as:
Blame Game Hypothesis: Upon observing dead-on-arrival legislation fail, moderate voters
blame the obstructing policymakers for the associated policy problem.
5.1.2 Reward Hypothesis
A second possibility is dead-on-arrival legislation generates support for the proposing
party among the public. This claim follows from the extensive literature on members of
Congress position-taking in order to gain favor among constituents (e.g., Grimmer 2013;
Mayhew 1974). Gilmour (1995) argues legislators can be rewarded for “strategically
disagreeing” when negotiating with the opposition. Harbridge and Malhotra (2011) note
strong partisans are more likely to approve of partisan behavior by individual lawmakers.3
Unlike the blame game hypothesis, the reward argument does not always distinguish
which portion of the public is affected by this legislative strategy. One possibility is
politicians gain support from co-partisan voters (Gilmour 1995). For instance, in reporting
on the 112th House’s record of DOA bills, Peters (2013) argues “the bills it has passed have
often been used to score points with the party’s base, a practice criticized by Democrats
as “governing by press release.”’ Another possibility is citizens more generally reward
lawmakers for advancing intended failures (Lee 2011). In this view, the DOA bills are
popular with most people, which in turn, creates support on that issue for the proposing
party.
Rewarding the majority party for an intended failure could manifest in two ways. First,
citizens could be more likely to credit lawmakers on that particular policy area. In this
scenario, the dead-on-arrival bill reveals the majority party’s position that the public
supports. For non-partisans, this change may be due to the DOA bill revealing new in-
3Recent work examines individual legislators proposing messaging amendments, a practice in which
lawmakers force votes on amendments that will certainly be defeated (Lee 2011; Evans and Oleszek 2001).
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formation about the proposing and obstructing policymakers.4 Second, partisans may be
more likely to reward a co-partisan majority party as they prefer the intended failure to
other legislation (Harbridge, Malhotra and Harrison 2014). I write the reward hypotheses
as:
Reward Hypothesis 1: Dead-on-arrival legislation makes co-partisan citizens more likely
to reward lawmakers for their actions on that policy issue.
Reward Hypothesis 2: Dead-on-arrival legislation makes citizens more likely to reward
lawmakers for their actions on that policy issue.
5.1.3 Rallying the Base Hypothesis
The rallying the base hypothesis suggests that dead-on-arrival bills motivate the party’s
electoral base to vote (Binder as quoted in Keith 2011). DOA proposals are “political
instruments intended only to stoke the passions of liberal or conservative base voters”
(O’Keefe and Farenthold 2013). Politicians analogize this strategy as tossing partisan
voters “red meat” right before an election in order to increase turnout (Pierce 2008). In
this scenario, partisans become excited about the policies their co-partisan lawmakers ad-
vocate. As a result, these voters are more inclined to turnout on election day to support
those candidates. More simply, after observing a DOA bill, majority party co-partisans
should be more likely to vote. I write this hypothesis as:
Rallying the Base Hypothesis: Partisan voters are more likely to vote after observing dead-
on-arrival legislation offered by co-partisan legislators.
4This is the inverse of the Groseclose and McCarty (2001) model, where the proposer is rewarded
rather than the receiver being blamed.
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5.1.4 Campaign Issue Hypothesis
Another common claim about dead-on-arrival bills is they are used to create a cam-
paign issue. By bringing up an intended failure, lawmakers get voters to focus on that
particular topic. Consequently, voters are more likely to use the DOA bill’s issue as a
reason in determining their vote choice. Lawmakers regularly cite dead-on-arrival bills as
the impetus for creating a campaign trail talking point. For example, after a failed clo-
ture vote on the dead-on-arrival Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (110-HR-2831), “Democrats
warned that the matter will return as a campaign issue” (Demirjian 2008). Similarly, Re-
publican bills to repeal the Affordable Care Act in the 112th Congress were viewed as a
way to generate more support for Republican candidates (Ethridge 2011).
Politicians and journalists do not specify which set of voters are supposed to view a
DOA bill as a campaign issue. One possibility is partisan voters are more likely cite the
intended failure as the reason they voted. A second option is the dead-on-arrival bill is
used to create a talking point targeted at all voters (Lee 2011). To test these possibilities,
I specify two hypotheses:
Campaign Issue Hypothesis 1: Partisan voters are more likely to cite the dead-on-arrival
legislation’s policy area as affecting their vote choice when the bill is proposed by co-
partisan lawmakers.
Campaign Issue Hypothesis 2: Voters are more likely to cite the dead-on-arrival legisla-
tion’s policy area as affecting their vote choice.
5.1.5 Dead-On-Arrival Bills and Counterfactuals
An issue in assessing these hypotheses is comparing dead-on-arrival legislation to the
correct counterfactual. Should voters be blaming or crediting legislators for an intended
failure compared to when lawmakers do nothing on that issue? Or does this strategy
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only work when used instead of compromising? The literature on DOA legislation offers
a mix of answers. Gilmour (1995) argues dead-on-arrival bills are useful as an alternative
to compromise legislation. Groseclose and McCarty (2001) suggest the intended failure
has value compared to any other legislation on the same topic and doing nothing. More
generally, most commentators state a DOA bill has some political utility without con-
sidering other strategies lawmakers could have pursued. In my analysis, I consider three
counterfactual scenarios, namely: a compromise bill on the same topic, legislation on the
same topic whose type (dead-on-arrival or enactable) is unknown, and no bill on the same
topic being proposed.
5.2 Border Funding Experiment
I conducted a survey experiment from October 10th through October 16th, 2014 on a
national representative sample of 1819 U.S. adults.5 The respondents were recruited by
Survey Sampling International, a firm commonly used for political science experiments
(Karl 2015; Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 2014; Kam 2012). The final sample was 51
percent male, 65 percent white, 37 percent Democrat, and 25 percent Republican.
My experiment leverages a unique case in which Democrats and Republicans offered
dead-on-arrival legislation on the same topic. In July 2014, an influx of Central American
children arrived in the United States via the U.S.-Mexico border. This event created
pressure on Congress to provide more border funding to stem the flow of immigrants, house
those already in the U.S., and expedite deportation hearings. The Obama administration
responded by proposing legislation Senate Democrats and House Republicans believed
was too expensive. Senate Democrats offered a cheaper alternative (113-S-2648), but
House and Senate Republicans would not agree to that legislation either. Ignoring the
Senate and the president’s objections, House Republicans postponed their summer recess
5The full sample was 2100 individuals. I exclude the 281 respondents who spent less than 5 seconds
reading the treatment. All findings are robust to empirical specifications that use all 2100 respondents.
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and passed a less extensive measure (114-HR-5230) that “Senate Democrats... rejected
out of hand” Sullivan 2014. The Senate Democrats’ and House Republicans’ bills can be
characterized as dead-on-arrival. In both cases, party leaders signaled their unwillingness
to support the opposition’s proposal. Even so, the Senate and House majority parties
advanced legislation that had no chance of becoming law and did not lead to further
negotiations (Parker 2014; Holland 2014).
These DOA bills make for a good experimental case for three reasons. First, both
parties (Democrats in the Senate and Republicans in the House) proposed similar intended
failures on the exact same issue in the same week. Thus, the experimental conditions are
realistic as that exact situation actually occurred. Second, by examining DOA bills on
the same policy issue, I can assess any relative political return the parties received from
engaging in this behavior. Third, the policy issue is complicated enough that individuals
are not likely to recall any bill-specific details that differentiated the Democratic and
Republican plans. Both parties offered similar ideas but emphasized different aspects of
immigration/border security policy in their bills.
5.2.1 Survey Design
The survey began by presenting respondents with a newspaper article concerning a
majority party’s (identified as Democrats or Republicans in Congress) attempt to pass
a border funding bill.6 For each majority party, there were three treatments concerning
the type of bill it forwarded: 1) an unknown version, 2) a compromise version, and 3) a
dead-on-arrival version (see the Appendix for the treatments and survey instrument). Ad-
ditionally, I included a control treatment which discusses bureaucratic action in regulating
drones.
In each case, the respondent viewed a news article from USA Today. Groseclose and
Milyo (2005) report USA Today is relatively centrist in its political coverage, unlike other
6The only question preceding the treatment was the individual’s year of birth. This prevented those
under 18 years old from participating.
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newspapers with national circulations (e.g., the New York Times and Wall Street Jour-
nal). In survey experiments, respondent attentiveness to the treatment is a concern
(Berinsky et al. 2014). To minimize this problem, all six border issue treatments mention
the majority party and the bill’s fate in the title as well as the article’s first sentence.
Thus, even a cursory glance at the treatment would inform respondents of the relevant
details.7
The dead-on-arrival treatment makes clear the proposed bill will not be enacted. In
order to uncover any effect DOA bills may have, this treatment is unambiguous about
who the majority party believes should be blamed for letting the border security bill die.
The majority party identifies the obstructionist party by name and explicitly faults it for
the legislative failure. In other words, majority party Democrats blame Republicans and
vice versa in this treatment.
The unknown treatment informs readers that there are ‘problems at the U.S.-Mexico
border’ and that majority party legislators are attempting to enact a border funding bill.
The article claims the bill’s fate is uncertain, and the majority party blames members of
Congress for not taking a clear stand on the issue. The compromise version identifies the
majority party’s legislation as a compromise plan. The article implies the bill will pass and
the majority party thanks members of Congress for taking a stand on the issue. Finally,
the control condition reports the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is considering
new guidelines for domestic drone flights. It does not mention either political party,
Congress, or border issues.
After viewing the newspaper article, respondents answered a series of questions relating
to border issues and immigration, as well as their views concerning Congress, the political
parties, and government. The questions immediately after the treatment pertain to the
blame game, reward, rallying the base, and campaign issue hypotheses. Only after an-
7The median time spent reading the articles was 27 seconds. 281 respondents spent less than 5 seconds
reading the article.
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swering those questions did respondents respond to more general questions about politics
and demographics. In all possible cases, the question wording is identical to the wording
used in the American National Election Study (ANES).
5.3 Results
The previously discussed theories of dead-on-arrival bills all claim a party-specific ef-
fect. For instance, Republicans advancing an intended failure generates blame towards
Democrats. An implication of this argument is DOA legislation should produce the same
effect (e.g., generating blame towards the obstructing party) for Democrats and Republi-
cans. However, if one party benefits from the intended failure and the other does not, we
need to reassess whether the dead-on-arrival bill itself or other factors produce a particular
political effect.
For this reason, I split my analysis by party. I examine the effect of dead-on-arrival bills
relative to each counterfactual when Democrats propose the bill as well as Republicans.
Doing so allows me to assess two questions. First, I examine the within party variation
to determine if and when DOA bills are effective. Second, I consider the between party
consistency in which citizens ascribe political value to intended failures. This allows me
to evaluate whether both parties receive the same political return for focusing on dead-
on-arrival legislation.
5.3.1 Testing the Blame Game Hypothesis
I test the first blame game hypothesis by asking respondents “Who do you blame
more for the problems at the U.S.-Mexico border - the Democrats in Congress or the
Republicans in Congress?” Recall that this hypothesis predicts moderate voters will blame
the blocking party for legislative failure. To that end, I subset the analysis on respondents
130
who self-identified as moderates.8 I coded the dependent variable as 1 if the respondent
blamed the obstructing party and 0 otherwise. I coded the main independent variable,
Dead On Arrival, as 1 if the respondent received the DOA bill treatment and 0 otherwise.
In some models, I include three additional covariates. First, I control for whether a
respondent self-reported as Latino. Since Latinos may be more attentive to immigration
policy, they may be more likely to blame lawmakers who avoid trying to solve these
policy issues. I expect this variable to have a positive coefficient. Second, I include
a dummy variable, Proposer Co-Partisan, for whether the respondent self-identified as
being a member of the same party as the proposing legislators. Although individuals may
view themselves as ideologically moderate, they can identify as Democrats or Republicans.
Since partisans tend to credit their party’s lawmakers and blame the opposition (Bartels
2002), I expect this covariate to have a positive coefficient.
Third, I control for an individual’s Attention to Immigration Issues. This covariate is
a 4-point scale based on the question “How closely have you been following the debate on
immigration policy?” Higher values indicate more attentiveness. I expect this variable to
have a positive coefficient as respondents who pay attention to immigration issues may be
more willing to blame politicians obstructing a policy change. Finally, I examine whether
moderates are more likely to blame Democrats or Republicans by subsetting the data
on which party obstructed the legislation. I report twelve models in Table 5.1. Models
1 through 6 are bivariate logistic models. Models 7 through 12 include the additional
control covariates:
8Individuals had the opportunity to report their political ideology using the standard 5 point scale
utilized by the ANES.
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Table 5.1: Probability Moderates Blame Obstructing Party for Border Issues, By Party
Republican Blame Democratic Blame
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sign Control Compromise Unknown Control Compromise Unknown
Dead On Arrival + 1.247∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗ 0.574∗ 0.131 0.715∗ 0.460
(0.357) (0.362) (0.331) (0.363) (0.422) (0.415)
Constant -1.925∗∗∗ -1.638∗∗∗ -1.253∗∗∗ -1.330∗∗∗ -2.177∗∗∗ -1.922∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.292) (0.253) (0.234) (0.318) (0.309)
N 208 184 188 195 193 179
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.006 0.080 0.718 0.087 0.265
Log-Likelihood -104.536 -110.814 -110.280 -97.513 -76.657 -77.010
Republican Blame Democratic Blame
Expected Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Sign Control Compromise Unknown Control Compromise Unknown
Dead On Arrival + 1.244∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗ 0.594∗ -0.166 0.612 0.521
(0.382) (0.387) (0.356) (0.386) (0.472) (0.455)
Latino + 0.905∗∗ 0.478 0.505 -1.012 -1.170 -1.537
(0.462) (0.459) (0.421) (0.783) (1.091) (1.079)
Proposer + 1.484∗∗∗ 1.633∗∗∗ 1.611∗∗∗ 1.507∗∗∗ 2.388∗∗∗ 2.008∗∗∗
Co-Partisan (0.410) (0.423) (0.387) (0.383) (0.492) (0.468)
Attention to + 0.419∗∗ 0.242 0.149 0.081 0.200 0.043
Immigration Issues (0.203) (0.195) (0.176) (0.208) (0.250) (0.270)
Constant -4.544∗∗∗ -3.705∗∗∗ -2.899∗∗∗ -2.095∗∗∗ -3.794∗∗∗ -2.905∗∗∗
(0.877) (0.836) (0.747) (0.800) (1.035) (1.100)
N 208 184 188 195 193 179
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood -92.135 -89.877 -98.315 -87.332 -60.084 -63.828
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic regression. DV = 1 if respondent said ob-
structing party is more to blame for border issues and 0 otherwise. The data is subset on
respondents who self-reported as political moderates.
The results in Table 5.1 lend inconsistent support to the blame game hypothesis.
Relative to each counterfactual, moderates are more likely to blame Republicans for bor-
der issues if they observe Republicans blocking a dead-on-arrival bill. In other words,
Democrats can generate blame for Republicans by offering a DOA proposal rather than
doing nothing or offering other legislation. However, moderates do not consistently at-
tribute blame to obstructionist lawmakers. Democrats are never blamed more for blocking
legislation relative to the counterfactuals. The one consistent finding from these models
are self-identified partisan moderates are more likely to blame the opposing party for
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being obstructionist. This result is consistent regardless of the counterfactual and fol-
lows other studies that note the role partisanship plays when citizens blame politicians
(Bartels 2002). The asymmetry in blame that moderates ascribe to Republicans but not
Democrats can be seen in the predicted probabilities from Models 7 through 12 plotted
in Figure 5.1:
Figure 5.1: Probability Moderates Blame Opposing Party for Blocking Dead-On-Arrival
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Note: Predicted probabilities that self-identified moderate blames Democrats or Repub-
licans for blocking a dead-on-arrival bill based on the results from Models 7 through 12
in Table 1. Latino and Proposer Co-Partisan are held at 0.
The results in Figure 5.1 reveal the somewhat limited effect dead-on-arrival bills have
on moderates’ view of the obstructing party. Substantively, Republican sponsored DOA
bills only convince a small percentage of moderates, between 1 and 9 percent, to blame
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Democrats for border issues. When proposing an intended failure, Democrats fare better.
When Republicans block a DOA bill, between 7 and 9 percent of moderates blame them,
relative to any of the other counterfactual scenarios. These results suggest the limited ag-
gregate impact DOA bills have in generating blame. While they can significantly increase
blame towards the obstructing party, these proposals do not change most moderates’
opinions.
5.3.2 Testing the Reward Hypothesis
I test the reward hypotheses by asking respondents “Who is doing more to solve the
problems at the U.S.-Mexico border - the Democrats in Congress or the Republicans in
Congress?” To test the first hypothesis, that co-partisan citizens reward the majority
party for advancing a DOA bill, I specify six logistic regression models. Models 1 through
3 examine whether Republican lawmakers are credited for proposing a DOA bill. Models
4 through 6 assess if Democratic lawmakers receive support for proposing a DOA bill.
The dependent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent said the proposing party is doing
more to solve border issues and 0 otherwise. I specify four main independent variables.
I include a dummy variable for whether the respondent received the Dead On Arrival
treatment. Since this hypothesis concerns partisan support for DOA legislation, I control
for whether an individual self-identifies as a member of the proposing party. I split these
individuals into three groups based on the intensity of their partisanship. Doing so allows
me to examine the conventional wisdom that strong partisans prefer dead-on-arrival bills
more than weak partisans.9
Lean Partisan is coded as 1 if the respondent reported they lean Democrat/Republican.
Partisan and Strong Partisan are dummy variables based on whether an individual identi-
fied as a Democrat/Republican or a strong Democrat/Republican. The baseline category
9This follows from Gilmour’s (1995) notion that intended failures are targeted at “enthusiastic con-
stituents.” In contemporary American politics, a common claim is that primary voters, who are assumed
to identify as partisans or strong partisans, incentivize lawmakers to focus on DOA bills.
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is all respondents who do not identify with the proposing party.10 Since partisans tend
to be more likely to credit their own party, I expect a positive coefficient for each of the
partisan variables.
To assess the first reward hypothesis, I interact the Dead On Arrival and partisan
covariates. These interactions can be interpreted as the likelihood a respondent says the
majority party is doing more solve border issues, conditional on the respondent receiving
the dead-on-arrival treatment. I expect each interaction to have a positive coefficient.
This would indicate partisans who received the DOA treatment are more likely to reward
the majority party on border issues than partisans who received a non-DOA treatment.
I include four control variables. I specify a Latino dummy variable coded as 1 if the
respondent self-identified as Latino. I control for an individual’s Attention to Politics, Po-
litical Efficacy, and Education. Each of these covariates is correlated with a respondent’s
engagement with the border issue policy area or politics more generally. As a result, an
individual may be more or less willing to reward a majority party for its proposal based
on their familiarity with the policy area or comfort with political issues. I report all six
models in Table 5.2:
10These covariates are created based on the standard 7-point partisanship scale used in the ANES.
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Table 5.2: Probability Proposing Party is Credited for Advancing DOA Bill by Co-Partisan
Respondents
Republican Proposing Party Democratic Proposing Party
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sign Control Compromise Unknown Control Compromise Unknown
Dead On Arrival 0.523 -0.079 0.040 1.237∗∗ 0.736∗ 0.840∗
(0.381) (0.338) (0.347) (0.525) (0.432) (0.446)
Lean Partisan + 2.560∗∗∗ 1.802∗∗∗ 2.440∗∗∗ 2.308∗∗∗ 2.041∗∗∗ 2.533∗∗∗
(0.491) (0.608) (0.414) (0.620) (0.582) (0.593)
Partisan + 1.798∗∗∗ 2.700∗∗∗ 1.695∗∗∗ 2.391∗∗∗ 2.517∗∗∗ 3.372∗∗∗
(0.452) (0.465) (0.482) (0.566) (0.481) (0.494)
Strong Partisan + 0.981∗ 0.332 1.748∗∗∗ 0.280 0.885∗∗ -0.096
(0.588) (0.545) (0.654) (0.438) (0.449) (0.437)
Dead On Arrival x + -0.796 -0.018 -0.680 -0.332 -0.083 -0.538
Lean Partisan (0.653) (0.740) (0.597) (0.789) (0.756) (0.768)
Dead On Arrival x + 0.302 -0.570 0.414 -0.327 -0.438 -1.335∗∗
Partisan (0.624) (0.627) (0.646) (0.704) (0.633) (0.644)
Dead On Arrival x + -0.282 0.394 -1.080 0.579 -0.061 1.030∗
Strong Partisan (0.778) (0.745) (0.836) (0.624) (0.624) (0.613)
Latino -0.673 -0.1392 -0.522 0.004 -0.022 0.118
(0.464) (0.400) (0.402) (0.335) (0.321) (0.311)
Attention -0.158 0.184 0.018 0.045 0.102 0.030
to Politics (0.165) (0.157) (0.158) (0.163) (0.153) (0.150)
Political 0.407∗∗ -0.001 0.260 0.069 0.076 -0.027
Efficacy (0.176) (0.166) (0.175) (0.170) (0.162) (0.163)
Education -0.126 -0.094 -0.092 -0.076 -0.090 0.004
(0.090) (0.086) (0.086) (0.089) (0.090) (0.088)
Constant -2.980∗∗∗ -2.212∗∗∗ -2.692∗∗∗ -3.369∗∗∗ -3.033∗∗∗ -2.875∗∗∗
(0.666) (0.579) (0.625) (0.701) (0.640) (0.636)
Log-Likelihood -223.714 -238.902 -237.243 -228.660 -234.444 -236.868
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 525 524 524 519 520 524
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic regression. DV = 1 if respondent said proposing party
is doing more to solve for border issues and 0 otherwise. The data includes all respondents who
received each treatment.
The results from Table 5.2 provide little support for the reward hypothesis. Only one
interaction term, in Model 6, returns a positive, significant coefficient. Moreover, the signs
across models are inconsistent. For instance, for strong partisans, half of the interaction
coefficients are negative and half positive. More generally, after learning about a dead-
on-arrival bill, partisans do not credit their majority party co-partisans for proposing the
intended failure relative to any of the counterfactual scenarios. These results contrast with
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the conventional wisdom surrounding intended failures. Political commentators regularly
argue dead-on-arrival bills are used to satisfy the party base. In this view, partisan voters
prefer intended failures compared to compromising with the opposition party. Yet, I find
partisans, even strong ones, do not reward this legislative behavior.
As expected, the leaning partisan and partisan covariates are positive in all six models.
The strong partisan covariate is positive in five of the six models. In Models 4 through 6,
the Democratic proposing models, the Dead On Arrival covariate is positive and signifi-
cant. In other words, non-Democrats are more likely to support Democratic lawmakers for
proposing an intended failure. This political benefit is not reciprocated. Non-Republicans
do not credit a Republican majority for advancing a DOA bill. To understand the sub-
stantive effects from these models, I plot the marginal effect observing a DOA bill relative
to a counterfactual has on a co-partisan respondent’s willingness to reward the majority
party. In Figure 5.2, I plot the results from Models 1 through 3, in which Republicans
propose the bill:
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Figure 5.2: Change in the Probability Republican Respondents Rewards Its Party for
Proposing DOA Bill Compared to Other Bill
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Note: Marginal effect of Republican partisans rewarding Republican lawmakers for
proposing a dead-on-arrival bill based on Models 1 through 3 in Table 5.2. Latino and
all other partisan variables are held at 0. All other covariates are held at their means.
The marginal effects in Figure 5.2 highlight that Republicans did not gain additional
support from its co-partisan voters after proposing a dead-on-arrival bill. Regardless of the
counterfactual specified, an intended failure never moves Republican respondents to view
their party more favorably after learning about an intended failure. The marginal effect
of a DOA proposal on Democratic respondents support for their co-partisan lawmakers is
similar and presented in Figure 5.3:
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Figure 5.3: Change in the Probability Democratic Respondents Rewards Its Party for
Proposing DOA Bill Compared to Other Bill
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Note: Marginal effect of Democratic partisans rewarding Democratic lawmakers for
proposing a dead-on-arrival bill based on Models 4 through 6 in Table 5.2. Latino and
all other partisan variables are held at 0. All other covariates are held at their means.
Democratic respondents who learn their co-partisans proposed a dead-on-arrival bill
tend to support those lawmakers more often than other Democratic respondents. In seven
of the nine models, Democrats who received the DOA treatment, on average, credit their
party’s lawmakers more than those who received a different treatment. Moreover, the
magnitude of these effects are larger than the Republican ones presented in Figure 5.2. In
other words, Democrats were more willing than Republicans to reward their lawmakers
for offering a DOA bill. Like the blame game results, these findings provide inconsistent
support for the first reward hypothesis. Again, Democrats seemed to benefit more from
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this strategy than Republicans.
In Table 5.3, I examine the second reward hypothesis, that the public, not just parti-
sans, credit the majority party for advancing an intended failure. The dependent variable
is coded as 1 if the individual credits the proposing party for solving the U.S.’s border
issues and 0 otherwise. The independent variable is if the individual received the DOA
treatment. This analysis includes all respondents:
Table 5.3: Probability Citizens Credit Majority Party for Proposing Dead-On-Arrival Bill
Republican Proposing Party Democratic Proposing Party
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sign Control Compromise Unknown Control Compromise Unknown
Dead On Arrival + 0.445∗∗ -0.083 -0.008 0.876∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗ 0.247
(0.206) (0.192) (0.194) (0.208) (0.193) (0.188)
Constant -1.372∗∗∗ -0.844∗∗∗ -0.919∗∗∗ -1.523∗∗∗ -1.048∗∗∗ -0.895∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.136) (0.138) (0.163) (0.142) (0.136)
N 525 524 524 519 520 524
Log-Likelihood -289.241 -316.360 -312.836 -289.307 -316.319 -326.336
Pr > χ2 0.030 0.665 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.188
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic regression. DV = 1 if respondent said proposing party
is doing more to solve border issues and 0 otherwise. The data includes all respondents who received
each treatment.
The results in Table 5.3 provide limited support for the second reward hypothesis. Both
Democrats and Republicans in Congress gain support for a dead-on-arrival bill compared
to doing nothing on the topic. However, Republicans do not receive credit for an intended
failure relative to when a enactable bill is proposed.11 This suggests a majority party gains
the most credit for an intended failure when no other legislative alternative is available.
The results in Model 5 provide the only evidence that lawmakers gain some credit
for a DOA proposal when an alternative exists. Respondents rewarded majority party
Democrats for an intended failure compared to a compromise proposal. Yet this credit
for Democrats is inconsistent. Respondents did not reward Democrats more for a DOA
bill when legislation whose fate is unknown was proposed. More generally, there is evi-
11These results are robust when I control for partisan voters.
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dence for the two reward hypotheses in very limited circumstances. Majority parties can
gain some support for a dead-on-arrival bill if no other enactable alternative is available.
However, relative to when the majority offers other legislation, intended failures rarely
gain lawmakers additional support.
5.3.3 Testing the Rallying the Base Hypothesis
I test the rallying the base hypotheses by asking respondents “Do you intend to vote
in the upcoming Congressional elections?” This hypothesis contends dead-on-arrival bills
invigorate the majority party’s base, and leads to partisan voters choosing to turnout at
higher rates. I examine if observing the DOA treatment makes self-identified majority
party partisans more likely to vote.
The dependent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent planned to vote in the upcoming
election.12 I specify the same independent variables as the models in Table 5.2. The main
independent covariates are a dummy variable for whether the respondent received the
Dead On Arrival treatment and three measures of partisanship, Lean Partisan, Partisan,
and Strong Partisan. I interact the Dead On Arrival variable with each of the partisanship
covariates. These terms can be interpreted as the likelihood a partisan plans to vote
conditional on receiving the dead-on-arrival treatment proposed by his/her legislative
co-partisans. I expect a positive coefficient on each interaction term.
I include three additional control variables. I control for the respondent’s level of
Education, Attention to Politics, and Political Efficacy.13 As these covariates are positively
correlated with an individual’s decision to turnout (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972), I expect
these variables to have positive coefficients. I report six logistic regression models in Table
12Eighty-four percent of respondents reported an intention to vote. This reflects a common problem
that individuals tend to overreport their intention to vote (e.g., Silver, Anderson and Abramson 1986).
This makes it less likely I will find support for this hypothesis, as most respondents claim they will vote
anyway.
13See the Appendix for exact question wordings and response options. Education is measured using a
7-point scale that ranges from ‘did not graduate from high school’ to ‘postgraduate degree’. Attention to
Politics and Political Efficacy are measured on 5-point scales.
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5.4. In Models 1 through 3, I assess the effect Republican-proposed dead-on-arrival bills
have on Republican partisans. Models 4 through 6 examine how Democratic partisans
respond to a Democratic-proposed intended failure.14
Table 5.4: Probability Partisans Choose to Vote After Learning About Dead-On-Arrival Bill
Republican Proposing Party Democratic Proposing Party
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sign Control Compromise Unknown Control Compromise Unknown
Dead On Arrival -0.367 -0.294 -0.557∗ 0.372 -0.255 0.657∗∗
(0.291) (0.289) (0.300) (0.349) (0.380) (0.328)
Lean Partisan 1.161 0.206 0.622 1.073 -0.128 0.128
(0.821) (0.878) (0.667) (0.694) (0.836) (0.604)
Partisan 0.754 0.944 1.685 0.743 -0.212 0.758
(0.546) (0.687) (1.062) (0.554) (0.540) (0.517)
Strong Partisan -0.092 0.006 1.513 0.317 1.249 0.135
(1.163) (0.992) (1.136) (0.768) (0.877) (0.682)
Dead On Arrival x + -0.536 0.448 0.028 -1.368 -0.119 -0.306
Lean Partisan (0.996) (1.046) (0.874) (0.985) (1.086) (0.921)
Dead On Arrival x + -0.447 -0.625 -1.357 -0.017 1.028 0.037
Partisan (0.739) (0.845) (1.171) (0.831) (0.822) (0.800)
Dead On Arrival x + 1.607 1.407 — -0.981 -1.853 -0.636
Strong Partisan (1.621) (1.494) (1.070) (1.156) (1.003)
Latino -0.389 -0.119 -0.199 -0.607∗ -0.589 -0.485
(0.329) (0.341) (0.342) (0.364) (0.382) (0.352)
Attention + 0.515∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
to Politics (0.160) (0.162) (0.170) (0.177) (0.192) (0.161)
Political + 0.510∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗
Efficacy (0.150) (0.158) (0.161) (0.165) (0.180) (0.159)
Education + 0.054 0.181∗ 0.176∗ 0.118 0.421∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.094) (0.102) (0.103) (0.1169) (0.1024)
Constant -2.057∗∗∗ -2.768∗∗∗ -2.316∗∗∗ -2.535∗∗∗ -2.666∗∗∗ -3.198∗∗∗
(0.562) (0.560) (0.603) (0.585) (0.655) (0.579)
Log-Likelihood -204.599 -202.281 -187.773 -175.952 -156.386 -194.640
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 525 524 498 519 520 524
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic regression. DV = 1 if respondent intends to vote in
upcoming congressional elections and 0 otherwise. The data includes all respondents who received
each treatment.
The results from Table 5.4 do not support the Rallying the Base hypothesis. None of
the models indicate partisans of any sort are more likely to vote based on observing a dead-
on-arrival bill relative to any of the counterfactuals. These findings suggest lawmakers’
14All findings are robust to models that exclude the control variables.
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unwillingness to compromise on an issue does not invigorate the party’s base to turnout.
As expected, a respondent’s education, attention to politics, and political efficacy are
associated with a propensity to vote. This indicates factors traditionally associated with
the decision to participate in politics, not dead-on-arrival bills, better predict whether an
individual intends to cast a ballot.
5.3.4 Testing the Campaign Issue Hypothesis
To test the campaign issue hypothesis I asked the respondents who planned to vote the
open-ended question “What issues are going to influence your vote choice in the upcoming
elections for congress?” An individual had unlimited space to explain the factors that were
going to influence his or her voting decision.15 This hypothesis suggests that individuals
who receive the dead-on-arrival bill treatment are more likely to report border issues or
immigration as a campaign issue relative to the counterfactuals.
One concern in this survey design is respondents are primed to mention border issues
or immigration. Individuals who receive the DOA, compromise or unknown treatments
all hear about this issue area just before answering the survey question. An easy way to
test if priming affects whether individuals mention border issues is to compare the dead-
on-arrival treatment to the control counterfactual. If no effect is found when comparing
these conditions, dead-on-arrival bills, even for respondents who are primed to think about
immigration/border topics, did not create a campaign issue for respondents. However, if
intended failures lead to more individuals mentioning immigration/border issues compared
to the control condition, priming may obfuscate any potential effect from the other models.
For this analysis, I subset the data on the 1527 respondents who reported an intention
to vote, as only these individuals were given the relevant survey question. The dependent
variable is coded as 1 if the individual mentioned immigration or border issues in their
15Among the 1527 respondents who reported they intend to vote, 20 responses are categorized as non-
responses. In these cases, individuals left the text block blank or wrote gibberish. These individuals are
omitted from the analysis.
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open-response answer. 399 respondents discussed these issue areas and 1128 did not. The
main independent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent received the Dead On Arrival
treatment and 0 otherwise. I include a dummy variable for whether the respondent is
a co-partisan with the proposing party. In each model, I interact these terms. The
interaction tests the first campaign issue hypothesis, that partisan voters are more likely
to mention border problems as a campaign issue after learning about an intended failure.
The unconditional Dead On Arrival covariate tests the second campaign issue hypothesis,
that voters more generally view border problems as a campaign issue after seeing a DOA
bill fail.
I specify twelve logistic regression models. Six of the twelve specifications are logistic
regression models that only include the interaction and its constituent terms. The other
six include two control variables. First, I control for respondents who self-report as Latino.
Since immigration is a particularly salient issue in the Latino community, Latino individ-
uals may be more likely to cite these policy issues as a determinant of their vote choice.
I expect this covariate to have a positive coefficient. Second, I control for an individual’s
Attention to Immigration Issues. This covariate is a 4-point scale in which higher values
indicate more attentiveness. I expect this variable to have a positive coefficient. I report
all twelve models in Table 5.5:
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Table 5.5: Probability Voters Mention Immigration/Border Issues as Campaign Issue
Republican Proposed Bill
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sign Control Control Compromise Compromise Unknown Unknown
Dead On Arrival + -0.129 -0.201 -0.318 -0.332 -0.431 -0.538∗
(0.324) (0.330) (0.317) (0.319) (0.314) (0.324)
Proposer Co-Partisan 0.832∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 0.164 0.162 0.339 0.354
(0.320) (0.328) (0.336) (0.3410) (0.305) (0.316)
Dead On Arrival x + 0.171 0.235 0.840∗ 0.850∗ 0.665 0.825∗
Proposer Co-Partisan (0.457) (0.466) (0.468) (0.473) (0.446) (0.462)
Latino + 0.744∗∗ 0.179 1.143∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.380) (0.333)
Attention to + 0.516∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
Immigration Issues (0.152) (0.1503) (0.150)
Constant -1.451∗∗∗ -2.484∗∗∗ -1.262∗∗∗ -2.017∗∗∗ -1.149∗∗∗ -2.293∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.372) (0.207) (0.359) (0.203) (0.354)
N 429 429 424 424 436 436
Log-Likelihood -240.966 -225.322 -233.831 -226.758 -249.385 -233.336
Pr > χ2 0.978 0.000 0.650 0.006 0.671 0.000
Democratic Proposed Bill
Expected Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Sign Control Control Compromise Compromise Unknown Unknown
Dead On Arrival + -0.054 -0.090 -0.175 -0.241 -0.147 -0.126
(0.289) (0.299) (0.269) (0.287) (0.281) (0.294)
Proposer Co-Partisan -0.890∗∗∗ -0.923∗∗∗ -0.893∗∗∗ -1.071∗∗∗ -0.853∗∗∗ -0.875∗∗
(0.324) (0.335) (0.314) (0.339) (0.324) (0.342)
Dead On Arrival x + 0.201 0.074 0.204 0.113 0.163 0.035
Proposer Co-Partisan (0.450) (0.465) (0.443) (0.471) (0.451) (0.470)
Latino + 0.882∗∗∗ 1.375∗∗∗ 0.588∗
(0.330) (0.328) (0.321)
Attention to + 0.643∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗
Immigration Issues (0.154) (0.154) (0.151)
Constant -0.678∗∗∗ -1.939∗∗∗ -0.557∗∗∗ -2.249∗∗∗ -0.585∗∗∗ -2.095∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.368) (0.183) (0.357) (0.200) (0.368)
N 442 442 454 454 433 433
Log-Likelihood -240.966 -232.179 -260.191 -234.711 -246.455 -230.366
Pr > χ2 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.000
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic regression. DV = 1 if respondent mentions border
issues or immigration as affecting their vote choice in the upcoming election. The data includes all
respondents who said they intended to vote in the upcoming congressional elections.
My findings lend very limited support the campaign issue hypotheses. In Models 1
through 6, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive. This suggests Republican
respondents were more likely to mention border issues as a campaign issue after learning
about a DOA bill relative to the counterfactual. However, only in Models 3, 4, and 6, do
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these coefficients approach conventional levels of statistical significance. The Republican
proposer models do not support the second campaign issue hypothesis. The negative
coefficient on the Dead On Arrival covariate indicates non-Republican voters who received
the DOA treatment were not more likely to mention border problems as a campaign issue.
The results from the models in which Democrats propose a DOA bill mirror the Re-
publican specifications. The interaction terms in Models 7 through 12 are positive but not
significant. The Dead On Arrival coefficients are negative. Notably, the results in which
respondents received the control condition do not differ from the other counterfactuals.
This is surprising as all respondents except those who received the control condition were
primed to think about border issues. Taken together, these results offer little support
for the campaign issue hypotheses. There is weak evidence partisan voters may be more
likely to mention border issues as a campaign issue after observing a DOA bill. However,
voters are not affected in the same manner.
As expected, Latinos and those who pay more attention to immigration issues are more
likely to report immigration and border issues as important to their vote choice. However,
the proposer co-partisan covariate results vary by party. Compared to non-Republicans,
Republican voters are more likely to mention immigration or border issues as a campaign
issue when Republican lawmakers propose a bill on the topic. In contrast, Democratic
voters are less likely to cite immigration or border issues as a reason to vote after observing
Democratic lawmakers forward a bill on the issue.
5.4 Conclusion
Political scientists, journalists, and politicians claim dead-on-arrival bills are targeted
at voters. Even lawmakers suggest as much. Before sending President Obama a dead-on-
arrival bill to veto, Senator Mike Enzi noted that “[w]hen the president vetoes something
[a dead-on-arrival bill], the whole world knows about it” (Devaney 2015). This argument
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is not surprising. For a majority party, the best intended failure is one that galvanizes
interest groups and the public. Popular DOA legislation can increase its political effects
when organized interests and candidates use that legislation to electioneer. Although the
conventional wisdom suggests dead-on-arrival bills are targeted at voters, scholars disagree
about the mechanism through which these proposals affect the public. In this study, I
consider the four main ways that political scientists argue DOA bills can affect voters.
My results indicate that many of these mechanisms require more careful consideration to
determine if and when DOA bills actually matter to the public.
In particular, this study reveals that political conditions not accounted for in my
experiment likely dictate when dead-on-arrival bills matter to citizens. For instance,
there is evidence respondents blamed Republicans for blocking an intended failure and
reward Democrats for proposing the DOA legislation. However, this political support
was not reciprocated to Republican legislators when they offered a dead-on-arrival bill.
These inconsistent findings across partisan treatments suggests political factors besides
the DOA proposal itself determine how voters view this legislation.
This study produces a number of null findings worth considering. In particular, this ex-
periment does not support the campaign issue hypothesis. Even after priming respondents
to think about border issues, this topic was not mentioned more often when comparing
individuals from the dead-on-arrival treatment and control groups. This inconclusive re-
sult suggests those who theorize DOA bills lead to voters using the issue in their voting
calculus need to clarify the circumstances in which this should occur.
Finally, it is important to note the limitations of this research design. The one shot
nature of my experiment casts additional doubt on the political effects of dead-on-arrival
on the public. Experiments of this sort tend to overemphasize an effect that cannot be
replicated in real world situations (Barabas and Jerrit 2010) and stacks the deck towards
finding a direct effect between DOA legislation and voters’ reactions. The inconsistent,
and mostly null, effects raise questions about if and when the public actually pay attention
147
to intended legislative failures.
Alternatively, the experiment may not capture the manner in which DOA bills matter
to voters. Rather than generating a political outcome based on one case of legislative
failure, DOA bills may have a cumulative effect over time. This research design cannot
capture this build-up in good or bad will towards a majority party and may be one reason
I find asymmetric results between Republican and Democratic majority parties. My
experiment may partially capture voters’ cumulative view that Republicans have become
more obstructionist in recent years relative to Democrats. This study cannot speak to
how repeatedly using DOA legislation affects the public (Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk
2007).
A second limitation concerns the experiment’s topic. While border issues and immigra-
tion is certainly a salient topic in contemporary American politics, it is possible this issue
is not well-suited for dead-on-arrival bills. Other topics, including healthcare, unions, and
abortion, are often used as intended failures. Designing additional studies around these
policy areas may yield additional insights on how DOA legislation affects the public.
More generally, political scientists should offer more careful consideration of when and
why citizens should care about dead-on-arrival bills. Majority parties have incentives
to offer popular intended failures, but in many cases these bills are on obscure topics.
Additionally, as Chapter 4 showed, these bills have a direct effect on interest group elec-
tioneering activities. Perhaps the main way DOA proposals affect the public is based on
how organized interests use this legislation during election season. For example, campaign
advertisements are important tools used to disseminate information and increase turnout
(see Goldstein and Ridout 2004 for a review). In this way, dead-on-arrival bills can have
important electoral consequences, but these effects may be mediated by organized inter-
ests’ political activities.
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5.5 Appendix
5.5.1 Blame Game Hypothesis Alternative Mechanisms
Another possible mechanism in which a dead-on-arrival bill generates blame is by hav-
ing moderates blame the obstructionist policymakers more generally. This follows Grose-
close and McCarty’s (2001) finding that major presidential vetoes lead to a decrease in
presidential approval. This hypothesis is written as:
Blame Game Hypothesis 2: Upon observing dead-on-arrival legislation fail, moderate vot-
ers’ support of the obstructing party decreases.
I test this blame game hypothesis by examining responses to the question “Do you
approve or disapprove of the job [Democrats OR Republicans] in Congress are doing?”16
I assess if self-identified moderate respondents’ approval changes towards the obstructing
party. For instance, if Democrats propose the intended failure, I examine whether Re-
publicans in Congress’s approval decreases among political moderates. The dependent
variable is coded as 1 if respondents answered ‘Approve’ and 0 if they reported ‘Dis-
approve’ or ‘Don’t Know’ when they assessed the obstructing party. I coded the main
independent variable, Dead On Arrival, as 1 if the respondent received the DOA bill treat-
ment and 0 otherwise. I expect this covariate to be negative, indicating the obstructing
party’s approval decreases after moderates read the intended failure article.
I control for two additional covariates. First, I control for whether a respondent self-
reported as Latino. As Latinos tend to pay attention to immigration issues, their attitudes
towards each party may decline when they observe lawmakers block immigration bills. I
expect this variable to have a negative coefficient. Second, I control for whether a self-
16Respondents were asked whether they approved of Democrats in Congress as well as whether they
approved of Republicans in Congress. I randomized the question ordering to avoid individuals being
primed to always think of one party first.
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identified moderate reported their party was the same as the proposing party. These
individuals, while ideologically moderate, still identify with the proposing party, and as
a result are more likely to blame the obstructing party. I expect this variable, Proposer
Co-Partisan, to have a negative coefficient. I report twelve models in Table 5.6. Models
1 through 6 are bivariate logit models. Models 7 through 12 include the Latino and
Proposer Co-Partisan covariates:
Table 5.6: Probability Obstructing Party’s Approval Decreases Among Moderates After Block-
ing DOA Bill
Republicans Obstructing Party Democrats Obstructing Party
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sign Control Compromise Unknown Control Compromise Unknown
Dead On Arrival - -0.531 -0.472 -0.682 -0.264 -0.424 -0.230
(0.442) (0.468) (0.450) (0.337) (0.334) (0.350)
Constant -1.771∗∗∗ -1.819∗∗∗ -1.609∗∗∗ -0.981∗∗∗ -0.821∗∗∗ -1.015∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.311) (0.283) (0.214) (0.209) (0.233)
N 208 184 188 195 193 179
Pr > χ2 0.232 0.310 0.124 0.431 0.200 0.510
Log-Likelihood -75.685 -64.817 -70.614 -109.619 -111.638 -99.608
Republicans Obstructing Party Democrats Obstructing Party
Expected Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Sign Control Compromise Unknown Control Compromise Unknown
Dead On Arrival - -0.488 -0.487 -0.667 -0.267 -0.302 -0.236
(0.457) (0.475) (0.457) (0.366) (0.355) (0.371)
Latino - -0.613 -0.621 -0.301 0.239 0.189 -0.144
(0.783) (0.780) (0.666) (0.457) (0.434) (0.473)
Proposer - -1.657∗∗∗ -0.979∗∗ -1.089∗∗ — -3.278∗∗∗ -2.657∗∗∗
Co-Partisan (0.524) (0.493) (0.334) (1.027) (0.747)
Constant -1.093∗∗∗ -1.284∗∗∗ -1.108∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗ -0.497∗∗ -0.519
(0.312) (0.372) (0.291) (0.334) (0.237) (0.267)
N 208 184 188 136 193 179
Pr > χ2 0.002 0.097 0.000 0.690 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood -68.918 -62.172 -67.476 -88.517 -97.200 -87.335
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic regression. DV = 1 if respondent approves of ob-
structing party and 0 otherwise. The data is subset on respondents who self-reported as political
moderates.
The results in Table 5.6 provide, at best, weak evidence for the second blame game
hypothesis. In all twelve models, the Dead On Arrival coefficient is negative but not
statistically significant. Proposer Co-Partisan is the stronger predictor of whether an
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individual is less likely to approve of the other party. These inconsistent results highlight
that playing the blame game is not a sure thing. While moderates sometimes blamed
Republicans for blocking a dead-on-arrival bill, this effect was not reciprocated towards
obstructionist Democrats. This suggests proposing an intended failure does not necessarily
change moderates’ evaluations of legislators who block the proposal. Rather, other context
specific factors likely cause this asymmetric willingness to blame Republicans and not
Democrats.17
A more general interpretation of the blame game hypothesis is the public, not just
moderates, blame the obstructing party for a DOA bill. To test this hypothesis, I specify
six models. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent said he/she blamed
the blocking party for border issues and 0 otherwise. The main independent is a Dead
On Arrival dummy variable. A positive coefficient would indicate that relative to the
counterfactual, individuals who received the DOA treatment are more likely to blame the
obstructing party.
I control for whether the respondent is Latino, if he/she reports being the same member
as the proposing party (denoted Proposer Co-Partisan), and the individuals Education,
Political Efficacy and Attention to Politics. I expect the Proposer Co-Partisan to have a
positive coefficient as proposing party partisans are more likely to blame the opposition
for blocking a bill. I report six models. Models 1 through 3 examine when Democrats
propose a DOA bill in order to generate blame towards Republicans. Models 4 through 6
examine Republican proposed bills used to create blame towards Democrats.
17One possibility is lower information moderates are more likely to blame obstructionists than higher
information ones who consistently pay attention to politics. However, the findings in Table 5.6 are robust
even when the respondent’s self-reported attention to politics or immigration policy is controlled for.
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Table 5.7: Probability the Public Blames Obstructing Party for Border Issues, By Party
Republican Blame Democratic Blame
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sign Control Compromise Unknown Control Compromise Unknown
Dead On Arrival + 0.774∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.375 0.170 0.232 0.157
(0.253) (0.250) (0.243) (0.234) (0.244) (0.241)
Latino 0.370 0.240 0.424 -0.912∗ -0.846 -0.724
(0.347) (0.331) (0.317) (0.510) (0.533) (0.462)
Proposer Co-Partisan + 2.583∗∗∗ 2.494∗∗∗ 2.623∗∗∗ 2.125∗∗∗ 2.310∗∗∗ 2.514∗∗∗
(0.324) (0.305) (0.302) (0.240) (0.251) (0.253)
Education -0.008 -0.124 -0.062 -0.117 -0.137 -0.058
(0.095) (0.097) (0.093) (0.088) (0.090) (0.088)
Political 0.743∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
Efficacy (0.210) (0.191) (0.193) (0.179) (0.188) (0.191)
Attention to -0.058 -0.081 0.004 0.119 0.267 0.082
Politics (0.176) (0.163) (0.159) (0.164) (0.166) (0.165)
Constant -6.237∗∗∗ -5.008∗∗∗ -5.361∗∗∗ -3.941∗∗∗ -4.419∗∗∗ -4.385∗∗∗
(0.793) (0.714) (0.733) (0.654) (0.692) (0.700)
N 519 520 524 525 524 524
Log-Likelihood -200.536 -204.791 -210.966 -229.232 -214.351 -217.784
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.697 0.000
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic regression. DV = 1 if respondent said obstructing
party is more to blame for border issues and 0 otherwise. The data includes all respondents.
The results in Table 5.7 are similar to those in Table 5.6. Republicans are more likely
to be blamed for border issues when they block a DOA bill compared to when no bill
is proposed and Republicans agree to a compromise. However, Democrats are not more
likely to be blamed relative to any counterfactual scenario. As expected, proposing party
partisans are more likely to blame the opposing party, regardless of the legislative action
on the topic.
5.5.2 Reward Hypothesis Alternative Mechanisms
A second way a dead-on-arrival bill can generate support for lawmakers is by citizens
approving of the majority party more generally. Rather than being rewarded on a partic-
ular policy area, intended failures increase the majority party’s approval. This possibility
is the inverse of the blame game hypothesis. If DOA bills decrease the obstructing actor’s
approval, it is possible the same legislation increases the proposing politician’s approval.
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To test this idea, I specify the following hypotheses:
Reward Hypothesis 3: Dead-on-arrival legislation increases co-partisans’ approval of ma-
jority party lawmakers.
Reward Hypothesis 4: Dead-on-arrival legislation increases citizens’ approval of majority
party lawmakers.
Reward Hypotheses 3 and 4 offer a second way majority party legislators can benefit
from DOA bills. Rather than specifically being credited for their action on the intended
failure’s topic, dead-on-arrival legislation may increase the party’s approval. To test this
possibility, I asked respondents “Do you approve or disapprove of the job [Republicans
OR Democrats] in Congress are doing?”
In Table 5.8, I assess Reward Hypothesis 3, which predicts co-partisan respondents’
approval of the majority party increases after observing a DOA bill. The dependent
variable is coded as 1 if a respondent said they approve of the majority party and 0
otherwise. I estimate the same models reported in Table 5.2. Again, the covariates of
interest are the interaction terms between the Dead On Arrival variable and the partisan
variables. Positive coefficients on these terms indicate that conditional on receiving the
DOA treatment, majority party partisans are more likely to approve of their co-partisans
in Congress. Models 1 through 3 include the Republican proposer treatments. Models 4
through 6, the Democratic ones.
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Table 5.8: Probability Partisans Approve of Co-Partisan Lawmakers for Proposing Dead-On-
Arrival Bill
Republican Proposing Party Democratic Proposing Party
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sign Control Compromise Unknown Control Compromise Unknown
Dead On Arrival 0.428 -0.155 0.549 0.395 -0.874 0.296
(0.403) (0.362) (0.423) (0.743) (0.549) (0.685)
Lean Partisan + 2.000∗∗∗ 1.909∗∗∗ 2.129∗∗∗ 4.3683∗∗∗ 2.028∗∗∗ 2.807∗∗∗
(0.509) (0.628) (0.475) (0.709) (0.5459) (0.743)
Partisan + 2.375∗∗∗ 1.852∗∗∗ 1.867∗∗∗ 3.406∗∗∗ 2.509∗∗∗ 3.979∗∗∗
(0.458) (0.469) (0.563) (0.666) (0.459) (0.621)
Strong Partisan + 0.050 0.609 2.212∗∗∗ 0.768∗ 0.956∗∗ 0.383
(0.576) (0.517) (0.684) (0.425) (0.471) (0.455)
Dead On Arrival x + -0.642 -0.513 -0.811 -2.080∗∗ 0.247 -0.533
Lean Partisan (0.691) (0.780) (0.670) (0.961) (0.846) (0.986)
Dead On Arrival x + -0.338 0.227 0.133 -0.632 0.274 -1.061
Partisan (0.636) (0.645) (0.720) (0.878) (0.729) (0.837)
Dead On Arrival x + 0.845 0.227 -1.291 0.867 0.680 1.111∗
Strong Partisan (0.772) (0.733) (0.866) (0.635) (0.661) (0.649)
Latino 0.032 0.182 -0.525 0.504 0.547 0.028
(0.431) (0.411) (0.474) (0.368) (0.345) (0.357)
Attention 0.110 0.157 0.203 0.199 0.247 0.449∗∗
to Politics (0.172) (0.163) (0.178) (0.182) (0.168) (0.176)
Political 0.382∗∗ 0.393∗∗ 0.272 0.197 0.205 0.074
Efficacy (0.186) (0.185) (0.201) (0.195) (0.183) (0.196)
Education -0.209∗∗ -0.026 0.016 0.037 0.0484 0.018
(0.094) (0.089) (0.094) (0.098) (0.010) (0.104)
Constant -3.711∗∗∗ -4.071∗∗∗ -4.534∗∗∗ -5.392∗∗∗ -4.387∗∗∗ -5.593∗∗∗
(0.725) (0.684) (0.767) (0.874) (0.719) (0.867)
Log-Likelihood -211.370 -224.590 -200.728 -187.541 -198.923 -177.305
Pr > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 525 524 524 519 520 524
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic regression. DV = 1 if respondent approve of proposing
party and 0 otherwise. The data includes all respondents who received each treatment.
The results from Table 5.8 do not lend support to the third reward hypothesis. In no
instance did observing a dead-on-arrival bill increase the majority party’s approval among
partisans. Only the strong partisans interaction term in Model 6 returns a positive coef-
ficient approaching statistical significance. As expected, self-reported partisans are more
likely to credit their co-partisans in Congress regardless of the treatment they received.
While partisan respondents’ approval does not increase when a DOA bill is proposed,
it is possible the public more generally responds positively to this behavior. In Table 5.9, I
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test this possibility. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent approved of the
majority party and 0 otherwise.18 The independent variable is coded as 1 if the respondent
received the Dead On Arrival treatment and 0 otherwise. I report six models. Models
1 through 3 assess boosts in approval Republican lawmakers receive from the public for
advancing an intended failure. Models 4 through 6 assess any support a Democratic
majority party receives for DOA legislation.
Table 5.9: Probability Dead-On-Arrival Bill Increases Proposing Party’s Approval
Republican Proposing Party Democratic Proposing Party
Expected Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sign Control Compromise Unknown Control Compromise Unknown
Dead On Arrival + 0.332 -0.019 0.228 -0.085 -0.173 0.000
(0.214) (0.203) (0.211) (0.197) (0.195) (0.197)
Constant -1.471∗∗∗ -1.120∗∗∗ -1.367∗∗∗ -0.924∗∗∗ -0.836∗∗∗ -1.009∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.145) (0.155) (0.138) (0.136) (0.140)
N 525 524 524 519 520 524
Log-Likelihood -272.216 -291.317 -277.673 -305.433 -310.181 -304.145
Pr > χ2 0.120 0.925 0.278 0.667 0.374 1.000
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Coefficients are log-odds from a logistic regression. DV = 1 if respondent approve of proposing
party and 0 otherwise. The data includes all respondents who received each treatment.
The results in Table 5.9 do not support Reward Hypothesis 4. In no specification do
respondents increase their approval towards a majority party that proposes a DOA bill.
Taken together, the results from Tables 5.8 and 5.9 indicate offering an intended failure
does not increase citizens’ or partisans’ approval of the majority party.
5.5.3 Survey Instrument
Pre-treatment:
Instructions
This is an academic survey with the goal of recording your views regarding a current event
and the government’s response to that issue.
18This coding is based on the same approval question used in Table 5.8.
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Please take a moment to read an article about a recent policy topic. After you are done,
please answer some follow-up questions.
Post-treatment:
Who do you blame more for the problems at the U.S.-Mexico border - the Democrats
in Congress or the Republicans in Congress? [Democrats in Congress/Republicans in
Congress/Both Parties Equally/Neither Party/Don’t Know ]
Who is doing more to solve the problems at the U.S.-Mexico border - the Democrats
in Congress or the Republicans in Congress? [Democrats in Congress/Republicans in
Congress/Both Parties Equally/Neither Party/Don’t Know ]
Do you intend to vote in the upcoming congressional elections? [Yes/No]
What issues are going to influence your vote choice in the upcoming elections for congress?
[Open response]
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job? [Approve/Disapprove/Don’t
Know ]
Do you approve or disapprove of the job Republicans in Congress are doing? [Ap-
prove/Disapprove/Don’t Know ]
Do you approve or disapprove of the job Democrats in Congress are doing? [Approve/Disapprove/Don’t
Know ]
Which political party is more effective at solving the problems at the U.S.-Mexico border,
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the Democratic party or the Republican party? [Democratic Party/Republican Party/Parties
are equally capable/Don’t know ]
Which political party is more effective at handling immigration policy, the Democratic or
Republican party? [Democratic Party/Republican Party/Parties are equally capable/Don’t
know ]
How much confidence do you have in the ability of Congress to solve important national
problems? [A great deal of confidence/Some confidence/Hardly any confidence/None at
all ]
Would you like to see your own representative to Congress get reelected in November
2014, or would you like to see someone else win the election in your district? [Reelect
current member of Congress/Would like to see someone else win/Don’t know ]
Would you like to see your own two Senators win reelection in their next elections or
would you like to see someone else win those elections in your state? [Reelect current
Senators/Reelect one but not both/Don’t reelect either Senator/Don’t know ]
Which of your two Senators would like to be reelected in his/her next election? [Open
response]
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and
Independent or what? [Democrat/Republican/Independent/Other ]
[If respond Republican] Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong
Republican? [Strong/Not very strong ]
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[If respond Democrat] Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong
Democrat? [Strong/Not very strong ]
[If respond Other] Do you think of yourself as close to the Republican Party, or to the
Democratic Party? [Closer to the Republican Party/Closer to the Democratic Party/Neither ]
In general, how would you describe your political viewpoint? [Very liberal/Liberal/Moderate/Conservative/Very
conservative/Don’t know ]
How closely have you been following the debate on immigration policy? [Very closely/Fairly
closely/Not too closely/Not at all ]
How often do you pay attention to what’s going on in government and politics? [emphAl-
ways/Most of the time/About half the time/Some of the time/Never]
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I feel that I have
a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country. [Agree
strongly/Agree somewhat/Neither agree or disagree/Disagree somewhat/Disagree strongly ]
In what year were you born? [Open response]
Are you male or female? [Male/Female]
What race or ethnic group best describes you? [White/Black or African-American/Hispanic
or Latino/Asian or Asian-American/Native American/Middle Eastern/Mixed Race/Other
(please specify)]
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What is the highest level of education you have completed? [Did not graduate from high
school/High school graduate/Some college, but no degree (yet)/2-year college degree/4-
year college degree/Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, PhD, JD, etc.)]
Which of the following best describes your current employment status? [Working full time
now/Working part time now/Temporarily laid off/Unemployed/Retired/Permanently dis-
abled/Taking care of home or family/Student/Other (please specify)]
In which state do you live? [Open response]
What is your current zip code? [Open response]
During a typical week, how many days do you follow the national news, excluding sports?
[None/One day/Two days/Three days/Four days/Five days/Six days/Seven days ]
Thank you for taking the survey. Your participation is greatly appreciated.
We previously informed you the purpose of this study is to assess attitudes towards
the government based on your reaction to a current event. The goal of our research is
to examine how citizens credit or blame politicians for their legislative activities. Note
the newspaper article you read may not reflect the exact status of that issue or USA
Today’s reporting on the topic. For more information, see Congress’s official website,
www.congress.gov or the FAA’s website, www.faa.gov. Again, thank you for your partic-
ipation.
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Figure 5.4: Dead-On-Arrival Treatments
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Figure 5.5: Compromise Treatments
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Figure 5.6: Unknown Treatments
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Figure 5.7: Control Treatment
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
During the past fifteen years, many of the most intense partisan fights in the United
States Congress have featured dead-on-arrival bills. The prevalence of intended failures
on the legislative agenda has led many to argue that intended failures are a symptom of
a dysfunctional, irrational Congress. What this argument belies is that DOA bills are
nothing new, they are strategically utilized by lawmakers and interest groups, and that
by studying these proposals, we gain new insight into how majority parties prioritize their
legislative agendas.
This dissertation reframes intended failures in two ways. First, more narrowly, I show
these bills are not just symbolic grandstanding. Instead, they are used by the majority
party to electioneer and by interest groups to improve their future policy prospects. The
idea lawmakers use dead-on-arrival bills for political reasons is not novel (e.g., Gilmour
1995). However, if this legislation is so electorally helpful, why are these proposals not
ubiquitous on Congress’s agenda? This project reveals when majority parties rely on
intended failures. Legislators gain the most political support for DOA bills when it is
uncertain if the majority can win unified government.
Additionally, I clarify who responds to dead-on-arrival bills and why an audience would
benefit from this legislation. My results provide evidence that interest groups, not voters,
provide political support to majority party lawmakers for advancing DOA proposals.
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More importantly, my theory shows why groups reward this behavior. By supporting an
intended failure, groups incentivize the majority party to coalesce around that alternative,
making it more likely that bill is enacted in the future. This argument contrasts with the
conventional wisdom that DOA proposals help an audience learn something new about
legislative preferences or legislators’ commitment to an issue. This conventional argument
frames an intended failure as a position-taking instrument. In contrast, I emphasize how
a dead-on-arrival bill is used as a policymaking instrument.
Second, more broadly, examining intended failures highlights important features about
agenda setting and issue prioritization in Congress. Dead-on-arrival bills are puzzling
because they do not provide lawmakers any policy utility. Understanding why these
proposals gain floor consideration means examining why DOA bills gain preference over
enactable legislation. To that end, I develop a new theory of why any legislation, dead-
on-arrival or otherwise, receives agenda space. To explain intended failures, I consider
lawmakers’ full range of incentives when they determine their agendas. I emphasize how
politics affects legislative attention and the transaction costs associated with lawmaking.
In contrast, theories of lawmaking and agenda setting almost exclusively examine a bill’s
policy utility and the likelihood it will be enacted (Brady and Volden 2006; Krehbiel 1998;
Baron and Ferejohn 1989), the two features absent from DOA legislation.
To develop a theory of agenda-setting that includes dead-on-arrival bills, I examine
how legislation competes for floor consideration. In Chapter 2, I specify an auction model
that considers the role interest groups play in generating DOA bills on the agenda. Groups
strategically reward this legislation when doing so makes it more likely the group can get
its preferred legislation enacted in the future. As a consequence, intended failures arise
on the agenda when the majority needs help winning unified government. The model
produces hypotheses about dead-on-arrival bills’ fates once they become enactable. By
being valuable to groups, and because lawmakers pay the decision-making cost associated
with the proposal, DOA bills are more likely to become law, relative to other legislation,
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once the majority wins unified government.
In Chapter 3, I test the model’s main hypotheses. Using data on all non-trivial bills
introduced in the House or Senate from 2003 through 2012, I find DOA bills are added
to the floor when control for government is competitive and lawmakers have divergent
policy preferences. The strategic timing in which the majority elevates these bills indicates
they are most useful to legislators when their collective electoral prospects are uncertain.
Additionally, my results indicate that interest groups are able to successfully improve the
long term prospects of its DOA proposal. In unified government, former intended failures
are three times more likely to be enacted than new bills and two times more likely to be
enacted than other previously failed bills.
The balance of my dissertation examines the assumptions that underly my and com-
peting theories of DOA bills. In Chapter 4, I assess if interest groups reward legislators
for intended failures. I find that allied interest groups consistently use these proposals
as the basis for their campaign television advertisements and legislative scorecards. The
political support DOA proposals generate outstrip the blame opposing groups create in
response to this legislation. Moreover, the order in which dead-on-arrival legislation gets
sent to the floor is consistent with the basic assumptions of an auction.
Chapter 5 considers the conventional wisdom arguments associated with intended fail-
ures. Using a novel survey experiment, I examine if this legislation creates blame for the
obstructing party, credit for the proposing party, or rallies partisan voters. I find dead-
on-arrival bills, at best, provide an inconsistent political return from voters. This study
shows that these bills do not provide the majority party an automatic political reward
from voters and must be contextualized in the broader political environment.
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6.1 Contributions
My dissertation makes three main contributions. First, by explicitly examining how
bills compete for legislative attention, I show when and why lawmakers prioritize certain
legislation. In particular, I find the majority party strategically adds dead-on-arrival bills
to the legislative agenda. Intended failures are not added to the floor on the majority
party’s whims. Interest groups incentivize this behavior by providing a reliable political
return for DOA legislation. These results make explicit the important roles of electoral
considerations and interest groups in shaping Congress’s legislative agenda.
More concretely, this theoretical framework helps explain why majority parties repeat-
edly bring up intended failures on the same topic in the same legislative term. This
phenomenon has gained widespread attention as Republicans have brought up numerous
bills to repeal the Affordable Care Act.1 As the auction makes clear, groups can offer
political benefits to the majority party to ensure its alternative, and not another option,
remains the party’s working policy position. In the context of the ACA, Republicans
repeatedly brought DOA bills to the floor for a vote because conservative groups consis-
tently rewarded this behavior. From the groups’ perspectives, this ensured Republicans
would not compromise on changing the legislation, but maintain their position of repeal-
ing and replacing the law. Once placed within the model’s general context, this type of
seemingly puzzling legislative behavior can be viewed as purposive.
Second, I show how issue attention affects a proposal’s chances of future enactment.
The most important feature of dead-on-arrival bills is that they serve as the foundation
for the majority’s agenda in unified government. One reason this occurs is the transac-
tion costs majority party lawmakers pay to advance DOA legislation. When the intended
failure is enactable, the party’s decision to pursue the bill is less costly relative to other leg-
1DOA bills are often brought up more than once in the same congress. For instance, during the
110th Congress, Democrats forwarded legislation that required new Department of Defense reporting
requirements and the removal of U.S. troops from Iraq.
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islation. This finding must be highlighted. Most theories of agenda setting and lawmaking
assume moving bills through the legislative process is costless (see Baumgartner and Jones
2005 for an important exception). However, paying the necessary decision-making costs
is a crucial part of lawmaking for legislators and interest groups. Dead-on-arrival bills
are a method by which organized interests reward lawmakers for paying these costs. The
result is an important link between seemingly symbolic behavior and a majority party’s
future policy agenda.
Finally, this dissertation examines the important role interest groups play in developing
a party’s floor agenda. Without belaboring the point, allied organized interests can push
legislators to adopt certain policy alternatives and prioritize some issues but not others.
The literature on interest group influence generally focuses on early stage lobbying or
roll call voting. This study fills an important gap by showing how groups pursue their
preferred legislation throughout the lawmaking process. Additionally, if dead-on-arrival
bills have political effects on voters, this process can be mediated through interest groups.
The public likely learns about most intended failures when organized interests use them
to electioneer.2 In short, groups are crucial in getting dead-on-arrival bills on the agenda
and ensuring voters use them to evaluate candidates.
6.2 Future Research
This project presents three main avenues for future research. First, this study does
not offer a unified theory of issue prioritization or agenda setting. Rather, I use a single
point in the legislative process and dead-on-arrival bills to examine how lawmakers choose
among legislative alternatives. The auction model presented in Chapter 2 offers an oppor-
tunity to further apply these ideas to other aspects of U.S. policymaking. This game can
be adapted to examine issue prioritization and competition at earlier and later lawmaking
2A good example of how this works is seen in how groups feature DOA bills in their television campaign
commercials.
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stages. For instance, committee chairs and a majority party face similar incentives, but
the committee chair faces a more restricted set of relevant interest groups. At the final
voting stage, lawmakers can auction off their votes and groups must decide to whom to
make offers and in what amount. The model’s flexibility, and its emphasis on competition
among alternatives offers new ways to study agenda setting and issue prioritization.
Second, more attention should be paid to how lawmakers respond as competition for
power changes. Individual legislators and parties have incentives to remain in the majority
and achieve unified government. Lee (2009) argues uncertainty over power determines how
much partisan bickering happens in Congress. While offering dead-on-arrival proposals is
one strategy that increases as control for government becomes uncertain, other legislative
behavior likely changes as well. Pursuing this question can shed new light on when and
why partisan contentiousness changes in Congress.
Finally, an outstanding question in this project concerns voters. We should consider the
unintended consequences dead-on-arrival bills may have on the public. While voters may
not ascribe specific credit or blame for DOA proposals, these bills may reinforce a general
distaste for Congress and government. Assessing this link can help connect how parties’
responses to competitive elections affects citizens, even if doing so is not the majority’s
intention. As a final note, dead-on-arrival bills offer a clear way to examine how partisan
bickering affects the public’s evaluation of Congress, the parties, and government. The
intentionality behind the legislation, and how it clearly pits parties against one another
makes it an ideal type of partisan disagreement for this sort of research.
6.3 Implications
From a normative standpoint, this study produces both positive and negative impli-
cations. On the positive side, dead-on-arrival bills are a useful feature of a competitive
representative democracy. These bills create policy distinctions between political parties.
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Intended failures, to the extent they are perceived by voters, help distinguish each party’s
policy program. These bills make stark the choice voters have when casting their ballots.
Moreover, when DOA legislation arises, it is because control for government is compet-
itive. In other words, these bills are the result of a healthy democracy in which parties
compete for control of government.
From a lawmaking perspective, this dissertation presents a bleaker view. The political
allure of dead-on-arrival bills can inhibit important policy change. On a given topic,
powerful interest groups can incentivize lawmakers to avoid compromise and wait to
legislate once in unified government. In recent years, solving numerous important policy
issues have been ignored in favor of intended failures. In particular, immigration reform,
improving the Affordable Care Act, and revising energy policy have all been preempted
by each party pursuing DOA bills on these same topics. It is possible these partisan
bills have deleterious effects on legislative politics beyond producing failed legislation.
Forcing lawmakers to constantly take extreme positions and engage in partisan warfare
may decrease incentives for bold attempts at compromise.
For political scientists, this study offers caution about dismissing legislative behavior
that does not immediately lead to policy change as merely symbolic. As Hall (1996)
argues, “the temptation is to distinguish between two different sorts of activities - those
which are substantive and serious and those that are legislatively superfluous or symbolic,”
which is a “temptation that ought to be strongly resisted” (25). This project serves as
evidence for why this dichotomy between serious and symbolic legislative behavior is a
false one. What appears to be symbolic in one congress may quickly become law in the
next one. Dismissing dead-on-arrival ideas as trivial or mere position-taking belies how
lawmakers and groups continuously work to ensure their policy proposals remain viable
legislative alternatives.
From a more practical standpoint, this project suggests many congressional and elec-
toral reforms aimed at improving policymaking will not reduce the number of DOA bills
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on the agenda. For example, much ink is spilled over the role interest groups play in
creating legislative dysfunction. The common claim is that by further limiting campaign
donations to lawmakers, Congress will become more productive (e.g., Lessig 2011). My
research indicates that such a policy may not be successful. As long as organized interests
can electioneer, through television ads or disseminating other election materials, they will
be important players in shaping the legislative agenda.
Finally, this study helps clarify claims about how to decrease legislative obstruction.
Most work in this area focuses on changing voting procedures through filibuster reform
(Shaheen 2013; Bondurant 2011). However, these ideas do not take into account that
a lot of obstruction is induced by the majority party. To the extent a majority party
has incentives to push extreme legislation that will not pass, changing voting thresholds
merely shifts where the ‘obstruction’ will occur. For instance, the House of Representatives
simply sends DOA bills to the Senate as a way to forward intended failures. Even if the
filibuster were to disappear, Senate majorities will still advance dead-on-arrival proposals
for electoral reasons.
Dead-on-arrival bills are a legislative feature that is unlikely to disappear. While their
prominence on the legislative agenda may change over time, these proposals are not a
symptom of dysfunctional government that must be excised. Instead, they are a fea-
ture of a competitive democracy in which groups compete to gain legislative attention.
Moreover, intended failures provide unique insight into how agenda setting and issue pri-
oritization in the United States Congress works. By viewing these bills as an important
mechanism for policy change, not symbolic political theater, political scientists can bet-
ter understand when and why lawmakers use the floor agenda to electioneer, how bills
compete for attention, and the important role interest groups play in structuring issue
priorities in Congress.
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